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1 SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 
AND THE INTERCEPTION 
OF TELECOMMUNICATION
1.1 National Security Architecture – Two 
Frameworks of  Interception
One of  the most important forming factors of  the distribution of  public 
powers in the Czech Republic is its totalitarian history. There is a strong 
sense of  distrust towards official institutions in the general public.1 
It is probably due to this fact, that the procedures and powers of  pub-
lic bodies and agencies are set very rigidly. The principle of  legality is set 
in Art. 2 para. 3 of  the Czech Constitution (Act No. 1/1993 Sb. Constitution 
of  the Czech Republic), which states that “State authority is to serve all citizens 
and may be asserted only in cases, within the bounds, and in the manner provided for 
by law”2 and in Art. 2 para. 2 of  the Charter of  Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms (the Resolution of  the Presidium of  the Czech National Council 
of  16 December 1992 on the declaration of  the Charter of  Fundamental 
Rights and Freedoms as a part of  the constitutional order of  the Czech 
Republic No. 2/1993 Sb.), which states that “State authority may be asserted only 
in cases and within the bounds provided for by law and only in the manner prescribed 
by law”.3 Since all the public authorities authorized to intercept telecommu-
nication fall within the scope of  these articles, they are permitted to act only 
within the framework of  what is expressly allowed for them by law.
In the Czech Republic, there are two frameworks under which electronic 
communications can be intercepted. The first is the framework of  criminal 
1 See for example Bobek, M., Molek, P., Šimíček, V. Komunistické	 právo	 v	Československu, 
Brno: Masarykova univerzita, 2009, 1005 p.
2 English translation taken from the webpage of  the Czech Constitutional Court. Online: 
http://www.usoud.cz/fileadmin/user_upload/Tiskova_mluvci/Ustava_EN_ve_
zneni_zak_c._98-2013.pdf.
3 English translation taken from the webpage of  the Czech Constitutional Court. Online: 
http://www.usoud.cz/fileadmin/user_upload/ustavni_soud_www/Pravni_uprava/
AJ/Listina_English_version.pdf.
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procedure conducted by the police force, including a special regime of  cus-
toms service, and the second is a framework of  civil and military intelligence 
services.
The Police of  the Czech Republic was established by Act No. 273/2008 Sb. 
on the Police of  the Czech Republic. Among its other duties, it is the main 
public authority for criminal investigation. It is organized on a geographical 
basis, as it is organized into divisions according to the administrative regions. 
There are also several divisions with a countrywide authority.4 Of  those, 
the most relevant Czech Police divisions for this report are the National 
Antidrug Central,5 the Division for Uncovering of  Corruption and Financial 
Criminality,6 the Division for Uncovering of  Organised Crime,7 and the Unit 
for Special Activities of  Criminal Police and Investigation.8
The Czech Police cannot use electronic communication interception 
as a preventive measure, since the law does not expressly allow it. This 
is due to the fact that Czech constitutional law strongly protects the privacy 
of  an individual, and interception of  communication is seen as a serious 
breach of  such protection.9 The law therefore provides quite a rigid formu-
lation of  exceptions from this protection. Czech criminal procedure is gov-
erned by Act No. 141/1961 Sb. Code of  Criminal Procedure. According 
to the Code of  Criminal Procedure communication may be intercepted only 
after the criminal proceedings have started. In the Czech Republic the ini-
tial part of  criminal proceedings is the preliminary hearing and, as is stated 
in Section 158 of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure, it is commenced either 
4 In Czech: http://www.policie.cz/clanek/utvary-s-pusobnosti-na-celem-uzemi-
cr-3125 10.aspx.
5 In Czech: www.policie.cz/narodni-protidrogova-centrala-skpv.aspx.
6 In Czech: http://www.policie.cz/clanek/uokfk-skpv-utvar-odhalovani-korupce-a-fi-
nan c ni-kriminality-skpv.aspx.
7 In Czech: http://www.policie.cz/clanek/vitam-vas-na-strankach-utvaru-pro-odhalo va-
ni- organizovaneho-zlocinu-570688.aspx.
8 In Czech: http://www.policie.cz/clanek/utvar-zvlastnich-cinnosti-sluzby-kriminalni-
policie-a-vysetrovani-716842.aspx.
9 For example, the Czech Constitutional Court formulates the importance of  this 
protection in Decision of  the Constitutional Court file number II. ÚS 502/2000, 
N 11/21 SbNU 83, followed by Decision of  the Constitutional Court file number 
II. ÚS 615/06-1, N 88/45 SbNU 291, in which necessary conditions for allowing the in-
terception of  communication were interpreted.
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when a criminal report is submitted by a citizen, or by the police authority itself  
as an ex	officio act. Once the criminal proceedings have started and the legal 
prerequisites are met, the Police can commence with the interception.
A specific example of  interception in accordance with the Code of  Criminal 
Procedure is a communication interception, which is grounded in Act 
No. 17/2012 Sb. on the customs service of  the Czech Republic. The cus-
toms service can, in certain cases, be considered a police force and can act 
in accordance with the rules of  criminal proceedings for obtaining authori-
sation to conduct interception. Section 63 of  Act No. 17/2012 Sb. specifies 
the cases over which the customs service has jurisdiction. It is interesting 
to point out that this can be understood as a preventive measure. The use 
of  this provision is, however, strictly limited by the purpose of  the intercep-
tion, which is set out in paragraph 1 of  Section 64 that reads as follows:10
“Section 64
(1) Usage of  operative search means must not follow any other purpose than 
the	one,	which	is	specified	in	the	concerned	international	treaty.	Rights	and	free-
doms of  intercepted persons can be restrained on in the necessary manner.”
The Czech Republic has three intelligence services: The Office for Foreign 
Relations and Information (foreign intelligence service), the Security 
Information Service (interior counter-intelligence service) and the Military 
Intelligence. They are strictly separated from one another. This separa-
tion can again be interpreted as a result of  the Czech totalitarian history 
and the general distrust towards public institutions, especially those with 
executive power of  this kind. Lex generalis covering these services is Act 
No. 153/1994 Sb. on intelligence services of  the Czech Republic; the spe-
cial acts are Act No. 154/1994 Sb. on the Security Information Service and 
Act No. 289/2005 Sb. on Military Intelligence. The rules for communication 
interception conducted by intelligence services are included in these acts.
A specific case connected with the intelligence services is the National 
Security Authority,11 an institution responsible for personnel and facility secu-
rity clearance procedures. It has overall competences in the area of  protection 
of  classified information and, among other things, it issues personnel security 
10 Section 64 of  Act No. 17/2012 Sb. on the Customs service of  the Czech Republic.
11 Http://www.nbu.cz/en/.
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clearance certificates. It is governed by Act No. 412/2005 Sb. on protection 
of  secret information and security. Section 107 para. 3 of  this act, which cov-
ers personal security clearance procedures, empowers the National Security 
Authority to ask an intelligence service to carry out an examination of  pos-




the	Top	Secret	degree	the	Office13 shall conduct all the acts according to the par-
agraph 2 and furthermore it requests competent intelligence service to conduct 
an examination of  possible security risks in the environment, in which the subject 
operates.”
This issue can be summed up as follows: There are two different and sep-
arate frameworks of  communication interception in the Czech Republic. 
Each of  them has a different purpose and a different approval procedure 
and thus, generally speaking, information gained within one framework can-
not be easily used in another.
1.2 Powers for interception of  telecommunication – 
Legislative grounds
1.2.1 The law of  criminal procedure
The interception of  communication can be used for the sake of  criminal 
proceedings only when the criminal proceedings are conducted for crimes 
that are specifically listed by the law. The general rule is that the intercep-
tion must be initially authorized by a judge but, in certain cases, which are 
laid down in Section 88 Para. 5 of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure, prior 
consent of  the person using the intercepted unit is sufficient.
The strict nature of  this authorisation process was confirmed by the Czech 
Constitutional Court in Decision file number II. ÚS 615/06-1 of  23 May 
2007. The court wrote the following in its decision:
12 Section 107 paragraph 3 of  the Act No. 412/2005 Sb. on protection of  secret informa-
tion and security. Informal translation by the author of  this chapter.
13 That is The National Security Authority.
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“The right to protection of  the secrecy of  messages arising from Art. 13 
of  the Charter of  Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, together with personal 
freedom and other constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights, comprises 
the personal sphere of  an individual, whose individual integrity, as an essential 
condition	for	a	dignified	existence	and	the	development	of 	human	life	generally,	
must be respected and thoroughly protected as a token of  respect for the rights and 
freedoms of  people and citizens.14
If  the constitutional order permits a breach of  this protection, it does so solely and 
exclusively in the interests of  a democratic society, or in the interest of  the constitu-
tionally guaranteed fundamental rights and freedoms of  others… Therefore, there 
may be only such infringement of  the fundamental rights and freedoms by the state 
power, which is necessary in this sense.15
It should be emphasized that an effective judicial review of  the use of  any opera-
tive means, with an overlap into the area of  fundamental rights and freedoms, 
is absolutely crucial to a fair trial in criminal proceedings.16
In terms of  the constitutional order, a violation of  the secrecy of  messages is pos-
sible only in cases and manner prescribed by law. Statutory regulation interfering 
with this right must be formulated so that it does not deny this fundamental human 
right and it must also be interpreted this way… A court order for interception 
and recording of  telecommunication operations must be written and reasoned. 
It must therefore be issued in respect to a person against whom criminal proceeding 
is conducted. If  the proceedings are conducted on the basis of  reasonable suspicion, 
it must be explained in a recital what evidence supports such conclusion. The mere 
criminal	complaint	itself,	if 	it	does	not	include	explanation,	is	not	sufficient	for	
court order… The order may therefore be issued only in duly commenced criminal 
proceedings	for	a	legally	qualified	crime,	and	must	be	supported	by	relevant	clues	
from which we can derive a reasonable suspicion of  committing such a crime. 
The	order	must	be	individualized	in	a	relation	to	the	specific	person	who	is	the	user	
of  intercepted telephone device… Finally, the order must provide at least a mini-
mal	indication	of 	what	facts	relevant	for	the	proceeding	are	to	be	thus	identified,	
and what is inferred from that.17”
This strict approach was also acknowledged in Art. 67 of  Internal Order 
of  the Police President No. 30/2009 of  21 April 2009 on the fulfilment 
14 Decision of  the Constitutional Court file number II. ÚS 615/06-1, N 88/45 SbNU 291.
15 Ibid, paragraph 14.
16 Ibid, paragraph 15.
17 Ibid, paragraph 16.
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of  operations in criminal proceedings,18 which was repealed by the Order 
of  the Police President No. 103/2013 on the fulfilment of  certain operations 
of  the bodies of  Police of  the Czech Republic in criminal proceedings.19
Outside the regime of  criminal procedure, the Police can conduct com-
munication interception when supervising a person protected in the special 
framework of  witness protection. This is done in accordance with Section 
10a of  Act No. 137/2001 Sb. on special protection of  a witness and other 
persons in connection with criminal proceedings. This interception can 
be commenced only after prior judicial authorisation.
The collection of  traffic and location data by providers of  electronic 
communications (data retention) and the option for the Police to access 
such data during criminal proceedings is laid down in Section 88a of  Act 
No. 141/1961 Sb. Code of  Criminal Procedure. In the cases enumerated 
in the paragraph 1 of  the section police can gain access to traffic and loca-
tion data after a preliminary judicial authorisation.
A general authorisation for the Czech Police to access location and traffic 
data is laid down in Section 66 para. 3 of  Act No. 273/2008 on the Police 
of  the Czech Republic: 20
“Section 66
Obtaining information from records and databases
(1)	Police	may,	 in	 cases	prescribed	by	 law	and	 to	 the	 extent	necessary	 to	 fulfil	
a	specific	task,	request	a	legal	or	natural	person	providing	a	public	communica-
tions	network	or	publicly	available	electronic	communications	with	the	traffic	and	
location data in a manner, which enables remote and continuous access, unless 
another law provides otherwise. These persons are obliged to grant the request 
without undue delay, as and to the extent determined by other legislation.”
However, there are three situations in which the Czech Police can access 
location and traffic data even outside the framework of  criminal procedure.
18 Available in Czech online: http://www.pecina.cz/files/pokyn2.pdf.
19 Even though the order No. 103/2013 is not publicly available, it is assumed that dis-
cussed issue is regulated in the same way, as it was in the order No. 30/2009.
20 Act No. 273/2008 on the Police of  the Czech Republic.
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The first situation concerns the search for persons and things. This authori-
sation to access traffic and location data is established in the second para-
graph of  Section 68 of  the Police Act.21
“Section 68
Search for persons and things
(2) Police can request legal or natural person providing a public communica-
tions	network	or	publicly	available	electronic	communications	service	traffic	and	
location data in a manner enabling remote and continuous access, for a purpose 
of  ongoing search for wanted or missing persons and for the purpose of  identifying 
a person of  unknown identity or the identity of  the found corpse, unless another 
law provides otherwise. The information is provided in the form and to the extent 
determined by other legislation.”
An interesting fact is that location and traffic data can be accessed without 
prior judicial authorisation within this framework.22 This statement is also 
true for the second situation, which is access to location and traffic data for 
the purpose of  fighting against terrorism and preventing specific terrorist 
threats as laid down in Section 71 of  the Police Act.
The fact that location and traffic data can be accessed without prior judicial 
authorisation and the lack of  other checks and balances23 gives the Police a pow-
erful instrument, which could be easily abused by collecting a disproportionate 
amount of  data. This could lead to a serious threat to personal data and privacy.24
21 Act No. 273/2008 on the Police of  the Czech Republic.
22 For more detail, see Myška, M. Právní	 aspekty	uchovávání	 provozních	a	 lokalizačních	údajů, 
Brno: Masarykova univerzita, 2013, 133 s.
23 Section 11 of  the Police Act sets a general principle of  proportionality; however, it is our 
opinion that this general provision is not a sufficient insurance that the legal authorisa-
tion to collect such data will not be abused. See more e.g. Vangeli, B. Zákon o Policii 
České republiky, Praha: C. H. Beck, 2014, p. 64.
“Section 11 Adequacy of  the procedure
A policeman and police employee are required to ensure that no person suffered unwar-
ranted injury due to their actions,
ensure that their decision not to act did not resulted in unsubstantiated harm to persons 
whose security is endangered,
proceed in a way that any possible interference with the rights and freedoms of  persons 
to whom the act is directed, or any others, did not exceed what is necessary to achieve 
the objective pursued by the act.”
Act No. 273/2008 on the Police of  the Czech Republic.
24 See more e.g. Myška, M. Právní	 aspekty	 uchovávání	 provozních	 a	 lokalizačních	 údajů, Brno: 
Masarykova univerzita, 2013, 133 s.; Harašta, J., Myška M., Budoucnost data retention, 
Trestněprávní	revue, 2015, Vol. 14, No. 10, pp. 238-241.
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The last situation, in which the Police can access traffic and location data 
outside the criminal proceedings involves supervision over a person pro-
tected by the special programme of  witness protection. Similar to commu-
nication interception, this permission is regulated by Section 10a of  Act 
No. 137/2001 Sb. on special protection of  a witness and other persons 
in connection with criminal proceedings. In this case, prior judicial authori-
sation is necessary to access traffic and location data.
1.2.2 Law of  intelligence agencies
Generally speaking, the conditions, which need to be met in order to legally 
carry out communication interception within the framework of  intelligence 
agencies, are less strict than those for interception in criminal proceedings.
The wording of  statutory authorisation to conduct communication inter-
ception in Acts No. 154/1994 Sb. on the Security Information Service and 
No. 289/2005 Sb. on Military Intelligence is practically identical. In both 
acts, the interception is grounded in Sections 8 and 9.25
The Office for Foreign Relations and Information is not expressly author-
ized by law to conduct communication interception. It is out of  the scope 
of  its competence, since the information collected by means of  interception 
would be from within the borders of  the Czech Republic. However, should 
the Office need to conduct such an interception, it can request it to be car-
ried out by other intelligence services, most likely the Security Intelligence 
Service. This can be done on the basis of  Section 9 of  Act No. 153/1994 Sb. 
on intelligence services of  the Czech Republic, which allows cooperation 
between services based on an agreement between them: 26
“Section 9
Intelligence services cooperate with each other on the basis of  agreements, which are 
concluded with the consent of  the Government.”
Such interception would be completely within the legal framework of  Act 
No. 154/1994 Sb. on the Security Information Service.
25 The provision, which is marked as the paragraph 5 of  section 9 of  the Act 
No. 154/1994 Sb. on Security Information Service, is equivalent to Section 8a of  the Act 
154/1994 Sb. on Security Information Service.
26 Act No. 153/1994 Sb. on intelligence services of  the Czech Republic
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Even though the intelligence service needs a judicial approval for conduct-
ing communication interception, just as it is needed in criminal proceedings, 
it is not limited to specific situations like the investigation of  a crime enumer-
ated in the statue. It is therefore legally easier to obtain such approval. This 
difference was elaborated by the Czech Constitutional Court in Decision 
file number I. ÚS 3038/07, N 46/48 SbNU 549, from 29 February 2008 
in which the Court stated that information obtained from communica-
tion interception by an intelligence service cannot be freely used in crimi-
nal proceedings.27 According to the Constitutional Court in this case, there 
is a difference in the purposes of  the two frameworks for communication 
interception. In the case of  the criminal proceedings framework, the entire 
process is contained within the judiciary branch of  the state power, its pur-
pose being solely the solving of  a crime; the evidence is obtained by the Police 
based on the rules laid down in the Code of  Criminal Procedure and subject 
to a closer judicial review. On the other hand, the intelligence framework 
is rooted in the executive branch of  state power, its purpose being national 
security; the judicial review is much less extensive than in the case of  crimi-
nal proceedings. In paragraph 29, the Court states: “Intelligence service intercep-
tions do not reach the guaranteed quality, which is required by the Code of  Criminal 
Procedure, and therefore they cannot be used in the criminal proceedings, because they were 
not obtained in a legal manner.”28
1.2.3 Financial and Customs Investigation Service
As discussed above, in the first subsection of  this chapter, the legal framework 
for communication interception for the customs investigation service specifi-
cally is stipulated in Section 63 of  Act No. 17/2012 Sb. on customs service 
of  the Czech Republic. This section, however, does not establish a new unique 
framework for message interception. It is only a specification of  the criminal 
27 In this case, the criminal proceedings against the defendant were commenced after 
the police obtained a military intelligence recording obtained by intercepting commu-
nication to which the defendant was party. She was, however, not a legitimate subject 
of  the interception. She issued a complaint against the commencement of  the crimi-
nal proceedings, which was denied by the public prosecutor. After a series of  appeals, 
the Constitutional Court ruled in her favour.
28 Paragraph 29 of  the decision of  the Czech Constitutional Court file number 
I. ÚS 3038/07, N 46/48 SbNU 549.
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procedure framework, since the customs service may serve as a police force 
in the first phase of  the criminal proceedings, the preliminary hearing. That is, 
however, only in the situation described in the above-mentioned Section 63.
Aside from the Police and the intelligence services, another institution that 
can request access to traffic and location data is the Czech National Bank. 
This can be done as part of  its responsibility for supervising the capital mar-
ket, and prior judicial authorisation is required. The Czech National Bank 
is entitled to request the data directly from providers of  electronic commu-
nications services, without the use of  police services.
1.3 Responsibility for the technical performance 
of  interception measures – a general overview
In the Czech Republic, the technical implementation of  communication 
interception is carried out by state agencies, with the cooperation of  legally 
bound subjects, in accordance with Act No. 127/2005 Sb. on electronic 
communication. Section 97 para. 1 of  the Electronic Communications Act 
establishes a duty for any legal or natural person providing a public commu-
nications network29 or a publicly available electronic communications ser-
vice30 to provide and secure interfaces at specific points of  the network for 
connection of  terminal equipment for message tapping and recording. This 
is done at the requesting party’s expense. This section authorizes the Police 
of  the Czech Republic, the Security Information Service, and the Military 
Intelligence to do so.
The access to traffic and location data is laid down in Section 97 para. 3 
in a similar fashion. This provision authorises public authorities involved 
in the criminal proceedings, the Police (for conducting a search for missing 
persons and things and the prevention of  terrorist activities), the intelligence 
29 Section 2 letter j) defines the public communication network as “an electronic commu-
nications network which is used wholly or mainly for the provision of  publicly available 
electronic communications services and which supports transmission of  information 
between end nodes of  the network or an electronic communications network via which 
is provided service of  television or radio broadcasting.”
30 Section 2 letter o) defines the publicly available electronic communications service 
as “electronic communications service from the use of  which no person is excluded 
beforehand.”
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services, and the Czech National Bank to request the legal or natural per-
son providing a public communications network or a publicly available elec-
tronic communications service to provide traffic and location data.
When it comes to the criminal procedure framework of  communication 
interception, the Unit for Special Activities31 (a division with countrywide 
authority) is the only division of  the Czech Police authorized to conduct 
interception operations. A detailed procedure for this process is set out 
by the Order of  the Police President No. 186/2011 upon request for tap-
ping and recording of  telecommunication traffic and upon request for traffic 
and location data, which was amended by the Order of  the Police President 
No. 139/2012. This order is unfortunately not publicly accessible. However, 
the technical and request process is quite well described in the document 
“Analysis of  tapping and recording of  telecommunication traffic,” which 
was published by the Police Presidium of  the Czech Republic on 6 June 
2014.32
When the conditions of  Section 88 para. 1 are met, the authorized per-
son, i.e. the policeman working the criminal case, can request the intercep-
tion. This request must contain a brief  summary of  the factual situation 
of  the case and a justification for the request. Most importantly, it must 
contain the facts that are expected to be uncovered through the intercep-
tion, which must be important for the case. Furthermore, the request must 
include an identification of  the user unit that is to be intercepted (num-
ber, address, and name of  its user, if  known) and the period of  time for 
which the interception should be conducted. This period may be no longer 
than four months. Before approval of  the request, a designated officer 
of  the Unit for Special Activities must be consulted; he or she will then 
evaluate the request from a technical and operative point of  view and decide 
whether the interception is possible and doable.33
If  the criminal proceedings are in the preliminary hearing phase, the request 
is send to the Public Prosecutor, who then requests the interception from 
31 The webpage of  the division in Czech: http://www.policie.cz/clanek/utvar-zvlastnich-
cinnosti-sluzby-kriminalni-policie-a-vysetrovani-716842.aspx.
32 In Czech online: www.mvcr.cz/soubor/ppr-102-31-cj-2014-990390-analyza-odpos le-
chu -a-sledovani-za-rok-2013-pdf.aspx.
33 An	analysis	of 	the	tapping	and	recording	of 	telecommunication	traffic, p. 16.
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the court. In the later phases of  the proceedings, the court can be con-
tacted directly. The court then issues a decision, namely a court order, which 
is delivered back to the Public Prosecutor (preliminary hearing) or directly 
back to the authorized person, who then delivers it to the Unit for Special 
Activities. When the conditions of  Section 88 para. 1 are met, the author-
ized officer must obtain consent from the person using the intercepted unit. 
Once again, a properly filled out request is delivered to the Unit for Special 
Activities. In both situations, the Unit conducts the requested communica-
tion interception and the result of  it, which is a sound recording recorded 
on a non-rewritable medium, is delivered back to the authorized person, 
who issued the request in the first place.
The court order must be specific and justified, including for example a refer-
ence to a specific international treaty, should the interception be conducted 
in the context of  an intentional criminal offense, for which the prosecution 
is stipulated in a declared international treaty. The order must contain spe-
cific identification of  the intercepted unit (the address and identity of  its 
user, if  known) and the time period for which the interception is authorized.
After the end of  the interception, the police institution has a short time 
to evaluate the recordings and insert statistical data into a specialized system, 
MU II. If  the recordings are not going to be used in the criminal procee-
dings, they must be destroyed three years after the proceeding has legally 
ended.
If  the recording of  the telecommunication service is to be used as evidence, 
it is necessary to provide a transcript for it, stating the place, time, manner, 
and contents of  the record, as well as the authority that issued the record. 
The police authority is obliged to label other records, securely store them 
to protect them against unauthorized use, and indicate the place of  storage 
in the transcript. In a criminal case other than that for which the interception 
and recording of  the telecommunication service was performed, the record-
ing may be used as evidence if  there is a criminal prosecution in this matter 
for a criminal offense referred to in Para. 1 of  Section 88 or with the con-
sent of  the user of  the intercepted station or device.
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The following diagram shows the request procedure for the authorisation 
of  communication interception.34
Section 19 of  Act No. 273/2008 on the Police of  the Czech Republic author-
izes the police forces to provide technical support and conduct communica-
tion interception for another public authority upon request and only when 
that body is authorized to perform such action. The other public authority 
must declare this fact in its request.
This is the case for the customs service, since, even though it is authorized 
by Section 63 of  the Act on Customs Service of  the Czech Republic to use 
communication interception, Act No. 127/2005 on electronic communica-
tions does not set a duty for electronic communications providers to allow 
the customs service access to their networks. Customs therefore use the ser-
vices of  the Police (and therefore the Unit for Special Activities). However, 
the general directorate of  customs is authorized to secure the application 
of  intelligence techniques, including communication interception (Section 
4 para. 5 letter c) of  the Customs Service Act), for other public authorities. 
34 Analysis	 of 	 tapping	 and	 recording	 of 	 telecommunication	 traffic, p. 15, edited and translated 
by the author of  the chapter.
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Like in the above-mentioned Section 19 of  Act No. 273/2005, this can 
be done upon a request when the other public authority is authorized to per-
form such action.
Interception of  communication can be conducted by intelligence services 
within their specific legal framework. The rules for communication inter-
ception carried out by the Security Information Service and the Military 
Intelligence are, as could be seen above, almost identical. Both services can 
request interception from a provider of  public electronic communications 
and both can serve as technical support for other public bodies with author-
ization to conduct communication interception (Section 9 paras. 4 and 5 
of  Act No. 289/2005 Sb. on Military Intelligence and Section 8a and Section 
9 para. 4 of  Act No. 154/1994 Sb. on the Security Information Service).
The judicial authorization procedure is the same for both intelligence 
agencies and it is laid down in Section 10 of  their respective acts (Act 
No. 289/2005 Sb. on Military Intelligence and Act No. 154/1994 Sb. 
on the Security Information Service).
An example of  a public authority that can request the use of  communica-
tion interception from the police and intelligence services is the General 
Inspection of  Security Forces. According to Section 9 para. 2 a) of  Act 
No. 341/2011 Sb. on the General Inspection of  Security Forces, this author-
ity can request communication interception of  Security Forces and other 
public bodies to be conducted for the purpose of  fulfilling its inspection 
duties. This interception is carried out within the legal framework of  crimi-
nal procedure, since the request must include authorization issued in a pro-
cess governed by the Code of  Criminal Procedure: 35
“Section 9
(3) General Inspection may require from Security Forces and other public authori-
ties,	if 	it	is	necessary	for	the	performance	of 	a	specific	task	of 	the	Inspection
a) technical and personal resources for interception and recording of  telecommuni-
cation operations or for operative intelligence means. In the request the Inspection 
demonstrates that the use of  interception and recording of  telecommunication oper-
ations or monitoring people and things have been permitted under the Criminal 
Procedure Code.”
35 Section 9 of  the Act No. 341/2011 Sb. on General Inspection of  Security Force.
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The Chamber of  Deputies of  the Czech Parliament is the control body for 
communication interception for the Police of  the Czech Republic (Section 98 
of  Act No. 273/2008 Sb. on the Police of  the Czech Republic) and the cus-
toms service (Section 65 of  Act No. 17/2012 Sb. on the customs service 
of  the Czech Republic). The Chamber of  Deputies is also a control body for 
intelligence services in general (Section 21 of  the Military Intelligence Act 
and Section 18 of  the Security Information Service Act); however, supervi-
sion of  specific communication interceptions is done by the courts (Section 
11 of  the Military Intelligence Act as well as of  the Security Information 
Service Act).
As was mentioned in the second part of  this chapter, the general authoriza-
tion for the Police of  the Czech Republic to request access to traffic and 
location data from electronic communications providers is found in Section 
66 para. 3 of  Act No. 273/2008 Sb. on the Police of  the Czech Republic. 
The general authorization for the intelligence services to access such data 
is found in Section 8a of  Act No. 154/1994 Sb. on the Security Information 
Service and in Section 8 para. 5 of  Act No. 289/2005 Sb. on Military 
Intelligence. The authorization for the Czech National Bank to access such 
data is found in Section 8 of  Act No. 15/1998 Sb. on supervision in the area 
of  capital market and change and supplementation of  some acts.
1.4 Legitimacy of  data transfers between 
different security services
Generally speaking, the situation in the Czech Republic is similar to the situ-
ation in Germany because the frameworks and functions are separate from 
one another. There are several reasons for this. The first one is the above-
mentioned strong principle of  legality. If  the possibility of  data transfer and 
sharing of  information is not expressly written in the law, the agency can-
not use information collected by another agency. If  the possibility of  infor-
mation transfer is written in the law, it can be done only within the scope 
of  the legal permission. The second reason for the separation is that different 
agencies intercept communication for different purposes and thus the pro-
cess of  obtaining permission for such interception also differs. Should 
the information be used in another framework than that for which they were 
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collected, especially when the interception conducted by the intelligence ser-
vice is to be used in criminal proceedings, it would be considered unlawful 
evidence and as such it would not be admissible by the court. In paragraph 
25 of  the above-mentioned Decision file number I. ÚS 3038/07 from 29 
February 2008,36 the Czech Constitutional Court states that of  the fact that 
the Code of  Criminal Procedure is silent in the matter of  the option of  using 
a communication interception obtained by a body other than the Police, 
or not obtained in compliance with the Code of  Criminal Procedure, as evi-
dence in criminal proceedings needs to be interpreted in the light of  the prin-
ciple of  legality, meaning that such interception cannot be used as evidence.
For example, intelligence services have a general authorisation to pass on data 
in the section 8 paragraph 3 of  the Act No. 153/1994 Sb. on intelligence 
services of  the Czech Republic. The intelligence service must provide infor-
mation to other public bodies and police forces – specifically the findings 
that fall within their jurisdiction. It is not, however, permitted to pass on too 
much of  specific information, since that would be a violation of  the princi-
ple of  legality, as stated by the Czech Constitutional Court in paragraph 28 
of  the above-mentioned Decision file number I. ÚS 3038/07.37
Passing on information within different intelligence services is not expressly 
covered by the law; therefore, it can only be carried out within the scope 
of  the general provision.
Furthermore, there are no specific provisions that expressly allow data 
to be passed from communication interception to intelligence services. 
However, there are authorisations for passing on information in general. 
This authorisation is not so specific and strong, so the principle of  legality 
could be breached should it be used disproportionally.
For the Police, the authorisation is laid down in Section 78 of  Act 
No. 273/2008 Sb. on the Police of  the Czech Republic. This section allows 
the Police to hand over information, which was acquired during the fulfill-
ing of  their duties, to the national member of  the Eurojust, the National 
Security Office, the intelligence services of  the Czech Republic, the Military 
36 Paragraph 25 of  the decision of  the Czech Constitutional Court file number I. 
ÚS 3038/07, N 46/48 SbNU 549, online: http://nalus.usoud.cz.
37 Ibid, paragraph 28.
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Police, the Ministry of  the Interior and other public bodies, should it be nec-
essary for services in their jurisdiction.
A very similar authorisation as this one can be found in the section 57 
of  the Act on Customs service of  the Czech Republic (Act No. 17/2012 Sb.). 
This section authorizes customs services to pass on information to the same 
degree as the above-mentioned Section 78 for the Police.
The same scope also covers Section 37 of  the Act on the General Inspection 
of  Security Forces (Act No. 341/2011 Sb.), which authorizes the General 
Inspection to pass on information to other public bodies.
1.5 Statistics on Telecommunication Interception
In Czech law is not present an obligation to collect and create statistics on tel-
ecommunication interception. However, the Police compile statistics based 
on the order of  the Police President No. 31/2012 on the analytical and statistical 
information system MU II. This order is, unfortunately, not publicly available.
The Czech Police publish statistical reports on the use of  electronic inter-
ceptions and the interception of  people and things. The most recent one 
is a report from 2013, which was published on 6 June 2014.38 These statistics 
include only the communication interception conducted within the frame-
work of  criminal proceedings under the provision of  Section 88 of  Act 
No. 141/1961 Sb. Code of  Criminal Procedure. Communication intercep-
tion by intelligence services and customs in accordance with their special 
legal regulation is therefore not included in these statistics. No statistics 
on these kinds of  communication interceptions are publicly accessible.
The following information has been taken from the police statistics, which 
present for example the absolute number of  interceptions, the number 
of  intercepted stations and people, and the differentiation of  interceptions 
according to the type of  crime, as well as the overall effectivity of  intercep-
tions. The statistics do not, however, distinguish interceptions based on their 
nature, namely whether they are electronic, meaning for example detection 
of  keystrokes, data tracking, etc. or whether they are telephonic interceptions.
38 In Czech online: www.mvcr.cz/soubor/ppr-102-31-cj-2014-990390-analyza-odposle-
chu-a-sledovani-za-rok-2013-pdf.aspx.
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Criminal Files 135 731 134 923 N/A 184 147 477
No. of  crimi-




47 944 47 513 N/A 93 91 247




1175 949 21 93 47 65
Percentage 
of  criminal files 
where intercep-
tion was realized 
to criminal files 
where it was 
legally possible 
to conduct it
2,5 % 2,0 % N/A 100 % 51,6 % 26,3 %
No. of  intercepted 
telecommunica-
tion units
6 689 4 095 51 990 964 589
No. of  inter-
cepted persons 4 258 2 581 36 518 628 495
Average no. 
of  units per 
Person
1,6 1,6 1,4 1,9 1,5 1,2
Average no. 
of  units per 
Criminal file
5,7 4,3 2,4 10,6 20,5 9,1
No. of  units 
intercepted after 
authorisation 
by a judge (sec-
tion 88, para. 
1 of  the Code 
of  Criminal 
Procedure)
6540 3947 51 989 964 589
No. of  units inter-
cepted after con-
sent of  the inter-
cepted person 
(section 88, para. 
5 of  the Code 
of  Criminal 
Procedure)
149 148 0 1 0 0
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The analysis also offers a chart with the data concerning the effectivity 
of  the performed interceptions. There are several categories that are used 
for this evaluation.
1. Active / Inactive interception
“Active” refers to interception that was commenced by the Unit 
for Special Activities of  the Criminal Police and Investigation and 
the information collected. The following categories (Nos. 2, 3, and 4) 
are subdivisions of  this category.
There are two kinds of  “inactive” interception.
a) The Unit for Special Activities of  the Criminal Police obtained 
an authorized request for the interception, the interception was 
commenced and realized, but no recordings for the criminal proce-
dure were obtained. An example of  this situation is that the mobile 
phone was inactive or the person of  interest was not present 
in the Czech Republic.
b) The Unit for Special Activities of  the Criminal Police obtained 
an authorized request for the interception; however, the interception 
was not realized. For personal, technical, or other reasons, no actions 
were taken by the Unit for Special Activities of  the Criminal Police 
for the entire time of  the validity of  court authorization, and there-
fore no recordings were collected.
2. Direct influence on the criminal procedure
The collected information was, or will be, used:
a) As evidence in ongoing criminal proceedings;
b) for tactical reasons and further investigation;
c) to prevent another crime;
d) to capture a criminal offender.
3. Indirect influence on the criminal procedure
The collected information was, or will be, used for a discovery of:
a) A new criminal activity on the part of  the criminal offender who was 
subject to the interception;
b) a new criminal activity on the part of  third persons who were not 
initially subject to the ongoing interception.
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4. Information obtained via the interception was not used.
This category covers interception that was ineffective, because 
it did not lead to any information that could be used in the criminal 
procedure.
Total Regional Police Directorates
The Office 












of  Corruption 
and Financial 
Crime
No. of  inter-
cepted telecom-
munication units
6 689 4 095 51 990 964 589
Inactive 
interception 578 386 0 27 126 39
Direct influence 
on the criminal 
procedure only
4123 2176 47 759 736 406
Indirect 
influence 
on the criminal 
procedure only
15 15 0 0 0 0
Combination 
of  direct 
and indirect 
influence 
on the criminal 
procedure





891 620 4 94 66 107
In 2013, the average length of  interception was 97.26 days.39
When compared with previous years, an increasing tendency 
in the number of  communication interceptions can be seen starting 
in 2009.
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
No. of  inter-
cepted units 7 599 5 491 4 973 4 571 5 006 5 766 6 241 6 689
39 Analysis of  tapping and recording of  telecommunication traffic. Police Presidium 
of  the Czech Republic. 2014, p. 80.
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2 CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY 
SAFEGUARDS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS
2.1 Areas of  constitutional protection
Apart from the constitution itself, the Czech Republic also has other docu-
ments that together form the Czech constitutional black-letter law: these 
are the constitutional laws and the Charter of  Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms. Together, these documents form the Czech Consitutional Order 
(Ustavni poradek). Basic safeguards for the protection of  fundamental rights 
are laid down in the Charter of  Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, which 
lists all of  them and provides brief  explanations.
The recently applicable Czech constitutional law (valid since 1993) acknowl-
edges privacy as a distinct distributive (individual) right. Apart from being 
mentioned in Art. 7(1) of  the Charter of  Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, 
it is also laid down specifically with regard to personal life in Art. 10(2), with 
regards to personal data in Art. 10(3), and with respect to communications 
and records in Art. 13.40
“Article 7(1): Inviolability of  the person and of  privacy is guaranteed. It may 
be	limited	only	in	cases	specified	by	law.
Article 10(2): Everybody is entitled to protection against unauthorized interfer-
ence in his or her personal and family life.
Article 10(3): Everybody is entitled to protection against unauthorized gathering, 
publication or other misuse of  his or her personal data.
Article 13: Nobody may violate secrecy of  letters and other papers and records 
whether privately kept or sent by post or in another manner, except in cases and 
in	a	manner	specified	by	law.	Similar	protection	is	extended	to	messages	commu-
nicated by telephone, telegraph or other such facilities.”
Privacy is laid down in the aforementioned provisions as a right per se (it does 
not form a subsequent right) that can be claimed individually. This means 
40 Resolution of  the Praesidium of  Czech National Council No. 2/1993 Sb., English 
translation is available at http://www.usoud.cz/fileadmin/user_upload/ustavni_soud_
www/Pravni_uprava/AJ/Listina_English_version.pdf.
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that privacy as a regulatory phenomenon consists of  individualized protec-
tive rights that are all subject to judicial protection, but also that whenever 
privacy is at stake, it should always be possible for an individual to seek 
direct judicial protection or at least a judicial review of  administrative deci-
sions or other regulatory actions.41
The secrecy of  telecommunication is specifically recognized as a fundamen-
tal right in Art. 13 of  the Charter of  Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (see 
above). Legislation thereof  is analogous to the traditional secrecy of  letters, 
whereas any limitation of  this protection has to be based on statutory law. 
This implies that telecommunication secrecy cannot be limited by bylaws 
or administrative decisions per se – any such limitation has to be grounded 
in the statutory law.
The fact that the secrecy of  telecommunication is recognized by the Charter 
of  Fundamental Rights and Freedoms as an individual right implies that any 
infringement has to be reviewable by an independent judiciary. Together 
with the fact that telecommunication secrecy is a highly sensitive issue 
in the Czech Republic,42 this principle correspondingly led to currently 
applicable strict statutory safeguards for wiretapping and similar intrusions 
of  information privacy.43
There are no specific constitutional provisions regarding the confiden-
tiality and integrity of  information systems. Such protection, however, 
can be derived from more general fundamental rights. In this respect, 
it is to be noted that there is a reason to distinguish between the confidenti-
ality and integrity of  information systems as such and the confidentiality and 
integrity of  data that are stored or communicated therein.
41 That is based on general Kantian centrality of  a person and their rights – see for example 
Kant, I. The Universal Principle of  Right: The Laws of  Freedom as Moral, Judicial and 
Ethical, Illinois Law Review, 1914-1915, vol. 9, No. 3, p. 574. The Czech Constitutional 
Court constantly reflects upon that principle – see e.g. case file number IV.ÚS 412/04, 
N 223/39 SbNU 353.
42 There are multiple reasons for high public sensitivity to privacy infringements, some 
of  which are grounded in the communist period of  the modern history of  the Czech 
Republic. See for example Bobek, M., Molek, P., Šimíček, V. Komunistické právo 
v	Československu, Brno: Masarykova univerzita, 2009, 1005 p.
43 For a general explanation of  protective tendencies with regards to information privacy 
in Czech criminal law, see Púry, F. Posílení ochrany informací v trestním řízení, Právní 
rozhledy, 2009, Vol. 17, No. 7, p. II.
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In the first case, specific protective tools are correspondingly based 
on the general protection of  property laid down in Art. 11(1), whichreads 
as follows: “Everybody has the right to own property. The ownership right of  all owners 
has the same statutory content and enjoys the same protection, inheritance is guaranteed.”
The latter case, i.e. the protection of  data stored in information systems, 
is based on fundamental rights protecting specific types of  data. Apart from 
the protection of  privacy and personal data, these might include, e.g. the pro-
tection of  trade secrets, health records, speech, etc.
The issue of  confidentiality and the integrity of  information systems is also 
closely linked to the active component of  the concept of  informational 
self-determination (see below). Recently the protection of  informational 
self-determination has served as a constitutional basis for the adoption 
of  the Cybersecurity Act,44 which is primarily aimed at the establishing 
of  security measures for the protection of  the confidentiality, security, and 
availability of  critical information infrastructure.45
The term ‘privacy’ is used in the Czech law in two main meanings of  the word. 
One of  them serves as general constitutional principle. Another meaning 
of  the term ‘privacy’ (soukromi) is primarily found in the Civil Code and 
it establishes civil remedies for cases of  infringement.
In the Czech civil law, privacy protection has been systematically included into 
a more general category of  personality protection (apart from privacy, per-
sonality protection also includes the protection of  dignity, esteem etc.). When 
used as a regulatory principle (typically in personal data protection law, the law 
of  electronic communications, criminal procedural law etc.), privacy is gener-
ally replaced by a more general term “the right to respect for private life.”
The German concept of  informational self-determination was adopted into 
Czech law through decisions of  the Czech Constitutional Court.46 It has 
44 Act No. 181/2014 Sb., English translation available at https:// www.govcert .
cz/ download/nodeid-1143/.
45 For a more specific analysis of  the Czech cybersecurity legal regulatory framework, see 
Polčák, R. Kybernetická bezpečnost jako fenomén českého práva, Revue pro právo a tech-
nologie, 2015, Vol. 11, No. 11, pp. 95-149.
46 For a detailed explanation of  the concept, see Schwartz, P. The Computer in German 
and American Constitutional Law: Towards an American Right of  Informational Self-
Determination, 1989, American Journal of  Comparative Law, Vol. 37, No. 4, pp. 675-701.
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recently been used in Czech constitutional practice as a common denomina-
tor for various individual information rights.
The Czech Constitutional Court distinguishes between the active and passive 
component of  informational self-determination. The passive component 
is represented by various individual information rights, which consist of  pro-
tecting data related to an individual from unlawful interference. The active 
component of  information self-determination is based on the assumption 
that one cannot live a regular personal life without the ability to actively 
communicate (i.e. without the possibility to have access to the means 
of  communication established as standard in regular interpersonal exchange 
of  information).
The Constitutional Court used the active component of  information self-
determination in a case where a woman was sentenced for an economic 
crime incl. subsequent damages.47 In the trial, her petition for pro bono 
legal representation was refused based on the fact that she regularly paid 
a relatively high fee for her cable TV and Internet connection at home 
(which was interpreted as a demonstration of  the fact that she had sufficient 
funds to pay for her legal representation). The Constitutional Court held 
that requiring her to give up her Internet connection would mean dispro-
portionate limitation of  her right for information self-determination, since 
one of  its components is also the right to communicate actively. This deci-
sion of  the Constitutional Court was partly criticised for its merits, namely 
because the court did not acknowledge in full that Internet connection 
might be obtained at significantly lower rates and that the active component 
of  information self-determination does not include a right to have access 
to cable TV. However, the inclusion of  the active component of  informa-
tional self-determination was accepted by Czech doctrine as one of  the pos-
sible forms of  interpretation of  the right to a personal life48.
47 Decision file number I. ÚS 22/10, N 77/57 SbNU 43, English translation available on-
line at http://www.usoud.cz/en/decisions/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=372&cHash
=1c2ede3ef55d98e9b6f7c2ebd4dc416b.
48 For a doctrinal comment on the decision, see Polčák, R. Internet	a	proměny	práva, Praha: 
Auditorium, 2012, p. 324.
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The court held:49
“The Constitutional Court also ascribed to this concept of  the right to a pri-
vate	 life,	when	it	stated	 in	 its	 judgment	file	No.	II.	ÚS	517/99	that:	“[T]he	
right to protection of  personal privacy is the right of  a natural person to decide 
according to his own deliberation whether, or to what extent and in what manner, 
the facts of  his own personal privacy are to be made accessible to other subjects, and 
at	the	same	time	to	defend	oneself 	against	(resist)	unjustified	interference	in	that	
sphere by other persons. Excessive emphasis on the positive component of  the right 
to protection of  one’s private life leads to inappropriately narrowing of  protection 
to	merely	 seeing	 to	 it	 that	 the	 facts	 of 	a	person’s	private	 life	not	be	 [disclosed]	
without his consent or without reasons recognized by the law, and thus the integrity 
of  the internal sphere, which is essential for positive personal development, not 
be violated. The Constitutional Court does not share this narrowed understand-
ing, because respect for private life must, to a certain degree, include the right 
to form and develop relationships with other human beings. Respect for private 




Therefore, it is the duty of  the courts to review the unique aspects of  each case 
so that, apart from observing the guarantees of  a fair trial, the individual’s other 
fundamental	rights	are	also	preserved	-	in	this	case	the	right	to	a	private	life	[G.	
Dürig	(G.	D.,	Der	Grundrechtssatz	von	der	Menschenwürde,	Archiv	des	öffen-
tlichen Rechts 81, 1956, p. 127) formulated the well-known theory of  the object, 
which was adopted in the case law of  the German Constitutional Court, connected 
to the questions of  human dignity. According to this theory human dignity is vio-
lated	when	state	authority	places	a	specific	individual	into	the	role	of 	an	object,	
in which they become a mere means to an end, and are reduced to a fungible value. 
One can conclude that a person is not only the object of  social “relationships”, but 
also becomes the object of  the law, if  they are forced to subject to it completely in its 
interpretation and application, i.e. without taking into account their individual 
interests,	or	fundamental	rights].	In	addition	to	the	subjective	factors	on	the	part	
of 	 the	 individual,	 when	 evaluating	 whether	 expenses	 are	 “usual	 or	 justified”,	
it is also necessary to take into account objective factors, which include, among 
49 Decision file number I. ÚS 22/10, N 77/57 SbNU 43, English translation available on-
line at http://www.usoud.cz/en/decisions/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=372&cHash
=1c2ede3ef55d98e9b6f7c2ebd4dc416b.
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other things, technological developments (e.g. mobile phones, the Internet) and 
changes in the methods of  communication, obtaining information, contact with 
government	offices,	association,	 etc.,	 or	 the	development	of 	 technologies,	 through	
which the individual’s right to personal development, relationship with other people 
and the outside world, i.e. the right to a private life, is realized (point 17).
The active component of  informational self-determination needs to be distin-
guished from freedom of  speech, which covers the right to actively communicate 
information to the public, i.e. the right to bring one’s speech to a public space. 
On the other hand, the active component of  right for informational self-deter-
mination (i.e. the right to communicate) includes only those forms of  active com-
munication that are regular in individual private (personal) life, including private 
interpersonal communication, individual requests for information (e.g. by brows-
ing on a website) etc.”
2.2 Proportionality of  access to data
The doctrine of  proportionality has constitutional origins, but it is now also 
occasionally applied by regular courts and even by administrative authorities. 
The methodological grounds of  proportionality of  rights were established 
in a decision of  the Constitutional Court file number Pl. ÚS 4/94. In this 
case, the court was assessing the constitutional compliance of  the institute 
of  anonymous witness and had to find a proportional balance between 
the witness protection and fair trial rights of  the accused.
With respect to proportionate balancing of  rights, the Court ruled that: 50
“When considering the possibilities of  restricting a basic right or freedom for 
the	benefit	of 	another	basic	right	or	freedom	the	following	conditions	can	be	stipu-
lated governing the priority of  one basic right or freedom:
The	 first	 condition	 is	 their	 mutual	 comparison,	 the	 other	 is	 the	 requirement	
to examine the substance and the sense of  the fundamental right or freedom being 
restricted (Art. 4 para 4 of  the Charter of  Fundamental Rights and Freedoms1).
The mutual comparison of  colliding fundamental rights and freedoms is based 
upon the following criteria:
50 Decision file number Pl. ÚS 4/94, 214/1994 Sb., N 46/2 SbNU 57, English translation 
available at http://www.usoud.cz/en/decisions/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=611&c
Hash=f69da5fcba1a2e433d74385371b3a196.
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The	 first	 is	 the	 criterion	 of 	 applicability,	 i.e.	 a	 reply	 to	 the	 question	 whether	
the institute restricting a certain basic right allows the achievement of  the desir-
able aim (the protection of  another basic right). In the given case the legislator can 
be	affirmed	in	that	the	institute	of 	anonymous	witness	allows	to	achieve	the	aim,	
i.e. to guarantee the inviolability of  his person.
The second criterion for measuring basic rights and freedoms is the criterion 
of  necessity residing in the comparison of  the legislative means restricting some 
basic right or freedom with other provisions allowing to achieve the same objective, 
however, without impinging upon fundamental rights and freedoms. The reply 
to	the	fulfilment	of 	the	criterion	of 	necessity	in	the	second	case	is	not	unambiguous:	
in addition to the legislative construction allowing the anonymity of  the witness 
the government can use also other means for his protection (such as the utilization 
of  anonymous testimony as a criminalistic means for further examination, offering 
protection to the witness etc.).
The	third	criterion	is	the	comparison	of 	the	importance	of 	both	conflicting	basic	
rights. In the case under consideration one of  them is the right of  fair trial ensur-
ing the right for personal freedom, the other is the right of  personal inviolability. 
These basic rights are prima facie equal.
The	comparison	of 	the	importance	of 	colliding	basic	rights	(after	having	fulfilled	
the condition of  appropriateness and necessity) resides in weighting empirical, 
systemic, contextual and value oriented arguments. As an empirical argument 
the factual seriousness of  a phenomenon can be understood that is connected 
with the protection of  certain fundamental right (in the case under considera-
tion this is the increasing number of  cases of  threatening and terrorising of  wit-
nesses by organized crime). A systemic argument means considering the sense and 
the	classification	of 	the	respective	fundamental	right	or	freedom	within	the	system	
of  basic rights and freedoms (the right to fair trial in this connection is part 
of  the general institutional protection of  basic rights and freedoms). As contextual 
argument also further adverse impacts of  the restriction of  one fundamental right 
due to the favouring another right can be understood (in the given case the possi-
bility of  misusing the institute of  anonymous witness in the criminal procedure). 
The	value	argument	represents	considering	the	positive	aspects	of 	the	conflicting	
fundamental rights as regards the accepted hierarchy of  values.
Part	of 	comparing	the	relative	weight	of 	the	conflicting	basic	rights	is	also	con-
sidering the utilization of  legal institutes minimizing the intervention into one 
of  them, supported by arguments.”
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As a result, the Court has established a three-step test, which consist 
of  the following parts:
• Suitability – a question as to whether the respective limitation 
of  a fundamental right is able to serve the desired purpose.
• Necessity – a question as to whether there might not be some other 
alternative ways to achieve the desired effect without a need to limit 
the respective fundamental right(s)
• Proportionality stricto sensu – a question as to whether there is a rea-
son for an ad hoc preference of  one fundamental right over another.
If  some limitation of  a fundamental right passes the test outlined above, 
there must be an additional assessment of  whether the fundamental right 
evaluated as less relevant will be limited only to a necessary extent. This 
assessment, known also as the limited proportionality test, is in many cases 
crucial. For example, in the case of  data retention51 or access to retained 
data52, the respective limitations of  privacy passed all three tests. That means 
that the Court stated that these measures were fit for the purpose, there were 
no reasonable alternatives and that there was a good reason to prefer cer-
tain fundamental rights over privacy. However, the Court held that the way 
in which data retention was legislated into the statutory law lead to a greater 
impact on privacy than necessary. In other words, the Constitutional Court 
has regularly struck down instruments, which were proportionate per se, 
but had to be legislated using less intrusive measures or implementing more 
safeguards and balances.
In the case No. Pl. ÚS 24/11, in which the Court assessed simple statutory 
provisions empowering law enforcement and security authorities to request 
traffic and geolocation data, the Court ruled (official translation): 53
“27. In a democratic society, apart from expressing the requirement of  necessity, 
51 See Decision of  the Constitutional Court file number Pl.ÚS 24/10. For a detailed anal-
ysis of  constitutional developments regarding data retention in the Czech Republic, 
Myška, M. Právní	aspekty	uchovávání	provozních	a	lokalizačních	údajů, Brno: Masarykova uni-
verzita, 2013, 133 s.
52 See Decision of  the Constitutional Court file number Pl. ÚS 24/11, 43/2012 Sb., 
N 217/63 SbNU 483, English translation available at http://www.usoud.cz/fileadmin/
user_upload/ustavni_soud_www/Decisions/pdf/Pl_US_24-11.pdf.
53 See Decision of  the Constitutional Court file number Pl. ÚS 24/11, 43/2012 Sb., 
N 217/63 SbNU 483, English translation available at http://www.usoud.cz/fileadmin/
user_upload/ustavni_soud_www/Decisions/pdf/Pl_US_24-11.pdf.
2 Constitutional and Statutory Safeguards of Telecommunications
39
the contested legal regulation should also contain the manner of  handling the data 
on the side of  the bodies active in criminal proceedings. It should include unambig-
uous and detailed rules containing the minimum requirements concerning the secu-
rity of  the retained data, which would guarantee that they will not be used for any 




damental rights and freedoms of  the affected individuals should be guaranteed 
by means of  a duty to subsequently inform the user of  the electronic communica-
tion	 services,	 provided	 that	 the	 person’s	 identity	 is	known,	 and	 that	 the	 traffic	
and location data concerning this person have been disclosed to the bodies active 
in criminal proceedings. At the same time, the person should be provided with 
a legal means on the basis of  which they could seek judicial review of  the procedure 
of  collecting and handling the relevant data. Any exemption to this duty would 
be admissible only for the reasons stipulated by law, where the interest in conceal-
ing the information prevails. Yet even in these cases, the legislature must guarantee 
that the assessment of  the relevant authorities as to whether there are grounds for 
concealing the information was not arbitrary but was subject to obligatory judi-
cial review (cf. also similar conclusions contained in the Judgment of  the Federal 
Constitutional	Court	 of 	Germany	 issued	 on	 2	March	 2010,	 file	 reference	 1	
BvR	256/08,	1	BvR	263/08,	1	BvR	586/08,	especially	paragraphs	281	and	
282). In this respect, the Constitutional Court adds that there is no reason why 
the extent of  the guarantees stipulated by law in relation to ordering the disclosure 
of 	 the	 telecommunication	 traffic	 data	 should	 differ	 from	 the	 perspective	 of 	 its	
content, unless such distinction is of  essential character, from the guarantees stipu-
lated	 in	 relation	 to	 ordering	 telecommunication	 traffic	 interception	 and	 records,	
without regard to the existing legal regulation, since in both cases the intensity 
of  the interference with the right to privacy is comparable.”
As can be also noted from the above citation, the Czech constitutional 
doctrine of  proportionality is to a large extent inspired by the German 
constitutional practice as well as by the works of  German legal schol-
ars.54 Consequently, fundamental rights are all methodologically treated 
54 The doctrine of  proportionality of  fundamental rights is directly derived from 
Rober Alexy’s method of  assessment of  contradictory legal principles – see Alexy, R. 
Constitutional Rights, Balancing and Rationality, 2003, Ratio Iuris, Vol. 16, No. 2, 
131-140.
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by the Court as legal principles, which means that none of  them is superior 
to another per se (their mutual relations always have to be resolved ad hoc). 
Thus, it is impossible to state that for instance privacy is in general more rel-
evant for the Court than freedom of  speech – on the contrary, every conflict 
of  fundamental rights (or in general of  any constitutional principles) has 
to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
2.2.1 Secrecy of  telecommunications
The doctrine of  proportionality was used in a number of  cases, namely with 
regards to wiretapping. In most cases, the courts (namely the Supreme Court 
and the Constitutional Court) did not assess the mere question as to whether 
wiretapping is compliant with the proportionate understanding of  constitu-
tional rights, but rather reviewed only the form in which wiretapping was 
used in a particular case, including its procedural aspects. That means that 
wiretapping is not normally subject to full review as to its mere existence 
in the Czech judicial practice, but rather as to the form in which it is used 
in particular cases.55
A specific issue, also considered by the Constitutional Court in several cases, 
is the transferability of  wiretapped records. In this issue, the Court had 
to deal namely with subjective and substantive transfers. Substantive trans-
fers are such transfers that happen e.g. when the Police has received a court 
order for wiretapping reasoned by a particular suspicion of  a crime and later 
it is determined that it might be used as an evidence in a different criminal 
matter (e.g. the court order is obtained for the crime of  fraud and it turns 
out later that the wiretapped data can be used as crucial evidence in a case 
of  blackmail). In these cases, the Constitutional Court has regularly ruled 
in favour of  such use of  wiretapped data.56
On the other hand, subjective transfers are such transfers that happen not 
just upon different causes but among different institutions. It means that e.g. 
the domestic intelligence agency received a court order for intelligence purposes 
and it then turned out the data could be used by the Police in an investigation 
55 For detailed analysis of  constitutional cases related to wiretapping and use of  wire-
tapped data, see for example Pokorný, L. Zpravodajské	služby, Praha: Auditorium, 2012.
56 See for example Kybic, P. K otázce použití odposlechu a záznamu telekomunikačního 
provozu jako důkazu v jiné trestní věci, Trestněprávní	revue, 2002, Vol. 1, No. 4, p. 114–117.
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of  a crime. In such cases, the Constitutional Court has regularly ruled against 
the admissibility of  such evidence in criminal trials, since it has ruled that once 
the eventuality of  possible use of  wiretapped data by a different institution 
arises, such an institution is obliged to request a new order.57
2.2.2 Secrecy of  retained traffic data
In terms of  the protection of  fundamental rights against state intrusions, 
the Czech Republic is substantially different from countries that have not 
been ruled by a Nazi or a Communist regime. Even 25 years after the politi-
cal changes of  1989, the general assumptions in the society regarding 
the regular functioning of  the state and its security institutions are a priori 
negative. Even the Supreme Administrative Court and the Constitutional 
Court present themselves as judicial bodies whose main purpose is to pro-
tect the individual against intrusions committed by the state. Consequently, 
there is a significant level of  suspicion about any new forms of  state activity, 
which intrude upon individual constitutional rights.58
Unlike some other EU Member States, the Czech Republic had data reten-
tion legislated prior to the adoption of  the Directive. Upon the adoption 
of  the Directive, the provisions laid down in the Telecommunications Act 
were broadened and so was the range of  state institutions entitled to ask for 
such data.
A recently applicable version of  data retention is valid after the Constitutional 
Court has ruled against its first implementation. Using the doctrine of  pro-
portionality, the Constitutional Court has stated that the retention as such 
might be fit to fulfil all three steps of  the proportionality test, but that it does 
not meet the requirement of  minimum possible intrusion.
The Court ruled that (official translation):59
“The primary function of  the right of  respecting private life is to provide space 
for development and self-realization of  the individual personality. Apart from 
the	traditional	definition	of 	privacy	in	its	space	dimension	(protection	of 	the	home	
57 See Polčák, R., Púry, F., Harašta, J. et al. Elektronické	 důkazy	 v	 trestním	 řízení, Brno: 
Masarykova univerzita, 2015, p. 181.
58 See Pokorný, L. Zpravodajské	služby, Praha: Auditorium, 2012, 150 p.
59 Decision file number Pl. ÚS 24/10, 94/2011 Sb., N 52/60 SbNU 625, English transla-
tion available at http://www.usoud.cz/en/decisions/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=40
&cHash=c574142df486769e0b435954fead08c3.
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in a broader sense) and, in connection with the autonomous existence and pub-
lic authority, undisturbed creation of  social relationships (in a marriage, family 
or society), the right to respecting private life also includes the guarantee of  self-
determination in the sense of  primary decision-making of  an individual about 
themselves. In other words, the right to privacy also guarantees the right of  an indi-
vidual to decide, at their own discretion, whether and to what extent, how and 
under what circumstances the facts and information concerning their personal pri-
vacy should be made accessible to other entities. This aspect of  the right to privacy 
takes the form of  the right to informational self-determination, expressly guaran-
teed in Article 10, para. 3 of  the Charter.
The right to informational self-determination is thus a necessary condition not only 
for free development and self-realization of  an individual, but also for establish-
ing free and democratic communication rules. Put it simply, under the circum-
stances of  an omniscient and omnipresent state and public authority, the freedom 
of  expression, the right of  privacy and the right of  the free choice of  behaviour 
and acting become virtually non-existent and illusionary.
Although	 the	 prescribed	 obligation	 to	 retain	 traffic	 and	 location	 data	 does	 not	
apply	to	the	content	of 	individual	messages	[see	Article	1,	para.	2	of 	the	Directive	
2006/24/EC	 of 	 the	 European	 Parliament	 and	 Council	 of 	 15	 March	
on the retention of  data generated or processed in connection with the provi-
sion of  publicly available electronic communications services or of  public com-
munications	 networks	 and	 amending	Directive	 2002/58/EC	 (hereafter	 only	
as the Data Retention Directive) and the contested provisions of  Section 97, para. 
3,	sentence	4)	of 	Law	No.	127/2005	Coll.	on	Electronic	Communications	and	
Amendment of  Some related Acts (Act on Electronic Communications) in their 
latest	wording]	the	data	on	the	users,	addresses,	precise	time,	dates,	places,	and	
forms of  telecommunications connection, provided that monitoring takes place over 
an extended period of  time and when combined together, allows compiling detailed 
information on social or political membership, as well as personal interests, incli-
nations or weaknesses of  individual persons.
On condition that the criminal law allows for exercising the public interest to pros-
ecute criminal activity by means of  robust tools the use of  which results in seri-
ous limitations of  the personal integrity and fundamental rights and freedoms 
of  an individual, then when applied, constitutional law limits have to be respected.
Restrictions imposed on personal integrity and individual privacy (i.e. breaching 
the respect towards them) may only be applied as an absolute exception, pro-
vided it is deemed necessary in a democratic society, unless it is possible to meet 
2 Constitutional and Statutory Safeguards of Telecommunications
43
the purpose pursued by the public interest in any other way and if  it is acceptable 
from	the	perspective	of 	the	legal	existence	and	respecting	effective	and	specific	guar-
antees against arbitrariness. Essential presumptions of  a due process require that 
the	individual	be	provided	with	sufficient	guarantees	against	the	potential	abuse	
of  power by the public authorities.
With respect to the seriousness and extent of  the infringement of  the right to pri-
vacy in the form of  the right to informational self-determination (in the sense 
of  Article 10, para. 3 and Article 13 of  the Charter), represented by the use 
of  the retained data, the legislature limited the possibility to use the retained data 
only for the purposes of  criminal proceedings prosecuting serious crime and only 
in the case that such an objective cannot be achieved using any other means. In fact, 
this is anticipated not only by the Data Retention Directive, referred to above, but 
also by the provisions of  Section 88, para. 1 of  the Criminal Procedure Code, 
defining	 the	 conditions	 for	 enacting	 interception	 and	 records	 of 	 telecommunica-
tions operation (“on condition that criminal proceedings related to serious crime 
have been initiated”), from which the afore-mentioned legal regulation included 
in the provisions of  Section 88a of  the Criminal Procedure Code as a whole 
deviates without any due reason, providing for the legal regulation in obvious con-
tradiction to the opinions of  the Constitutional Court.
As for the examined case of  global and preventive collection and retention of  data 
on electronic communications, the need to have such guarantees available is becom-
ing even more important to the individual owing to the current enormous and fast-
moving development and occurrence of  new and more complex information tech-
nologies, systems and communication tools, which unavoidably results in the bor-
ders	between	private	and	public	space	being	blurred	to	the	benefit	of 	the	public	
sphere, since in the virtual environment of  information technologies and electronic 
communications (in the so-called cyberspace), every single minute, especially owing 
to the development of  the Internet and mobile communications, thousands or even 
millions of  items of  data and information are recorded, collected and virtually 
made accessible, interfering with the private (personality) sphere of  the individual, 
yet if  asked, they would probably be reluctant to knowingly let someone else in.”
We might speculate that the original draft of  the reasoning of  this deci-
sion might have contained even stronger statements about the actual con-
stitutional disproportionality of  the instrument of  data retention as such. 
The final version of  the reasoning, however, includes these formulations 
only in the form of  rhetorical questions as a part of  its obiter dictum. In any 
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case, the Court’s very strong stance against the form, in which data retention 
had been previously legislated, is apparent from the fact that the respec-
tive provisions of  Czech statutory law were repealed with immediate effect 
(this caused significant problems to law enforcement and security authori-
ties in the time between the publication of  the decision and the adoption 
of  new legislation).
In addition to the above-cited decision, the Constitutional Court also ruled 
against a provision that originally provided for the opportunity of  various 
authorities to request traffic data for the purpose of  criminal procedure. 
In this case, the Court essentially stated that procedural safeguards in request-
ing of  traffic data should be analogically strong as in the case of  wiretapping. 
The Court ruled (official translation):60
“It may be summarised that although Section 88a of  the Criminal Procedure 




Although the assessment as to whether this condition has been met is granted 
to the presiding judge or the judge within the preliminary proceedings, who decides 
on	 ordering	 such	 data,	 its	 very	 general	 and	 vague	 definition	 cannot	 be	 deemed	
sufficient.	That	 is	 especially	 true	when	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 absence	 of 	 any	
further regulation concerning the subsequent disposal of  the data and the fact 
that disclosing the data in question represents, in relation to the affected users 
of  electronic communications services, an interference with their fundamental right 
to privacy in the form of  the right to informational self-determination pursuant 
to Art. 10, para. 3 and Art. 13 of  the Charter and Art. 8 of  the Convention. 
Above	all,	the	legislature	utterly	failed	to	reflect	the	requirement	of 	proportion-
ality of  interference with fundamental rights with respect to the pursued goal 
in the contested provision, since the access to the data in question is authorised, 
in essence, as a common means of  collecting evidence for the purposes of  criminal 
proceedings, conducted for any criminal offence whatsoever. In view of  the serious-
ness of  the relevant interference with an individual’s private sphere, this limitation 
will only pass the test if  it meets the conditions arising from the proportionality 
60 Decision of  the Constitutional Court file number Pl. ÚS 24/11, 43/2012 Sb., N 217/63 
SbNU 483, English translation available at http://www.usoud.cz/fileadmin/user_up-
load/ustavni_soud_www/Decisions/pdf/Pl_US_24-11.pdf.
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principle. That means that the access of  the bodies active in criminal proceedings 
to	the	telecommunications	traffic	data	may	only	come	into	question	when	the	pur-
pose of  the criminal proceedings cannot be achieved any other way. The legal regu-
lation	must	therefore	contain	sufficient	guarantees	for	preventing	the	use	of 	such	
data for any other purposes than those assumed by the law and that the restric-
tion of  the individual’s right to informational self-determination does not amount 
to	excessive	interference	with	respect	to	the	importance	of 	specific	societal	relation-
ships, interests or values that are subject to the criminal offence subject to the cor-
responding criminal proceedings. The contested provision does not respect these 
limitations	and	this	deficiency	may	not	be	eliminated	even	by	means	of 	the	stipu-
lated judicial review. In their decisions on ordering the disclosure of  relevant 
data, courts may grant protection to the right to informational self-determination 
with respect to the facts of  a particular case, yet their case law cannot replace 
the	absence	of 	a	sufficient,	definite	and	legitimate	legal	regulation,	which	is,	pursu-
ant to Art. 4, para. 2 of  the Charter, a condition for placing limitations upon 
fundamental rights and freedoms in general.”
In comparison with the case of  substantive statutory provisions, which lay 
down merely the data retention obligations, the Constitutional Court did not 
consider the procedural constitutional disproportionalities, although they 
were found unconstitutional, as equally problematic. We might also specu-
late that the Court may have noted the serious problems previously caused 
by the immediate effect of  its prior decision on data retention. Consequently, 
Article 88a of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure was repealed with a suffi-
cient delay to enable the adoption of  a constitutionally compliant alternative.
The Court also expressly stated that although the statutory procedure was 
unconstitutional as such, it did not imply a lack of  constitutional compli-
ance (and the subsequent inadmissibility of  the retained data as evidence) 
in individual criminal cases per se. Although some of  the accused or sen-
tenced individuals later tried to challenge the admissibility of  such evidence 
in their trials, the results were mostly in favour of  admissibility. In that 
respect, we might state that the lack of  proportionality in the substantive 
and procedural statutory rules of  data retention was in practice often cured 
by the fact that the respective Police forces, State Prosecutors etc. acted 
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in a manner that is constitutionally compliant. In other words, the Police 
or Public Prosecution acted in certain cases with a higher standard of  pro-
tection of  individual rights than what was expressly demanded by the appli-
cable law.
2.2.3 Secrecy of  information systems
For a relatively long time, the Czech law did not include any instrument 
making intrusions into information systems illegal as such. Criminal law, 
as well as civil and administrative law included specific provisions that made 
it possible to sanction destructive intrusions (e.g. those that lead to damag-
ing these systems or revealing data) or intrusions made against specific kinds 
of  systems (e.g. systems containing classified data).61 However, an intrusion 
in itself  was not subject to any specific kind of  legal sanctions.62
Nowadays, the Czech criminal law contains different provisions, which 
ensure for criminal liability in cases of  simple intrusions. Consequently, 
it is possible to prosecute an offender only upon proving the mere fact 
of  intrusion (i.e. without the need to prove actual damage).63
Section 232 of  the Criminal Code provides for criminal sanctions only 
in cases when damage to data is proven. That is analogous to the aforemen-
tioned provision of  repealed Criminal Code that originally served the pur-
pose of  protecting information systems against intrusions.
Including criminal sanctions for a mere intrusion of  information systems 
triggered negative response mainly from computer scientists.64 There was 
even a popular petition against the adoption of  new types of  criminal con-
ducts into the Criminal Code, motivated by the fear that freedom of  scien-
tific research was being threatened (research and development in computer 
61 For a historical overview of  the development of  the Czech cybercrime law, see Smejkal, 
V. Kybernetická kriminalita, Plzeň: Aleš Čeněk, 2015, 636 p.
62 See Smejkal, V. Kriminalita v prostředí informačních systémů a rekodifikace trestního 
zákoníku, Trestněprávní	revue, 2013, Vol. 2, No. 6, pp. 161-166.
63 See sections 182, 183 and 230 – 232 of  the Criminal Code. For detailed description, see 
Šámal, P. et al. Trestní	zákoník	–	komentář	II.	§	140-421, Praha: C. H. Beck, 2009, pp. v-xiv, 
1451-3586.
64 See for example the public petition titled „Opinion of  IT Security Experts 
on the Clarification of  the Amendment to the Criminal Code“ (Názor odborníků 
z oblasti ochrany informačních systémů k upřesnění návrhu trestního zákoníku), pub-
lished online 11. 10. 2015 at http://itpravo.cz/index.shtml?x=694071.
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sciences includes, namely as to security assignments, the possession and 
use of  intrusive tools, which fall under the hypotheses of  the above-cited 
provisions). The Criminal Code, however, contains an escape clause (called 
‘material corrective’ in the Czech doctrine of  criminal law), which makes 
it possible to prosecute only such conduct that is harmful to society. This 
requirement is laid down, together with the principle ultima ratio, in sec-
tion 12, para 2, which reads as follows: “Criminal liability of  an offender and 
criminal consequences associated with it may only be applied in socially harmful cases 
where	application	of 	liability	according	to	other	legal	regulations	does	not	suffice.”
2.3 Statutory consequences of  constitutional protection
Historically, intrusive measures, as well as protective instruments, were pri-
marily focused on real-time communications and specifically on telecom-
munications (nowadays called ‘electronic communications’). Consequently, 
there is, apart from the Charter of  Fundamental Rights and Freedoms cited 
supra, also a set of  more or less traditional black-letter rules that lay down 
in detail the procedures for wiretapping and the subsequent use of  acquired 
data.
On the contrary, the Czech law does not have much regulatory experience 
with stored communications, i.e. with data that are for some reason stored 
somewhere and can also be used as evidence or as security intelligence. 
The only examples of  relatively detailed rules that are related to stored com-
munications are those implemented for the retention of  traffic data.65 In any 
case, there is still a lack of  more detailed provisions for communications 
(data) stored on personal devices and those stored by providers of  informa-
tion society services, apart from electronic communications service providers.
For example, the acquisition and forensic analysis of  mobile communica-
tion devices is subject to the same rules as acquisition of  any other tan-
gible assets.66 Similarly to that, there are no specific rules for the Police 
65 For a detailed analysis of  these provisions, see Chudomelová, Z., Beran, M., Jadrný, V., 
Němečková, Š., Novák, J. Zákon	o	elektronických	komunikacích	–	komentář, Praha: Wolters 
Kluwer, p. 313.
66 See for example Polčák, R. Púry, F., Harašta, J. et al. Elektronické	důkazy	v	trestním	řízení, 
Brno: Masarykova univerzita, 2015, p. 121 and 145.
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or other forces with investigative powers to request data that are stored, 
mostly upon the consent of  users, by providers of  hosting services,67 which 
fall outside the licensing regulations for providers of  services of  electronic 
communications.68
All that, of  course, does not mean that the Police or the Prosecution Service 
would be entirely disqualified from working with stored e-mails or files 
in the clouds – in such cases, they just have to apply the general rules origi-
nally made with an entirely different teleology. Apart from the lack of  effi-
ciency, redundant formalities and sometimes even the lack of  logical sense 
(in some areas, the Police uses, in order to get stored data, the terms related 
to stored tangible assets), another problem is that this situation might also 
lead to a higher risk of  ad hoc disproportionate infringement of  constitu-
tional rights. It is, in our view, only a matter of  time before the courts start 
ruling against the admissibility of  evidence obtained from some stored com-
munications, simply due to the fact that the general procedural tools used 
to acquire it did not provide for enough safeguards as to informational self-
determination or other individual (distributive) informational rights.
2.3.1 Protection of  the secrecy of  telecommunications
Apart the Charter of  Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (cited supra, 
II.2.1), the secrecy of  telecommunications is protected by a number of  stat-
utory provisions. In particular, the Electronic Communications Act contains 
specific provisions which lay down in relatively detailed manner the duties 
of  electronic communications service providers to secure substantive data 
(content), traffic data and related metadata (e.g. directories) from unlaw-
ful interference.69 In any case, the aforementioned provisions, whenever 
they apply on personal data, act as lex specialis in relation to the Personal 
67 See Art. 14 of  the Directive 2000/31/EC of  the European Parliament and of  the Council 
of  8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of  information society services, in particular elec-
tronic commerce, in the Internal Market (‘Directive on electronic commerce’).
68 Stored data discovery and acquisition is, together with freezing orders, currently dealt 
with by a special expert group of  the Ministry of  Justice, which aims to draft an amend-
ment to the Code of  Criminal Procedure specifically for that purpose. This initiative, 
however, has proven, for various reasons, to be more complex and problematic than 
it was originally envisaged.
69 See Chudomelová, Z., Beran, M., Jadrný, V., Němečková, Š., Novák, J. Zákon o elektron-
ických	komunikacích	–	komentář, Praha: Wolters Kluwer, p. 289.
2 Constitutional and Statutory Safeguards of Telecommunications
49
Data Protection Act.70 Any subsequent forms of  processing of  personal 
data, including the rights of  data subjects, the limitations regarding trans-
fers of  data to other jurisdictions, etc. are regulated by the Personal Data 
Protection Act. The subsequent applicability of  the Personal Data Protection 
Act became apparent in a case where a user requested traffic data from 
the operator of  their mobile phone. That request was based on a general 
provision of  the Personal Data Protection Act, which lays down in the sec-
tion 12 the duty of  a controller to inform the data subject, upon a request, 
about any of  their personal data that are being processed.71
It is to be noted that general provisions of  the data protection law apply, 
apart providers of  services of  electronic communications, also to other 
information society providers (e.g. on-line messengers, hosting providers 
etc.). However, these providers are not recognised as electronic communica-
tions providers by Czech law, so we do not deal with their obligations.
2.3.2 Protection of  the confidentiality and 
integrity of  information systems
The issues of  confidentiality and integrity of  information systems (and even-
tually of  the third aspect of  IT security, i.e. the availability) are not recog-
nised in the form of  a specific constitutional principle. As noted above, they 
are constitutionally protected through the protection of  the respective sys-
tems as such (namely by the general protection of  property) or by the pro-
tection of  data stored therein (i.e. by the protection of  information self-
determination, the freedom of  speech, the freedom of  scientific research, 
the right to work etc.)
Confidentiality and integrity, however, form a specific part of  the Czech law 
of  electronic communications.
Sections 98 and 99 of  the Electronic Communications Act cover the pro-
viders of  services of  electronic communications.72 Apart from that, 
70 Act No. 101/2000 Sb., English translation available at https://www.uoou.cz/en/vis-
mo/zobraz_dok.asp?id_org=200156&id_ktg=1107.
71 For a detailed analysis of  specific provisions of  the Czech Data Protection Act, see 
Kučerová, A., Nováková, L., Foldová, V., Nonnemann, F., Pospíšil, D. Zákon	o	ochraně	
osobních	údajů	–	komentář, Praha: C. H. Beck, 2012.
72 In detail, see Chudomelová, Z., Beran, M., Jadrný, V., Němečková, Š., Novák, J. Zákon 
o	elektronických	komunikacích	–	komentář, Praha: Wolters Kluwer, p. 325.
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the confidentiality and integrity of  information systems and information 
networks is also subject to the Cybersecurity Act73, which defines its main 
aim, i.e. the security of  information in section 2 c) as follows (informal 
translation): “Security of  information means ensuring the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of  information”.
Under normal circumstances, the Cybersecurity Act applies to administra-
tors of  information and communication systems, which belong to specifi-
cally listed critical information infrastructure, administrators of  important 
information systems (specifically listed public information systems) and 
administrators of  important networks (i.e. networks with direct cross-bor-
der connectivity). These entities are, regardless of  their nature (i.e. private 
or public entities), obliged to implement standard security measures and 
to report in real-time the occurrence of  cybersecurity incidents to a national 
or governmental CERT. They also have to obey administrative orders issued 
by the National Security Authority (Narodni bezpecnostni urad). Any lack 
of  compliance is, just like in the case of  the Electronic Communication Act, 
considered an administrative offence.74
2.3.3 Protection of  the core area of  privacy
The only part of  the Czech law where privacy stricto sensu is addressed spe-
cifically is private law. However, the Civil Code, although adopted as recently 
as 2012, reflects neither the recently problematic nature of  the concept 
of  privacy nor its current technological determination. The reason is that 
its structure and wording is hugely inspired mostly by Code Civil, ABGB, 
BGB and by Czech legislative drafts from the first half  of  the twentieth cen-
tury. As a result, the Czech Civil Code includes only very general provisions 
whose meaning for the everyday life in the information society is highly 
uncertain.
Moreover, the Civil Code introduces an extremely broad concept of  an asset 
(věc) – anything (including rights) “distinguished from an individual and 
73 Act No. 181/2014 Sb., English translation available at https://www.govcert.cz/
download/nodeid-1143/.
74 For a complex overview of  Czech cybersecurity law, see Polčák, R. Kybernetická 
bezpečnost jako fenomén českého práva, Revue pro právo a technologie, 2015, Vol. 6, No. 11, 
p. 95-149.
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useful to humans” is considered to be an asset. The implementation of  this 
traditional Austro-German concept into the Czech law was entirely new and 
so there is a substantial shortage of  case-law that would clarify even the basic 
interpretative questions. In particular, it is questionable whether personal data 
or other data that originate in the private information sphere of  an individual, 
might be considered “assets.” On one hand, they can be distinguished from 
individuals (they can exist independently); on the other hand, they are still 
strictly related to them. A similar situation exists in the case of  profiles on user-
generated-content services processing personal data (e.g. social networks).75
The relative uncertainty of  the meaning of  privacy stricto sensu in private 
law leads to practically problematic situations where even very basic dis-
putes have to be handled as hard cases. In such cases, even regular courts 
have to apply the doctrine of  proportionality described in the first part 
of  this chapter. For example, the Regional Court of  Brno had to decide 
a case, in which an owner of  an apartment building installed cameras into 
the entrance hall and justified their presence by the purpose to protect mail-
boxes from theft. The court applied the full proportionality test and held 
that such an installation is not proportionate, as there are less privacy-intru-
sive alternatives available for achieving the same purpose (i.e. to preventively 
protect mailboxes).76
The relatively vague nature of  the meaning of  the term ‘privacy’ in the Czech 
law (whether it be constitutional or private law) means that the concept of  pri-
vacy is not used in administrative or criminal law. In particular, the liability for 
administrative offences and crimes is constructed upon more formally defined 
terms like “personal data,” “traffic data,” “correspondence” etc.
2.3.4 Criminal liability for the unlawful infringement 
of  the telecommunication secrecy
The Criminal Code offers several of  options that cover different possibilities 
of  unlawful interference with communication networks. The Czech Republic 
is party to the Budapest Treaty,77 so these provisions reflect the standard 
75 For a detailed discussion of  this issue, see Polčák, R. Informace a data v právu, Revue 
pro právo a technologie, 2016, Vol. 7, No. 13, pp. 67-91.
76 See case No. C 45/2007-121 (Krajský soud v Brně, 6 November 2015).
77 The treaty was finally passed and promulgated in 2013 under No. 104/2013 Sb.m.s.
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types of  crimes laid down therein.78 In particular, unlawful interference can 
be typically subsumed under the following:
• section 182 Violating Confidentiality of  Messages;
• section 230 Unauthorised Access to Computer Systems and 
Information Media.
It ought to be noted that there are specific provisions in the Electronic 
Communications Act and Cybersecurity Act, which lay down technical 
requirements for the providers of  various telecommunication services. 
As a result, there is a reason to expect that such services are properly techni-
cally secured and any unlawful interference would require overcoming some 
security measures. Thus, it is possible to sanction the unlawful interference 
also through the possession crime aimed at devices and tools (including 
passwords) whose aim it is to access protected systems or networks – in par-
ticular, the Criminal Code provides for section 231 Measures and Possession 
of  Access Devices and Computer System Passwords and other such Data.
It must be noted that the Czech criminal law sanctions also preparatory 
activities as well as attempted crimes, as laid down in sections 20 and 21 
of  the Criminal Code.
Stored communications are protected by the criminal law through the crime 
defined in section 183 as Breach of  Confidentiality of  Documents and 
other Privately Kept Documents. Subsequently, it is also possible to use 
section 230 Unauthorised Access to Computer Systems and Information 
Media and section 231 Measures and Possession of  Access Devices and 
Computer System Passwords and other such Data.
In any case, it is relatively complicated to formulate doctrinal opinions about 
particular elements of  the aforementioned protective provisions, as relevant 
case-law is still not available. For example, there are no cases so far that 
would provide for answers as to the applicability of  section 230 or sec-
tion 231 in relation to decryption keys or other tools making it possible 
to work with encrypted data.
78 For a discussion of  the implementation issues of  the Budapest treaty, see for exam-
ple Smejkal, V. Kriminalita v prostředí informačních systémů a rekodifikace trestního 
zákoníku, Trestněprávní	revue, 2013, Vol. 2, No. 6, pp. 161-166.
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2.3.5 Protection of  professional secrets in criminal procedural law
The Czech law does not have a common denominator for professional 
secrets. However, certain sorts of  data are specifically protected in crimi-
nal procedural law through the general protection of  secrecy and protec-
tion of  classified information. Duties of  secrecy are contained in different 
parts of  Czech statutory law. The most important examples for the scope 
of  this book include the duties of  secrecy laid down in the Advocacy Act,79 
those defined in medical law (secrecy of  health records), banking law (secrecy 
of  bank account data), those defined in the Electronic Communications Act 
or those laid down in the Cybersecurity Act (secrecy of  records on cyber-
security incidents). A very specific case relates to the secrecy duties with 
regards to security files, i.e. personal files assembled by the National Security 
Authority in the course of  evaluation of  applicants for a security clearance 
(i.e. for the permission to handle classified information) – there are only 
extremely exceptional cases when, together with client data held by solicitors, 
these data might be used in criminal proceedings. In the case of  other sorts 
of  data covered by secrecy duties, the respective statutory provisions always 
contain relatively accessible procedures for the exclusion of  secrecy duties.
The main provision covering the use of  data under secrecy duties is contained 
in section 8 of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure. The provision implies that 
the most sensitive sort of  data covered by secrecy duties are the client’s data, 
processed by their solicitor. The higher level of  their statutory protection 
is based on the right to a fair trial, which also includes the right for profes-
sional representation at court. Such representation can be provided only 
if  the client is able to give their solicitor open access to the complete data 
about their case (incl. information that might not be favourable to their court 
standing). Consequently, such data have to be excluded from being avail-
able to the prosecutors or the police. Therefore, when the data processed 
by solicitors are to be gathered and used in criminal proceedings, a special 
procedure involving the Bar association and a court decision is required.
The so-called ‘advocate confidentiality,’ is, as to its range and possibilities 
of  abuse, subject to a continuous debate in the Czech Republic. On the one 
79 Act No. 85/1996 Sb., English translation is available at http://www.cak.cz/assets/act-
on-legal-profession_219_2009.pdf.
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hand, solicitors tend to abuse this statutory limitation to cover corruption, 
money laundering, operations prohibited by antitrust laws etc.80 On the other 
hand, the Public Prosecution Service is constantly testing the boundaries 
of  this statutory protection and so raids on stored solicitor communications 
are not rare.
Recently, there a decision was made in a highly debated case, in which 
the Public Prosecution Service requested a permission to search a cloud stor-
age facility that contained solicitor communications.81 The law firm in ques-
tion refused to provide the requested data with a reference to the aforemen-
tioned ‘advocate confidentiality’. The Public Prosecution Service requested 
a court warrant and the court held that data stored in cloud, i.e. outside 
of  premises of  the solicitor, should not be regarded as client-solicitor com-
munication – meaning that solicitors are obliged to keep such data under 
their physical control. The court therefore considered the storage on a cloud 
service as proof  of  the fact that these data are not to be regarded as solici-
tor-client communication.
This decision triggered strong reactions from the Bar Association and its 
members, because it can be technically interpreted in the sense that protec-
tion under the header of  ‘advocate confidentiality’ only applied to such data 
that are physically stored within the premises of  the respective solicitors. This 
would technically ban solicitors from using cloud services (even those based 
on specifically rented secure servers). However, the reasoning of  the deci-
sion in question did not provide sufficient technical detail as to the condi-
tions under which the seizure of  solicitor data in the cloud was possible, 
so there is a reason to expect further development of  the Czech case law 
in this matter.82
80 This was mentioned even in a decision of  the Constitutional Court file number III. 
ÚS 3988/13, U 5/72 SbNU 583, available in Czech (no known English translations are 
available to this date) at http://nalus.usoud.cz/Search/ResultDetail.aspx?id=83083&po
s=1&cnt=1&typ=result.
81 Interim decision (usneseni) No. Nt 615/2014, available in Czech (no known English 
translations are available to this date) at http://www.scribd.com/doc/235322741/
Nt-615-2014.
82 See for example Smejkal, V. Ochrana dat advokátů v elektronických úložištích, Bulletin 
advokacie, 2015, No. 3, pp. 15-22.
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2.3.6 The principle of  the “purpose limitation of  personal data”
The principle of  the purpose limitation of  personal data is incorporated 
in the Personal Data Protection Act. The most important provisions that 
lay down the purpose limitation are section 5 paragraphs 1 and 2. These 
provisions are general and apply to all kinds of  personal data, including 
data processed by providers of  electronic communications services, services 
of  information society etc. The general purpose limitation, however, does 
not apply on security, defence and law enforcement bodies, as these are 
exempt by section 3 para 6, whichreads as follows:83
“The provisions of  Article 5(1) and Articles 11 and 12 of  this Act shall not 
apply	to	processing	of 	personal	data	necessary	to	fulfil	obligations	of 	the	controller	
provided by special Acts to ensure:
(a) security of  the Czech Republic,
(b) defence of  the Czech Republic,
(c) public order and internal security,
(d) prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of  criminal offences,
(e) important economic interest of  the Czech Republic or of  the European Union,
(f)	important	financial	interest	of 	the	Czech	Republic	or	of 	the	European	Union,	
in	particular	the	stability	of 	financial	market	and	currency,	functioning	of 	cur-
rency circulation and system of  payments as well as budgetary and taxation meas-
ures, or (g) exercise of  control, supervision, surveillance and regulation related 
to exercise of  public authority in the cases under (c), (d), (e) and (f), or (h) activi-
ties	related	to	disclosure	of 	files	of 	the	former	State	Security.”
The exemption of  the aforementioned authorities and public bodies from 
the general purpose limitation does not mean that the purpose limitation 
does not apply at all. Such processing is also limited by its purpose, because 
the Act expressly states that the processing powers are to ensure (i.e. for 
the purpose of) security, defence etc. The respective state authorities and 
other bodies are then limited as to the scope and methods of  processing 
of  personal data by statutes that specifically define their powers. All such 
authorities are then internally and externally supervised, so the purpose 
limitation applies not directly through the Personal Data Protection Act 
83 For a doctrinal commentary, see Kučerová, A., Nováková, L., Foldová, V., Nonnemann, 
F., Pospíšil, D. Zákon	o	ochraně	osobních	údajů	–	komentář, Praha: C. H. Beck, 2012, p. 12.
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but through regular limitations and supervisory powers over their activi-
ties. It is also to be noted that a general constitutional principle applies, 
regarding the fact that state institutions may only engage in operations that 
are expressly ordered or permitted by the law – this principle is laid down 
in Article 2(3) of  the Constitution, which reads as follows: “State authority 
is to serve all citizens and may be asserted only in cases, within the bounds, 
and in the manner provided for by law.”84
84 Constitutional Act No. 1/1993 Sb., English translation is available at http://www.psp.
cz/en/docs/laws/constitution.html.
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3 POWERS FOR ACCESSING 
TELECOMMUNICATION DATA
3.1 Overview
The key regulation the interception of  electronic communication and 
other methods for accessing electronic communications data for the pur-
pose of  criminal investigations, is contained within the Code of  Criminal 
Procedure.85
There are two specific provisions of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure that 
allow law enforcement authorities to intercept electronic communication 
and to access electronic communications data for the purpose of  criminal 
investigations – sections 88 and 88a.
The first of  these lays down the rules for interception and recording of  elec-
tronic communications, while the second one states the rules for accessing 
metadata related to data transmission in electronic communication networks, 
which are the subject of  the telecommunications secret or which are sub-
ject to the protection of  personal and intermediation data. Section 88 basi-
cally allows law enforcement authorities in criminal proceedings to intercept 
and record the content of  data transmissions in real time, under specified 
conditions, whereas section 88a allows them, under specified conditions, 
to access traffic and location data, which must be retained by all entities pro-
viding a public communications network86 or a publicly available electronic 
communications service87 (ISPs) in accordance with the Act on Electronic 
Communications.88
85 Act No. 141/1961 Sb. on Criminal Procedure.
86 An electronic communications network used fully or mainly for providing publicly avail-
able electronic communications services, which support the transfer of  information be-
tween end nodes of  the network. See Section 2 of  the Act on electronic communications.
87 A publicly available service normally provided for a remuneration, which consists fully 
or mainly of  a transfer of  signals via electronic communications networks. See Section 
2 of  the Act on electronic communications.
88 Act No. 127/2005 Sb. on electronic communications and amending certain related laws 
(the Act on Electronic Communications).
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Since there are no other specific rules for coercive powers trying to obtain 
stored data, communications stored by the user or the ISP may be accessed 
and processed in accordance with more general provisions, which allow 
law enforcement authorities to obtain (with the subject’s consent, or upon 
request according to Section 78 of  the Act on Criminal Procedure) or seize 
(Section 79 of  the Act on Criminal Procedure) devices and storages 
in which the data are stored, to conduct surveillance of  persons and things 
during (section 158d of  the Act on Criminal Procedure) which the data may 
be gathered, or to request respective information or data using production 
order (section 8 of  the Act on Criminal Procedure).
Czech statutory law also includes other laws that deal with intercep-
tion or are somehow important for it. Those primarily include Act 
No. 127/2005 Sb. on electronic communications and its implementing regu-
lations, Act No. 273/2008 Sb. on the Police of  the Czech Republic or Act 
No. 85/1996 Sb. on advocacy. These acts will be described in more detail 
bellow.
3.2 Requirement of  (reasonable) clarity for 
powers in the law of  criminal procedure
As noted above, the Czech Republic has a relatively long experience with 
situations when the work of  state authorities, including those involved 
in criminal proceedings, had almost no other purpose than to oppress citi-
zens of  a dissenting political opinion. Consequently, the recently applicable 
limitations on the powers of  institutions involved in the criminal procedure 
are strict and there is also a general tendency to outline these powers quite 
strictly and precisely. A basic summary of  the principles that govern Czech 
criminal procedural law is provided in Section 2 of  the Code of  Criminal 
Procedure.
The need for a strict clarity of  powers was also one of  the main reasons 
why the Constitutional Court stopped the previous implementation of  data 
retention obligations, since it contained only general formulations instead 
of  an explicit list of  institutions entitled to ask for retained traffic data and 
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a precise specification of  the related procedures, including an explicit pos-
sibility for a judicial review. The Court ruled:89
“37.	 In	 its	 judgments,	 the	 conditions	 outlined	 above	 have	 been	 specified	
by the Constitutional Court when assessing the admissibility of  the interven-
tion of  the public authority to individual privacy taking the form of  telecom-
munication	operation	interception	[cf.	e.g.	the	quoted	Judgments	file	reference	II.	
ÚS	502/2000,	file	 reference	 IV.	ÚS	78/01,	file	 reference	 I.	ÚS	191/05,	
or	 file	 reference	 I.	 ÚS	 3038/07	 issued	 on	 29	 February	 2008	 (N	 46/48	
SbNU	549)].	The	infringement	of 	the	individual’s	fundamental	right	to	privacy	
in the form of  the right to informational self-determination in the sense of  Article 
10, para. 3 and Article 13 of  the Charter, due to the prevention of  and protec-
tion against criminal activity is thus possible only by means of  imperative legal reg-
ulations which have to conform to, above all, the rights arising from the principle 
of  the legal state (rule of  law state) and which meet the requirements arising from 
the	proportionality	test	when,	 in	the	case	of 	a	conflict	between	the	 fundamental	
rights and freedoms with the public interest or any other fundamental rights and 
freedoms, the purpose (objective) of  such infringement must be assessed in relation 
to the means applied, whereas it is the proportionality principle (in a broader 
sense) that provides the standard for such assessment. The wording of  such legal 
regulations	must	be	precise	and	unambiguous,	while	also	being	sufficiently	predict-
able	so	that	it	provides	potentially	affected	individuals	with	sufficient	information	
on the circumstances and conditions under which the public authority is entitled 
to interfere with their privacy and so that they can act accordingly in order to avoid 
conflict	with	 the	 restricting	norm.	Moreover,	 the	powers	 granted	 to	 the	 relevant	
authorities, as well as the manner and the rules of  application, must be strictly 
defined	so	that	individuals	are	provided	with	protection	against	arbitrary	infringe-
ments. From the perspective of  the proportionality principle (in a broader sense), 
assessing the admissibility of  the infringement in question includes three criteria. 
The	first	one	lies	in	assessing	the	eligibility	of 	fulfilling	the	purpose	(or	appropri-
ateness	as	well),	where	it	is	determined	whether	the	specific	measure	itself 	is	capa-
ble of  achieving the intended purpose, being the protection of  another fundamental 
right or public interest. The second criterion consists in assessing the necessity, 
i.e. examining whether, upon selecting the appropriate means, the one being most 
89 Decision of  the Constitutional Court file number Pl. ÚS 24/10, 94/2011 Sb., 
N 52/60 SbNU 625, English translation available at http://www.usoud.cz/en/
decisions/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=40&cHash=c574142df486769e0b435954fead
08c3.
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considerate	of 	 the	 fundamental	right	has	been	opted	for.	And	finally,	 it	 is	nec-
essary to assess the adequacy (in a narrower sense), i.e. whether the prejudice 
to the fundamental right is not disproportionate in relation to the intended pur-
pose, which means that the measures imposing a restriction on fundamental rights 
and freedoms must not, in case of  a collision of  the fundamental right or free-





51. Under no circumstances may the stipulation of  the duty imposed on legal 
entities or natural persons to secure that “the content of  message should not 
be	retained	together	with	the	defined	data”	(Section	97,	para.	3,	sentence	four)	
or the duty to “eliminate them upon the expiration of  the period unless they have 
been provided to the competent authorities in compliance with a special legal regu-
lation or unless stated otherwise within the Act (Section 90)” (Section 97, para. 
3,	 sentence	 six)	be	deemed	by	 the	Constitutional	Court	as	providing	 sufficient,	
unambiguous, detailed and appropriated guarantees. The retention period itself, 
“no shorter than 6 months and longer than 12 months”, the expiration of  which 
determines the obligation to remove the data, can also be deemed as ambiguous 
and	totally	insufficient	with	respect	to	the	extent	and	sensitivity	of 	the	retained	











in the Electronic Communications Act (Section 87 and further), “over observing 
the duties and obligations when processing personal data” or the corresponding 
instruments of  its activities and monitoring cannot be considered as an adequate 
and effective means of  protecting the fundamental rights of  the individuals 
affected,	since	they	do	not	control	the	instrument	by	themselves	[see	the	Judgment	
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file	reference	Pl.	ÚS	15/01	issued	on	31	October	2001	(N	164/24	SbNU	
201;	 424/2001	 Coll.)	 where	 appropriate].	 As	 a	 consequence,	 the	 actions	
referred to above, constituting an obvious infringement of  the fundamental right 
to privacy in the form of  the right to informational self-determination (in the sense 
of  Article 10, para. 3 and Article 13 of  the Charter) and due to the legal 
regulation	being	considered	as	insufficient	and	failing	to	meet	the	afore-mentioned	
constitutional requirements, occur beyond the scope or reach of  any immediate (yet 
subsequent) review, particularly a judicial one, the necessity of  which has also been 
expressed by the ECHR in the Decision concerning the case of  Camenzind v. 
Switzerland, referred to above.”
It is to be noted that the Public Prosecution Service and the Police imple-
mented relatively strict procedures internally, which ensured for a precise, 
case-by-case documentation of  each request. They also included court orders 
(although that not been legislated). Consequently, the retained data used 
in some previous cases did not have to be declared inadmissible evidence.
The lack of  clarity was also the main reason for the Constitutional Court 
decision cited supra, which repealed the former provisions of  the Code 
of  Criminal Procedure that laid down the competence of  the Public 
Prosecution to request retained data. In that case, the Court ruled:90
“24. The wording of  the contested provision implies that the order for disclosure 
of 	the	telecommunication	traffic	data	is	only	expressly	conditioned	by	the	fact	that	
such	measures	must	pursue	the	goal	of 	“clarification	of 	the	circumstances	signifi-
cant for criminal proceedings”. The Constitutional Court believes that the limits 
of  the fundamental right to informational self  determination regulated in this 
manner are formulated too widely and vaguely, and in essence, they allow the rel-
evant data to be requested and used by the bodies active in criminal proceedings 
each time a certain connection with the on-going criminal proceedings may be asso-
ciated with them. At the same time, the Court is aware of  the obligation of  public 




other possibility to achieve the goal of  the criminal proceedings otherwise or whether 
90 Decision of  the Constitutional Court file number Pl. ÚS 24/11, 43/2012 Sb., N 217/63 
SbNU 483, English translation available at http://www.usoud.cz/fileadmin/user_up-
load/ustavni_soud_www/Decisions/pdf/Pl_US_24-11.pdf.
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it does not amount to an inadequate interference with the individual’s fundamental 
right. It also considers important that the protection of  fundamental rights and 
freedoms is subject to, in every individual case, review of  an independent and 
impartial court, since decision making on issuing the relevant order is granted 
by the contested provision to the presiding judge or the judge within the preliminary 
proceedings, whereas such orders must be issued in writing and accompanied with 
reasoning. Nevertheless, these are guarantees that allow protection to be provided 
against an inadequate interference with the right to informational self-determina-
tion	with	respect	to	the	facts	of 	a	particular	case,	yet	they	cannot	eliminate	the	defi-
ciencies	 consisting	 in	 indefiniteness	and	 too	 general	a	 character	 of 	 the	 contested	
legal regulation in such a way that they would replace, on their own and in general 
terms, the consideration of  the legislature on the intensity of  a certain public inter-
est in restricting a fundamental right or freedom in the case of  individual criminal 
offences	and	the	manner	(i.e.	specific	form)	of 	such	restriction,	including	the	afore-
mentioned subsequent guarantees when disposing of  the relevant data, which rep-
resent	a	political	decision	adopted	within	the	limits	defined	by	the	constitutional	
order, with their own detailed abstract consideration. If  adopted by courts, this 
approach would also be inconsistent with Art. 4, para. 2 of  the Charter, pursu-
ant to which limitations of  the fundamental rights and freedoms may be placed 
upon them only by law, since only the legislature is provided with the constitutional 
capacity, upon imposing a certain duty, to give preference, at its own discretion 
and while respecting the proportionality principle, of  the public interest approved 
by	the	constitutional	order	to	the	fundamental	right	in	a	type-defined	legal	rela-
tion. Furthermore, leaving the determination of  the constitutionally constituent 
limits only on the decision-making practice of  courts would not be consistent with 
the requirement of  legal certainty, since any potential interference with the right 
to	informational	self-determination	is	not,	as	a	consequence	of 	the	indefiniteness	
of  the current legal regulation, predictable for the individual to such an extent 
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3.3 Differentiation and classification of  powers 
in the law of  criminal procedure
The coercive powers related to telecommunications data are relatively 
precisely defined in the criminal procedure. In that respect, Czech law 
is relatively specific by having a bi-lateral regulation of  interception of  
electronic communications and retention of  traffic metadata. That means 
that the duties and procedures that apply on the side of  the providers 
of  electronic communications services are defined in the Act on Electronic 
Communications, while the procedures that apply on the side of  the Police 
or the public prosecution are laid down in the Code of  Criminal Procedure. 
The reason for such dichotomy lies in the fact that wiretapping and data 
retention serve other purposes than just criminal procedure. Consequently, 
the provisions laid down in the Act on Electronic Communications cover 
in general the obligations of  the providers of  services of  electronic com-
munications and specify only the purposes for which the given data might 
be requested. The procedures of  requesting these data as such are then laid 
down in specific Acts (incl. the Code of  Criminal Procedure).
The relevant provision of  the Act on Electronic Communications is sec-
tion 97 and the relevant provisions of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure are 
sections 88 and 88a.
It is to be noted that, despite having a formal opportunity to request wiretap-
ping or retained traffic data, de facto, the Police has extremely limited options 
to use this coercive power in criminal proceedings. As a result, in practice 
there are no situations in which the Police requests wiretapping or traffic 
data for the purposes of  criminal procedure directly – when the given data 
is needed for use in a criminal procedure, such requests are always made 
through the Public Prosecution Office.
As noted earlier, there are, apart from traffic data, no specific procedural 
rules for the various coercive powers to obtain stored communications. 
Consequently, stored communications are gathered and forensically used 
based on the general rules, which enable the Police or the Public Prosecution 
to secure assets, request information, conduct surveillance etc.
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4 INTERCEPTION OF CONTENT DATA
4.1 Object of  interception
Like in most modern countries, the Czech law contains one key provision 
in the criminal procedure law, that deals with interception of  the content 
of  communication in transmission – Section 88 of  the Criminal Procedure 
Code.
According to this provision, the object of  interception is broadly specified 
as “telecommunications traffic”. Neither legislature nor case law however 
deals with the definition of  this term. Traditionally, this term means com-
munication between persons via landlines, mobile phones, fax, radio or sim-
ilar devices. However, due to technological development, the interpretation 
of  has evolved. Nowadays it would probably cover all sorts of  communi-
cation transferred via telecommunications and electronic communications 
networks, including communication between computers or other communi-
cation devices, as well as any kind of  IP traffic, regardless of  whether it was 
generated by persons or computers. Even content data transferred while 
one is surfing the web via electronic communications networks would prob-
ably be subject to interception.
When defining the term “telecommunications traffic”, literature usually 
refers to the Act on Electronic Communications.91 This act in itself  does not 
contain a definition of  the term, but we may understand it as content trans-
ferred via electronic communications networks, which are defined by the act 
as transmission systems and, where applicable, switching or routing equip-
ment and other facilities, including network elements, which are inactive and 
which permit the conveyance of  signals.92
Another suggestion may be found elsewhere in the Act on Electronic 
Communications, specifically in Section 89, which deals with the confiden-
tiality of  communication. Based on this provision and other clues, we may 
91 For example Šámal, P. et al. Trestní	řád:	komentář. 7., extended release, Praha: C. H. Beck, 
2013, xxii, 1898 p.
92 Section 2 letter h) of  the Act No. 127/2005 Sb. on electronic communications.
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conclude that telecommunications traffic may be defined as any data trans-
ferred via public electronic communications networks between a finite num-
ber of  subscribers or users. Since it is impossible to tell in advance whether 
intercepted electronic communication will or will not contain such data, any 
interception should be done only after an interception order is issued.
The abovementioned provision of  the Criminal Procedure Code therefore 
covers access to ongoing electronic communication. The Police may, once 
it has received the interception order, intercept any data that are “in traf-
fic” – from the moment they are sent from the source device to the moment 
they are received by the destination device. Which means that it also covers 
the interception of  electronic communication data, which are temporarily 
stored during the process of  transmission.
There is also debate on whether the interception order also covers transmis-
sion outside of  the network. Recently a decision has been issued, mention-
ing that an interception record also contained a conversation, which was 
taking place near a phone connected to another phone at the time of  the 
interception93. According to technicians, the phone transmits surrounding 
sounds even before the other party of  the call picks up the phone and judg-
ing from the decision mentioned above, even these sounds are part of  inter-
ception record. The use of  such a record as evidence is rather problematic, 
because nobody can reasonably expect the phone to transmit the surround-
ing sounds to the provider even before the call itself  begins. However, there 
is at the moment no case law to clarify this matter.
Electronic communication data, which are stored before or after the process 
of  transmission (e.g. email drafts or sent emails, emails stored by the pro-
vider, received emails stored by the recipient or completely web-based com-
munication, for example on social networks), are not protected by the tel-
ecommunication secrecy, but are recognized as documents stored in private, 
which means that the access to such data is governed by different provisions 
of  the Criminal Procedure Code.
Since the Criminal Procedure Code is rather outdated, it does not address 
access to data or stored electronic communication in detail. The only 
93 Page 50 of  the decision of  the City court in Prague from 30. 4. 2014 No. 42 T 8/2013. 
Available in Czech at http://www.pecina.cz/files/Rozsudek_MS-P_30. 4. 2014.pdf.
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detailed rules are related to access to the traffic and location data retained 
by electronic communications service providers94. Apart from that, there 
are no specific provisions providing clear rules for accessing stored com-
munication data. Therefore, when there is need to access such data, law 
enforcement authorities are forced to apply more general rules, which were 
originally made for different purposes.
The methods usually used for accessing electronic communication data 
stored before the beginning or after the end of  telecommunication trans-
mission (message drafts, sent messages, stored received messages, etc.) vary 
depending on the source of  such data.
The communication data may be stored on a device (hard drives, flash 
drives, mobile phones, computers, etc.), which may be acquired following 
the provisions on Obligation to release property95, or Seizure of  property96, 
seized during house or personal searches97 or examined98. Such communica-
tion data can be accessed without further consent from the judge or public 
prosecutor. There is also some discussion as to what data are considered 
to be stored in the seized computer system. For example, according to some 
interpretations, even communications data that are stored in a connected 
cloud storage, may be accessed from the seized device without further con-
sent, because they are considered a part of  such a computer system. There 
is, however, no official opinion or judicial decision to clarify this matter.
If  the data is stored elsewhere (by the provider, in the cloud, on someone 
else’s device etc.), then it is protected as records stored in private and may 
be accessed only with prior consent of  the judge (surveillance of  persons 
or items99), or prior consent of  the respective user. This approach is also 
94 Section 88a of  the Act No. 141/1961 Sb. code of  criminal procedure.
95 Section 78 of  the Act No. 141/1961 Sb. code of  criminal procedure.
96 Section 79 of  the Act No. 141/1961 Sb. code of  criminal procedure.
97 Section 82 of  the Act No. 141/1961 Sb. code of  criminal procedure.
98 Section 113 of  the Act No. 141/1961 Sb. code of  criminal procedure.
99 Section 158d of  the Act No. 141/1961 Sb. code of  criminal procedure.
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supported by the Opinion No. 1/2015 of  the Supreme Public Prosecutors 
Office, which states: 100
“The current content of  the email inbox is determined by the will of  the user and 
can be accessed following the rules stipulated in section 158d para. 3. of  the Code 
of  Criminal Procedure, which can be considered a legal license to overcome the con-
stitutional	right	to	privacy	of 	records	located	in	an	email	inbox	[…]”
However, this applies only to the data stored on the device or on the server 
at the moment of  the seizure or first access. Should the seized device 
or obtained access be used for further interception of  transmissions received 
in the future, an order for interception and recording of  telecommunica-
tions is necessary. This is also supported by the opinion cited above, which 
in the para. 3 states:




The Czech government is aware of  the obsolescence of  the Code 
of  Criminal Procedure and is therefore preparing its complete recodifica-
tion. As far as we know, during this process the possibility of  introducing 
specific provisions for access to electronic data, including communication 
data, has also been discussed. However, the entire process of  recodification 
is in its infancy and so we cannot expect any substantial changes in the leg-
islation in the near future.
4.2 Special protection of  confidential communication content
The provision on interception of  electronic communication only pro-
vides protection for the communication between the defence counsel and 
the accused. Such communication is inadmissible in criminal proceedings 
and if  the police authority finds during the interception that the accused 
has been communicating with their defence counsel, they are obliged 
100 Opinion No. 1/2015 of  the Supreme Public Prosecutors Office, on the harmonization 
of  interpretation of  laws dealing with access to mobile devices and other storage me-
dia, including the content of  e-mail inboxes. This document is not available in English, 
translation by the author.
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to immediately destroy the interception record and not to use the informa-
tion obtained in this context in any way101. These rules are deemed rather 
problematic by some sources. The reason is that most interceptions are 
conducted before the commencement of  the criminal prosecution and 
in this stage, the person against whom the criminal proceedings are con-
ducted is not related to as the accused. Therefore, a stricto sensu interpretation 
of  the provision would mean that before the commencement of  the crimi-
nal prosecution, the police would be able access and use even the commu-
nication between the persons against whom the criminal proceedings are 
conducted and their attorney. Some sources see this as an intrusion into 
the right to a fair trial102.
Also, the protection of  communication between the defence counsel and 
the accused is not absolute. Particularly when the communication relates 
to a crime, which has been committed by the defence counsel in coopera-
tion with the accused, the protection does not apply. This approach is sup-
ported in the decision of  the Constitutional Court No. I.ÚS 1638/14, which 
states (informal translation): 103
“However, as is clear from the case law of  the European Court of  Human 
Rights and of  the Supreme Court, the protection of  communication between 
a solicitor and their client is not absolute, inviolable and may be limited in certain 
circumstances. Any possible criminal activity of  the solicitor, both to the detriment 
of  the client or to the detriment of  others in complicity with the client, cannot 
be considered provision of  legal services, and in such case it is impossible to provide 
any protection of  such activity.”
4.3 Execution of  telecommunication interception
According to the Act No. 237/2008 Sb. on Police of  the Czech Republic, these 
activities are conducted by the Czech Police as is laid down in Section 19.
101 Section 88 paragraph 1 of  the Act No. 141/1961 Sb. code of  criminal procedure.
102 For example in Czech see Vantuch, P. Nová úprava odposlechu v trestním řádu 
od 1. 7. 2008. Bulletin advokacie, 2008, No. 10, p. 29.
103 Decision of  the Constitutional Court file number I. ÚS 1638/14. Available online 
in Czech at http://nalus.usoud.cz/Search/GetText.aspx?sz=1-1638-14_1. Provided ex-
cerpt translated by the author.
INTERCEPTION OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND SLOVAKIA
70
A special unit of  the Police called the Unit for Special Activities is respon-
sible for conducting the interception itself. The Unit for Special Activities 
is a specialized unit, which carries out interception and recording of  tel-
ecommunications traffic and surveillance of  persons and items for author-
ized security and law enforcement bodies, in accordance with the Code 
of  Criminal Procedure, the Act on Police of  the Czech Republic and other 
relevant legislation. It is the only unit authorized to conduct these operations 
and this position is reflected in its organizational structure – its headquarters 
is located in Prague and it also has subsidiaries in each region of  the Czech 
Republic. Every interception order is forwarded to this unit, which subse-
quently carries it out. The recordings of  intercepted traffic are then pro-
vided to the investigator who is responsible for the respective criminal 
investigation.
The criminal law does not stipulate which modes law enforcement authori-
ties should use when executing the interception. The specific methods they 
use are also kept confidential, but as far as the we know, the Police usu-
ally intercept the communication itself  using dedicated access points, which 
the ISPs are obliged to install into their infrastructures.104 They can prob-
ably also intercept the communication without any recourse to third parties 
(ISPs) by using special equipment and tools, even though it is not very usual. 
When it is practical, the police may also order the ISP to extract and sur-
render specific stored communication data.
There are no accompanying investigative measures mentioned in the main 
provision itself. Law enforcement authorities may, however, follow different 
provisions in order to access houses or other places105 or to be able to use 
specific technical measures to gain access to the communication.106
4.4 Duties of  telecommunication service 
providers to cooperate
The duty of  ISPs to cooperate in the interception is stipulated in the Act 
No. 127/2005 Sb. on electronic communications (Act on Electronic 
104 See Section 97 of  the Act No. 127/2005 Sb. on electronic communications.
105 See Section 82 of  the Act No. 141/1961 Sb. on Criminal Procedure.
106 See Section 158d of  the Act No. 141/1961 Sb. on Criminal Procedure Code.
4 Interception of Content Data
71
Communications), which obliges entities providing public communication 
networks or publicly available electronic communications services to install 
specific equipment for interception into their infrastructures and to cooper-
ate during the interception (see below). These entities are defined in Section 
2 of  the Act.
It is important to note that these obligations apply only to providers of  net-
work infrastructures or electronic communications services, which are 
licensed by the Czech Telecommunications Office. Therefore, providers 
of  services of  information society107 (IP-application level – Internet appli-
cations, cloud, email services, social networks, etc.), for example, are not 
specifically obliged to provide such cooperation.
More specifically, according to Section 97 of  the Act on Electronic 
Communications, an entity providing a public communications network 
(infrastructure providers working on the IP-transport level) or a pub-
licly available electronic communications service (access providers 
on the IP-transport level) is required to allow interception and recording 
of  transferred communication at the expense of  the police.
According to this provision, these providers are required to install a dedi-
cated interface into their infrastructures, which the Unit for Special Activities 
can use to connect their devices used for accessing ongoing traffic.
This duty is described in detail in the decree No. 336/2005 Sb. In accord-
ance with this decree, providers and the police shall agree on the technical 
parameters of  the equipment, which the provider will purchase and install 
into the network or service to provide an interface for connecting devices 
for wiretapping:108
“Section 7
(1) A legal entity or a natural person providing a public communications net-
work or a publicly available electronic communications service (hereinafter referred 
to as “operator”) shall equip their network or service with interface for connecting 
devices for interception on the basis of  a request from a competent authority.
107 According to the Act No. 480/2004 Sb. on some services of  the information society.
108 Decree No. 336/2005 Sb. on technical and operational conditions and points of  con-
nection of  the telecommunications equipment for interception and recording of  tele-
communications traffic. This decree isn’t available in English to date. The cited provision 
was translated by the author.
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(2)	If 	the	operator	is	developing	a	new	network	or	service,	significantly	expand-
ing or changing the existing network or service, they shall prompt the competent 
authority to issue a request for equipping the network or service with an interface 
for connecting interception devices. The competent authority shall issue the request 
within 15 days from the prompting.
(3) On the basis of  request issued according to the paragraph 1 or 2, the operator 
in cooperation with the competent authority shall propose possible technical solu-
tions, including the reasons for their implementation and a calculation of  the cost 
of  each solution.
(4)	The	chosen	solution	and	its	parameters	shall	be	specified	in	a	record	jointly	elab-
orated by the competent authority and the operator. The record shall also include 
a	calculation	of 	financial	costs	and	the	method	and	schedule	of 	the	payment.”
The methods of  transfer of  intercepted data from the ISPs to the Police are 
described in Section 13 of  the decree No. 336/2005 Sb., according to which 
the intercepted communication is transferred to the police via a hard data 
link or a secure virtual channel on the Internet (using the standardized 
communication protocol SFTP – the provider accesses the police server). 
The provided data should be equipped with a specific identifier and a times-
tamp. The integrity of  the data is to be ensured by creating a fingerprint using 
the SHA-1 hash function. The intercepted emails may be sent to the Police 
also via a dedicated SMTP server. The respective provision states:109
“Packet networks outputs
Section 13
(1) The output of  the network or service is provided via a) a hard data link, 
or b) a secure virtual channel on the Internet using the standardized communica-
tion protocol FTP, server shall be provided by a competent authority and operator 
should connect as a client.
(2)	 The	 sent	 data	 unit	 shall	 be	 equipped	 with	 an	 identifier	 of 	 user	 address	
and a serial number or a time stamp. The data integrity of  the data unit shall 
be	ensured	by	creating	a	file	stamp	using	the	hash	function	SHA-1.
109 Section 13 of  the decree No. 336/2005 Sb. on technical and operational conditions 
and points of  connection of  the telecommunications equipment for interception and 
recording of  telecommunications traffic. This decree isn’t available in English to date. 
The cited provision was translated by the author.
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(3) During the interception of  emails, the operator may, with consent from 
the competent authority, send copies of  messages using protocol for transferring 
email	to	the	SMTP	server	provided	by	the	competent	authority.”
As far as we know, there are no checks and filtering obligations for provid-
ers mentioned in the statutory law. ISPs (providers of  a public communi-
cation network or a publicly available electronic communications service) 
are, however, according to Section 97 paragraph 6 of  the Act on Electronic 
Communications, obliged to provide access to decrypted traffic if  they are 
using any form of  encryption.
If  the communication is encrypted by the user, or by the provider 
of  IP-application level services, then the ISP is not obliged to assist com-
petent authorities in decrypting it in any way. Also, these rules do not apply 
to providers of  information society services (IP-application level), although 
they may be required to provide access to decrypted communications data 
by the police authority if  it is necessary for the success of  surveillance of  per-
sons and items, according to section 158d para. 9 of  the Code of  Criminal 
Procedure.
4.5 Formal prerequisites of  interception orders
The interception of  electronic communications may be conducted only 
after there is a valid interception order, which is a decision sui generis.
Only the public prosecutor may apply for the interception order in pre-
liminary proceedings, usually after consultation with the police investiga-
tor. Before submitting the application, the public prosecutor usually verifies 
whether the criminal proceedings are being conducted for a crime, for which 
the interception can be ordered. He particularly assesses whether the offence 
described in the record of  the commencement of  the criminal proceeding 
or in the resolution to initiate the criminal prosecution corresponds with 
the used legal classification. He also assesses whether it may be reasonably 
assumed that the interception will yield facts relevant to the criminal procee-
dings and whether there is no other way to achieve such purpose or whether 
its achievement would be otherwise significantly reduced.
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The justified application is then presented to the judge, who can authorize 
the interception by issuing the order, according to the section 88 para. 2 
of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure:
“Interception and Recording of  Telecommunications
Section 88
(2) The presiding judge and, in preliminary proceedings upon the petition 
of  the public prosecutor, the judge, is entitled to warrant the interception and 
recording	of 	telecommunications.	[…]	The	order	for	the	interception	and	record-
ing of  telecommunications shall immediately be forwarded to the police authority. 
In the preliminary hearing, the judge shall send a copy of  the order for the inter-
ception and recording of  telecommunications to the public prosecutor without 
undue delay.”
This procedure is described in detail in the section 32 of  the instruction 
of  the Ministry of  Justice Ref. No. 505/2001-Org, which issues the internal 
and office directive for courts: 110
“Section 32
Interception and Recording of  telecommunications
(1) The judge shall, at the time of  availability, apply the procedure described 
in section 27 para. 1.
(2) The judge shall decide on the application of  the public prosecutor for intercep-
tion	 and	 recording	 of 	 telecommunications	 traffic	 in	 accordance	with	 section	88	
para. 2 of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as “inter-
ception”)	without	delay	 or	within	 the	period	agreed	with	 the	public	 prosecutor;	
on the proposal of  the public prosecutor to extend the duration of  the interception 
(section 88 para. 4 of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure), the judge will decide 
no later than on the last working day before the expiry of  the previously issued 
interception	order,	if 	the	public	prosecutor	filed	the	proposal	at	least	3	working	
days before the expiry of  the interception order.”
The order is then forwarded to the investigator and to the Unit for Special 
Activities, which carries out the interception.
110 Instruction of  the Ministry of  Justice Ref. No. 505/2001-Org, which issues the internal 
and office directive for courts. Provided provision translated by the author.
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The application for interception order, according to the Art. 67 of  the bind-
ing guideline of  the Police President No. 30/2009 Sb. on the tasks in crimi-
nal proceedings,111 usually contains the following information:
a) the identifier of  the device or the user, if  his identity is known,
b) the specific facts about the case, which justify the need to issue 
the interception order, and its duration,
c) if  the criminal proceedings are conducted for an intentional criminal 
offence, for which prosecution is stipulated in a declared internatio-
nal treaty, a reference to this international treaty,
d) a description of  the offence and its legal classification,
e) a list of  interception orders already issued for the same identifier,
f) the application for an interception order itself.
The complexity of  the justification and description of  the case in individual 
applications varies depending on the complexity of  each case. The appli-
cation may also be submitted with investigative files or other additional 
materials.
Applications are submitted to the court in written form. The basic formal 
requirements for the interception orders themselves are defined in the sec-
tion 88 para. 2 of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure as follows:
“[…]	The	order	for	interception	and	recording	of 	the	telecommunications	service	
shall include a determined user address or a user device and the user if  their 
identity is known, and the period during which the interception and recording 
of 	 telecommunications	 traffic	 is	 conducted	 cannot	 be	 longer	 than	 four	months;	
the	justification	of 	the	order	must	include	the	specific	facts	that	justify	the	issue	
of 	such	order	as	well	as	its	period.	[…]”
The Constitutional Court has also dealt with the formal requirements 
of  interception orders in its Decision number II. ÚS 615/06.112 According 
to it, an interception order must be supported by relevant clues from which 
one can derive a reasonable suspicion of  committing a crime. The mere 
existence of  a criminal complaint is not a sufficient justification for issuing 
the interception order. In addition, the court stated that the interception 
111 Binding guideline of  the Police President No. 30/2009 Sb. on the tasks in criminal 
proceedings. In Czech available online at http://www.pecina.cz/files/pokyn2.pdf.
112 Decision of  the Constitutional Court file number II. ÚS 615/06-1, N 88/45 SbNU 291.
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order must be individualized in relation to a specific person or device. 
The order must also specifically state what facts relevant to the criminal 
proceedings would probably be obtained. The court also criticized the prac-
tice of  some interception orders being issued, even though the material 
conditions of  the case had not been sufficiently assessed. The interception 
order also must therefore contain an assessment of  these conditions.
Based on these findings, the interception order should contain at least:
a) the order of  interception,
b) an identifier of  the user or the device,
c) the name of  the user, if  it is known (name, address, etc.),
d) an identification of  the crime, for which the criminal proceedings 
is conducted (a reference to an international treaty if  applicable),
e) the duration of  the interception (no longer than 4 months).
Additionally, the justification of  the order should include:
a) specific facts about the case, which justify the issuance of  the inter-
ception order and its duration,
b) the purpose of  the interception,
c) an explanation of  the reason why there is no other way to achieve 
the purpose or why its achievement would otherwise be significantly 
reduced.
4.6 Substantive prerequisites of  interception orders
According to Section 88 para. 1 of  the Criminal Procedure Code, the inter-
ception order can be justified by the following crimes:
• machinations in insolvency proceedings,
• violation of  regulations on the rules of  competition,
• negotiating advantages during public procurement, tender and auction,
• machinations during public procurement and tenders,
• machinations at a public auction,
• misuse of  the powers of  an official person, or other intentional crimi-
nal offence for which prosecution is stipulated in a declared interna-
tional treaty.
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Additionally, it may be justified also by crimes for which the law stipulates 
a prison sentence with the upper penalty limit of  at least eight years.
Any user and any device that fall within the scope of  the Act on Electronic 
Communications may be subject to an interception order if  the required cri-
teria are met and if  the judge considers the reasoning of  the application suf-
ficient. Since the interception order must include a determined user address 
or user device, it cannot target any particular communication content, but 
only a particular person or device. A user is, according to section 2 of  the Act 
on Electronic Communications, defined as “anyone who uses or requests 
a publicly available electronic communications service”, so it includes users 
of  IP-transport level services as well as users of  IP-application level services.
The order for the interception and recording of  telecommunications may 
be issued if  it may be reasonably assumed that facts relevant to the crim-
inal proceedings will be obtained this way and if  there is no other way 
to achieve such purpose or if  its achievement would be otherwise signifi-
cantly reduced113. The investigator, the public prosecutor and most impor-
tantly the judge should therefore consider whether the specific facts relevant 
for criminal proceedings cannot be secured by other, less intrusive means 
of  investigation referred to in the Code of  Criminal Procedure.
This approach is based upon basic principles of  criminal proceedings 
defined in the section 2 of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure, especially 
on the principle of  proportionality and the principle of  moderation formu-
lated in Section 2 para. 4 as follows:
“[…]Criminal	cases	shall	be	dealt	with	a	full	investigation	of 	rights	and	freedoms	
guaranteed by the Charter of  Fundamental Rights and Freedoms and by interna-




There is no additional obligation for the authorizing authority to verify 
that the interception is proportionate to the seriousness of  the offence 
in the individual case. The proportionality is, however, always assessed 
in the interception order. For example, if  in one case the police authority 
113 Section 88 paragraph 1 of  the Act No. 141/1961 Sb. Code of  Criminal Procedure.
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applied for too many interception orders, the judge would probably refuse 
to issue it, because he would find it disproportionate and against principle 
of  moderation formulated in the section 2 para. 4 of  the Code of  Criminal 
Procedure cited above.
The required degree of  suspicion is not specified in the positive law, but 
it usually is evaluated on a case by case basis by the judge. In some intercep-
tion orders judges did not assess the degree of  suspicion enough, which 
is why the Constitutional Court stated in the supra cited decision that 
the order should contain at least relevant clues, from which one can derive 
reasonable suspicion of  committing the specified crime.
The maximum length of  an interception order is 4 months, and based 
on the assessment of  the current course of  the interception, the judge 
of  a superior court and, in the preliminary hearing upon a petition 
of  the public prosecutor, a deputy county court judge may extend the dura-
tion of  the interception and recording of  telecommunications traffic even 
repeatedly; however, always only for a maximum period of  four months.
There is no positive provision that deals with the possibility of  revoca-
tion of  the interception order. However, in our opinion, the issuing judge 
may decide to revoke the order when a lack of  substantive prerequisites 
for the interception becomes apparent. Also the Constitutional court may 
revoke the interception order.
According to Section 88 para. 8 of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure, 
the Supreme Court may subsequently review the legality of  the intercep-
tion order, following the procedure described in sections 314 l – 314 n 
of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure.
The police authority is also obliged to continuously assess whether the rea-
sons, which led to the order for the interception and recording of  telecom-
munications are still valid. If  the reasons have expired, they are obligated 
to immediately terminate the interception and recording of  telecommunica-
tions even before the end of  the period, for which the interception order was 
issued. They also must immediately notify in writing the judge who issued 
the order for the interception and recording of  telecommunications.114
114 Section 88 paragraph 3 of  the Act No. 141/1961 Sb. Code of  Criminal Procedure.
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4.7 Consent by a communication participant to the measure
The law enforcement authority may also order the provider to intercept 
and record telecommunications or conduct it themselves, even without 
the interception order, but only if  the user of  the intercepted unit agrees 
to such a measure and if  the interception is conducted in connection with 
a criminal proceeding for following criminal offences:
• human trafficking,
• the delegation of  the custody of  a child to someone else,
• restriction of  personal freedoms,
• extortion,
• kidnapping of  a child or persons suffering from a mental disorder,
• violence against a group of  people or an individual,
• dangerous threats, or dangerous persecution115.
This provision is in some sources criticized because it infringes the telecom-
munications secrecy of  the other intercepted user, who did not provide 
the consent. Normally, such infringement is justified on the basis of  a proper 
court order, in which the judge assesses whether there is a reasonable justi-
fication for interception. However, in this case the protection is somewhat 
weaker. On the other hand, some kind of  protection is provided according 
to the General Instruction of  the Supreme Public Prosecutor No. 8/2009, 
on criminal proceedings, which states in Section 45: 116
“Section 45
Interception without court order
The public prosecutor shall make sure, that if  a police authority orders the inter-
ception and recording of  telecommunication without a court order, it shall inform 
him immediately. The public prosecutor then assesses whether the interception was 
ordered in the criminal proceedings for the offence, for which it is possible to use 
this	measure,	and	 that	 throughout	 the	period	of 	 interception	such	qualification	
is	 justified.	 If 	 the	 public	 prosecutor	 determines	 that	 the	 interception	 could	 not	
lead to obtaining facts important for the criminal proceedings, or that the consent 
is invalid or was waived, he orders the police authority to immediately discontinue 
115 Section 88 paragraph 5 of  the Act No. 141/1961 Sb. Code of  Criminal Procedure.
116 General Instruction of  the Supreme Public Prosecutor No. 8/2009, on criminal 
proceedings.
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the interception and destroy the obtained records. The obtained information cannot 
be used further in this case. If  the interception is ordered by the public prosecutor, 
the provisions on the interception ordered by the judge shall apply adequately.”
4.8 Duties to record, report, and destroy
The intercepted data and communications are stored by the Unit for 
Special Activities in a secure storage, and provided to the police investi-
gator. He then assesses the content of  the data and prepares an intercep-
tion record – a document, which usually contains a transcript of  the parts 
of  the communication, which are relevant to the criminal proceedings. 
If  the record is to be used as evidence in the criminal proceedings, it needs 
to be accompanied with a protocol. The protocol must, according to Section 
88 para. 6 of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure, contain information about 
the place where the interception was conducted, the time of  the intercep-
tion, the manner of  the interception, the authority that issued the record, and 
general information about the contents of  the record. The protocol must 
also contain the general information required by Section 55 of  the Code 
of  Criminal procedure.
The police authority is not obliged to provide any reports on the progress 
of  the interception or any other final report to the judge. The record is, 
however, available to the public prosecutor, who should regularly assess its 
content and the legality of  the interception.
If  the interception did not help to find any facts relevant to the criminal 
proceedings, the police authority, after approval from the court or the pub-
lic prosecutor in preliminary hearings, must immediately destroy all records 
after three years from the final conclusion of  the matter.117
If  the police authority was informed about an extraordinary appeal 
within the set deadline, they shall destroy the records of  the interception 
after the decision on the extraordinary appeal or after a final conclusion 
on the matter.
The police authority is responsible for the destruction of  the record and it also 
must send a transcript on the destruction of  the record of  the interception 
117 Section 88 paragraph 7 of  the Act No. 141/1961 Sb. code of  criminal procedure.
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to the public prosecutor, whose decision finally concluded the matter or, 
in the proceedings before a court hearing, to the presiding judge in the first 
instance, for the record on file. The police authority must also order the Unit 
for Special Activities to destroy their respective records.
Also, if  the police authority finds during the interception and record-
ing of  telecommunications that the accused has communicated with their 
defence counsel, they are obliged to immediately destroy the relevant part 
of  the interception recording. In this case the report on the destruction 
of  the record should be placed in the file.118
4.9 Notification duties and remedies
After the final conclusion of  the matter the public prosecutor or the police 
authority, by whose decision the case was finally concluded, or the presiding 
judge in the first instance in the proceedings before a court hearing shall 
inform the affected person, if  their identity is known, about the interception 
and recording of  telecommunications service.119 The information should 
include the designation of  the court that issued an order for the intercep-
tion, the duration of  the interception and the date of  the conclusion.
The information about the interception is not provided to the affected per-
son in cases when:
• the criminal proceedings is conducted for specific crimes,
• the criminal offence involved more people and in relation to at least 
one of  them the criminal proceedings have not yet been finally 
concluded,
• it could lead to threats to national security, life, health, or the rights 
and freedoms of  individuals, etc.120
The affected person may file a petition to review the legality of  the order 
for interception to the Supreme Court121. The procedure of  the judicial 
review is described in the provisions 314 l – 314n of  the Code of  Criminal 
Procedure.
118 Section 88 paragraph 1 of  the Act No. 141/1961 Sb. code of  criminal procedure.
119 Section 88 paragraph 8 of  the Act No. 141/1961 Sb. code of  criminal procedure.
120 See Section 88 paragraph 9 of  the Act No. 141/1961 Sb. Code of  Criminal Procedure.
121 Section 88 paragraph 8 of  the Act No. 141/1961 Sb. Code of  Criminal Procedure.
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If  the interception was conducted illegally, the officials conducting such 
interceptions may also be held liable for the criminal offence of  violat-
ing the confidentiality of  messages according to Section 182 of  the Code 
of  Criminal Procedure. They and also the judge who issued the illegal inter-
ception order may be held liable for the criminal offence of  abuse of  pow-
ers of  an official person according to Section 329 of  Code of  Criminal 
Procedure.
The legality of  interception is also controlled by a Parliamentary Commission 
for monitoring the use of  interception and recording of  telecommunica-
tions traffic, according to Section 98 of  the Act on Police of  the Czech 
Republic.
4.10 Confidentiality requirements
The information about specific measures implemented to allow communica-
tion interception is classified (reserved) according to the act No. 412/2005 Sb. 
on the protection of  classified information.122 If  anyone discloses classified 
information to an unauthorised person, they may be, according to Section 
140 of  the Act on the Protection of  Classified Information, fined for 
an administrative offence with a fine of  up to 5,000,000 Czech crowns and 
also prosecuted for the criminal offence of  endangering classified informa-
tion according to Section 317 or 318 of  the Criminal Code.
ISPs and their employees are also required to maintain confidentiality of  any 
tapping or recording of  traffic and data, according to Section 97 para. 8 
of  the Act on Electronic Communications. The ISP may be fined according 
to the section 118 of  the Act on Electronic Communications for violating 
this duty of  confidentiality in the amount up to 20.000.000 Czech crowns.
122 Act No. 412/2005 Sb. on the protection of  classified information. This act is not avail-
able in English.
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5 COLLECTION AND USE OF TRAFFIC 
AND SUBSCRIBER DATA
5.1 Collection of  traffic data
The most important provision relevant to the collection of  traffic and sub-
scriber data is Section 88a of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure.
Additionally, traffic data not protected by the telecommunications secrecy 
or by the protection of  personal and intermediation data may be requested 
following the procedure stipulated in Section 66 paragraph 3 of  the Act 
No. 273/2008 Sb. on the Police of  the Czech Republic.
Section 88a of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure specifies the types of  crime 
for which the retained traffic data may be requested. The general requirement 
is that the prosecuted crime should be an intentional one, for which the law 
allows for imprisonment with an upper limit of  the penalty of  at least three 
years. This, however, does not apply for the exhaustive list of  crimes, which 
cannot be practically prosecuted without traffic and location data, i.e. crimes 
committed by means of  electronic communication.123 As the Explanatory 
Memorandum states “should the police during investigation of  these crimes have 
no	chance	to	get	traffic	and	location	data,	one	could	consider	the	decriminalization	of 	such	
conduct, as these crimes would be virtually inexplicable.”124 Finally, the data could 
be also requested for the purposes of  criminal proceedings for an intentional 
crime, which the Czech Republic has to prosecute pursuant to an interna-
tional treaty, which is binding the Czech Republic.
123 The full list with the relevant section of  the Penal Code No. 40/2009 Sb. includes 
the following crimes: violating the secrecy of  conveyed messages (Sec. 182), fraud (Sec. 
209) unlawfully gained access to computer system or data carrier (Sec. 230) acquisition 
and receipt of  access equipment or codes for computer systems or other similar data 
(Sec. 231), criminal threat (Sec. 353), stalking (Sec. 354), spreading of  false news (Sec. 
357), incitement (Sec. 364) and criminal connivance (Sec. 365).
124 Explanatory Memorandum to the Act No. 127/2005 Sb. On electronic communications 
and on amendment to some related laws (Electronic Communications Act), as amend-
ed, and certain other laws. Available online in Czech: http://www.psp.cz/sqw/text/
orig2.sqw?idd=84557.
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The provision cited supra also states that the order for the ascertainment 
of  data on the telecommunications service can be issued only when there 
is no other way to achieve the pursued purpose or when its achievement 
would otherwise be significantly harder.
The application for a court order to request traffic data is prepared in the pre-
liminary proceedings by the public prosecutor, usually on the basis of  a written 
and reasoned proposal from the police authority. Before he submits the appli-
cation, he must assess whether the order is necessary in order to obtain facts 
relevant to criminal proceedings, whether there is no other way to achieve 
the pursued purpose, whether the criminal proceedings are conducted for 
an adequate criminal offence and whether he has enough information about 
the case to properly determine what data are to be obtained. He should 
mention these facts in the application in which he also indicates the scope 
of  the required data and formulates a proper justification.125 The completed 
application is then forwarded to the judge, who evaluates the provided infor-
mation and, if  satisfied, issues the order to request traffic data. The order usu-
ally contains more or less the same information as the application. The order 
is then forwarded to the public prosecutor.
The duty of  ISPs to retain and subsequently disclose traffic data is spe-
cifically mentioned in Section 97 paragraph 3 of  the Act on Electronic 
Communications.
According to this provision, ISPs (of  services on IP-transport level) are 
required to retain specific traffic data for a period of  6 months. General 
categories of  data that are subject to data retention are mentioned in para. 
4 of  the respective provision; a more detailed list of  these data is specified 
in Section 3 of  the decree No. 357/2012 Sb. on storing, handing over and 
liquidation of  traffic and location data, which is not available in English. 
The data to be retained may be divided into two general groups:
• data used for identification of  the source and the recipient of  the data 
communication (telephone numbers, IMEIs, IP addresses, MAC 
addresses, port number, IMSI identifier, account identifier – email, 
username etc.)
125 According to the General Instruction of  the Supreme Public Prosecutor No. 8/2009, 
on criminal proceedings.
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• data used for identification of  the date, time, manner and dura-
tion of  the communication (communications protocol details, type 
of  communication, time and date of  the communication, duration, 
length, etc.).
Providers of  information society services (IP-application level) are not spe-
cifically required to retain any traffic data; however, they do so with the con-
sent of  users. The extent of  the data that are retained in this manner varies 
depending on the type of  service.126
In practice orders to request traffic data are usually carefully evaluated 
by the ISPs themselves. If  the order is not specific enough or does not 
contain all the information required by the law, they usually refuse to release 
the data.
As of  now it is not possible to access traffic data by an automated on-
line procedure. The only authority that can request traffic data from ISPs 
is the Unit for Special Activities. They usually send the request to an ISP 
via email to the ISP, who, upon such request, releases the requested data 
in the prescribed format. The Unit for Special Activities then forwards 
the data to the police authority.
5.2 Collection of  subscriber data
Subscriber data could be requested from providers of  a public communi-
cations network or a publicly available electronic communications service 
(IP-transport level services) following the same procedure as in the case 
of  traffic data – Section 88a of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure.
A different procedure applies if  the subscriber data is requested from 
ISPs providing services on an IP-application level according to the Act 
on Information Society Services. In this case the subscriber data may 
be requested from the provider of  IP-application level services using 
a production order issued by the police or a public prosecutor according 
to Section 8 of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure. If  the respective subscriber 
data are subject to an obligation of  secrecy, then they may be requested for 
126 For example social media services usually retain a lots of  traffic and location data where-
as hosting providers retain just a few.
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criminal proceedings upon prior consent of  the judge (Section 8 para. 5). 
This of  course does not affect the obligation of  confidentiality of  an attor-
ney under the Advocacy Act.
The communication data may be requested from ISPs of  IP-transport 
level services in cases specifically stipulated127 in Section 88a of  the Code 
of  Criminal Procedure upon order issued by the judge based on an appli-
cation by the public prosecutor. The formal requirements are the same 
as in the case of  the order to release traffic data. The subscriber data may 
be also requested directly by the police according to Section 66.
5.3 “Data retention”
The “full-scale” data retention framework was first introduced in 2005 
by the Act on Electronic Communications. The act contained quite a vague 
formulation that was in substantive parts linked to the implementing Decree 
No. 485/2005 Sb., on the extent of  traffic and location data, the period 
of  time for which such data are retained and the manner in which they are 
submitted to bodies authorised to use the data, which laid down the techni-
cal details. This whole data retention regulation was rather unclear and loose.
After the adoption of  the Data Retention Directive128 in 2006 the Act was 
amended by the Act No. 247/2008 Sb. However, with regard to the extent 
of  the data to be retained, the Czech implementation went far beyond what 
was requested by the Directive. Namely the amount of  transferred data, 
IMEI and SIM cards relations and the type of  encryption of  the communi-
cation had to be retained.
After harsh criticism of  the data retention framework in the Czech Republic, 
a group of  MPs and Senators submitted a petition to the Constitutional 
Court requesting a review of  the constitutionality of  the framework and 
127 If  the criminal procedure is conducted for the listed crimes and if  there is no other way 
to achieve the pursued purpose or if  its achievement would be otherwise significantly 
harder.
128 Directive 2006/24/EC on the retention of  data generated or processed in connection 
with the provision of  publicly available electronic communications services or of  public 
communications networks.
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an annulment of  the relevant provisions. The Constitutional Court ruled 
on it in the Decision file number Pl. ÚS 24/10,129 which was described 
in the second chapter.
The new version of  data retention was introduced in 2012 by the Act 
No. 273/2012 Sb. amending Act on Electronic Communications, and 
certain other laws. The technical details were prescribed by Decree 
No. 357/2012 on storing, handing over and liquidation of  traffic and loca-
tion data. The new wording of  Section 97 entails an exhaustive enumeration 
of  the subjects that may request the data. A new section 88a of  the Act 
on Electronic Communications was also added, requiring ISPs to ensure 
the security and confidentiality of  the retained data, and ordering them 
to destroy them in an irreversible manner. According to the new wording 
of  Section 97 of  the Act on Electronic Communications, ISPs are required 
to retain specific traffic data for the period of  six months.
The following categories of  data are subject to data retention:
• data used for identification of  the source and recipient of  the data 
communication (telephone numbers, IMEIs, IP addresses, MAC 
addresses, port number, IMSI identifier, account identifier – email, 
username etc.)
• data used for identification of  the date, time, manner and duration 
of  a communication (communications protocol details, type of  com-
munication, time and date of  the communication, duration, length, 
etc.)
129 Decision of  the Constitutional Court file number Pl. ÚS 24/10, 94/2011 Sb., 





6 ACCESS TO (TEMPORARILY) STORED 
COMMUNICATION DATA
There is no specific provision that allows law enforcement authorities 
to access stored communications data, which is why they follow the proce-
dures defined in more general provisions. In the past the fact that regional 
police units work rather independently led to situations, when different 
investigators and public prosecutors followed different general provi-
sions for accessing stored data. For example, in South Moravian Region 
the law enforcement authorities accessed remotely stored email with order 
to request traffic data according to Section 88a of  the Code of  Criminal 
Procedure, whereas in the Pilsen Region the same data were accessed fol-
lowing provision 158d para. 3 of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure on sur-
veillance of  persons and items.
Since this situation led to many problems, the Supreme Public Prosecutors 
Office decided to harmonize the procedures applied by law enforcement 
authorities in different regions of  the Czech Republic. Opinion No. 1/2015 
of  the Supreme Public Prosecutors Office, on the harmonization of  inter-
pretation of  laws dealing with access to mobile devices and other stor-
age media, including the content of  e-mail inboxes states that for access-
ing stored communications data the procedure mentioned in Section 158d 
of  the Criminal Procedure Code, the Surveillance of  Persons and Items 
shall be followed.
A further description of  the differences between the access to data in traffic 
and stored data is provided supra in chapter 4.1.
6.1 Online searches with the help of  remote forensic software
Online searches are not regulated by any specific provision. There is also 
not a great deal of  experience with using specialized remote forensic tools. 
However, it is probable that the police use them even for online searches, 
as an investigative measure. Various forensic tools could be probably used 
for online searches during the general surveillance of  persons and items 
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according to Section 158d of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure. If  the use 
of  these technologies interferes with in the inviolability of  residence, the con-
fidentiality of  correspondence, or the protection of  the contents of  other 
documents and records kept in private, then it may be performed only with 
a prior authorisation of  a judge. However, because there is a lack of  relevant 
case law, it is impossible to predict whether the use of  such measures would 
be considered proportionate. In the opinion of  the author of  this chapter, 
the use of  these measures would interfere at least with the principle of  pro-
portionality and the principle of  moderation formulated in Section 2 para. 4 
of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure. It can also be said that the evidence 
obtained this way would be probably considered inadmissible. The reason 
is that the rules on the surveillance of  persons and items does not provide 
enough safeguards. Therefore, an introduction of  a specific provision will 
probably be necessary in the future.
There are also known cases when such a measure was conducted by the vic-
tim in a state of  self-defence or extreme emergency according to sections 28 
and 29 of  the Criminal Code.
The evidence gathered during the use of  these measures must then be pro-
vided to the police authority for the purpose of  criminal proceedings. There 
is some discussion in the Czech Republic about whether this is legal and 
proportionate and whether such evidence would be admissible.
6.2 Search and seizure of  stored communication data
Due to the reasons mentioned supra, there are no special provisions deal-
ing with the seizure of  stored communication data in the Czech criminal 
procedure law.
As far as we know, the data itself  cannot be seized; however, a police author-
ity could seize a device or a storage medium, in which the data is stored 
(hard drives, flash drives, mobile phones, computers, etc.), following the pro-
visions on the seizure of  property (Section 79 of  the Code of  Criminal 
Procedure), or during house or personal searches (Section 82 of  the Code 
of  Criminal Procedure). Such data can be accessed and used without further 
consent from the judge or public prosecutor. According to Section 158d 
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of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure, law enforcement authorities can also 
access stored communication in a clandestine way during the surveillance 
of  persons and items.
The safeguards and requirements for the interception of  communication 
differ from those for access to stored data.
According to Section 88 of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure, the intercep-
tion of  communication may be conducted only if  the respective criminal 
proceedings are conducted for specific crimes, if  it may be reasonably 
assumed that facts relevant to the criminal proceedings will be obtained and 
if  there is no other way to achieve such purpose or if  its achievement would 
be otherwise significantly reduced, whereas in the case of  access to stored 
data during the surveillance of  persons and items (section 158d of  the Code 
of  Criminal Procedure) there are no such conditions.
Additionally, if  the police authority wants to conduct interception, it always 
needs an order issued by the judge; in case of  access to the stored data, 
the consent of  the judge is necessary only if  is going to interfere with 
in the inviolability of  residence, the confidentiality of  correspondence, 
or finding the contents of  other documents and records kept in private with 
the use of  technology.
Therefore, the legal protection of  data in traffic is far better than the protec-
tion of  stored data.
It is also not necessary to inform the suspect and/or the provider about 
the fact, that the law enforcement authorities accessed the stored communi-
cations data. But since the assistance from the provider is usually necessary, 
they have to inform at least him.
6.3 Duties to cooperate: production and decryption orders
In the Czech Republic, there is no special regulation providing cooperation 
duties for decoding encrypted data or handing over the necessary passwords.
However, everyone is required to comply with letters of  request from 
law enforcement authorities for the performance of  their actions without 
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an undue delay.130 Such requests may even order anybody to decrypt data 
or to provide passwords. If  the decrypted data or passwords are subject 
to an obligation of  secrecy, they may be requested for criminal proceedings 
upon the prior consent of  the judge.
The requested parties may, however, argue, that the disclosure of  the requested 
information would interfere with their rights related to the principle of  pro-
hibition on self-incrimination, in which case they are not obliged to comply.
Since there is no specific provision and a lack of  specific case law on this 
matter, it is difficult to guess what would happen if  the police authority 
requested of  the decrypted data or passwords. The author even tried to ask 
police investigators and public prosecutors whether they had any experience 
with such cases, but without any luck.
130 Section 8 paragraph 1 of  the Act No. 141/1961 Sb. code of  criminal procedure.
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7 USE OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION 
DATA IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
7.1 Use of  electronic communication data 
in the law of  criminal procedure
The Code of  Criminal Procedure does not specifically regulate the situ-
ation of  intercepted electronic communications data in criminal procee-
dings; thus it is necessary to follow general rules on the interception and 
recording of  telecommunications under Section 88 of  the Code of  Criminal 
Procedure. This section does not make any difference between various 
forms of  intercepted communication.
The basic requirement to order the recording of  telecommunications for 
criminal proceedings is the drawing up of  a protocol for such an order 
which must fulfill statutory requirements under Section 88 para. 6 
of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure; it has to fulfill certain formal condi-
tions. Lack of  fulfillment of  these conditions (particularly regarding infor-
mation about the place, time, method of  recording, the authority that issued 
the recording) can be overcome, even at the stage of  criminal proceedings, 
in the same manner as any other formal defects in the protocol, e.g., hear-
ing the person who participated in the performance of  the act as the wit-
ness. This is not considered an inadmissible manipulation in the recording 
of  telecommunication.
The content of  the recording is also an essential requirement of  the proto-
col related to the recording of  telecommunication. The transcript of  each 
part of  the communication in such recording is, however, not an essential 
requirement of  the protocol; it is sufficient to provide information about 
each part of  the communication concerning the time, telephone numbers 
(or other identification related to other types of  exchange of  information), 
and identification of  the participants in the exchange of  information.131
131 Above stated was also confirmed in the decision of  the High Court in Prague from 18 
January 2001, file number 4 To 3/01.
INTERCEPTION OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND SLOVAKIA
94
Another important aspect when introducing the recording as evidence 
in criminal proceedings is its unaltered form. Assuming that, in the specific 
case, there is no apparent devaluation or any other reduction in the infor-
mation value of  the evidence, the applicability of  the evidence in the crimi-
nal proceedings is not affected in any way. Technical measures to compress 
the content of  intercepted communication cannot therefore be considered 
as unauthorized interference with the evidence in accordance with Section 
88 of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure (such as the compression of  com-
munication on a data carrier). The use of  only a part of  the communication 
related to the criminal case is also considered admissible.132
The evidence itself  could be presented in the form of  the recordings (the 
recording is played at the stage of  criminal proceedings where the evi-
dence is presented) or in the form of  the transcribed document containing 
the information from the recordings. It is however usual and recommended 
to present the intercepted material in transcribed form at the court.
The Code of  Criminal Procedure does not specify in which form the col-
lection of  traffic and location data by providers of  electronic communi-
cation under Section 88a should be presented at the criminal procee-
dings. There is no rigorous institute in the Code of  Criminal Procedure 
to specify that. Such information is, however, presented as evidence and 
clarified in the criminal proceedings by an expert under Section 105 – 111 
of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure. The data retained under Section 88a are 
used for identification of  the source and the recipient of  the data communi-
cation (telephone numbers, IMEIs, IP addresses, MAC addresses, port num-
bers, IMSI identifiers, account identifiers – email, username, etc.) and for 
identification of  the date, time, manner and duration of  the communication 
(communications protocol details, type of  communication, time and date 
of  the communication, duration, length, etc.). To clarify (interpret) the facts 
relevant to the criminal proceedings it is necessary to use an expert. Such 
practical procedure has developed because of  the actual need and possibil-
ity and the use of  the expertise under Section 105 et seq. has thus proven 
to be currently the most available institute.
132 This opinion was confirmed by the Supreme Court. The decision of  the Supreme Court, 
file number 5 Tdo 572/2009, No. 7/2008 Sb. tr. rozh.
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7.2 Inadmissibility of  evidence as a consequence 
of  inappropriate collection
It is not permissible to exclude any type of  evidence except in the cases 
indicated by the Section 89 of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure. The Code 
of  Criminal Procedure, however, does not contain any further statement 
which would require explicit enumeration of  all the cases of  inadmissible 
evidence. This is why it is necessary to follow the general requirements 
about the admissibility of  evidence in the Code of  Criminal Procedure and 
with respect to the proceedings.133 The inadmissibility of  evidence is there-
fore deduced mainly from the interpretation of  the provisions. There are 
two main approaches in the Constitutional Court regarding the inadmissi-
bility of  evidence based on whether there was any misconduct in obtain-
ing the evidence. The first concept is based on the fact that the evidence 
is inadmissible because of  the prohibition of  arbitrariness, which sets out 
the obligation of  the courts and other relevant authorities to not deviate 
in any way from the rules of  procedure.134 The second approach is based 
on the infringement of  the right to a fair trial through a breach of  the rights 
of  another person, e.g., privacy rights.
Specific questions connected with the inadmissibility of  the interception 
(Section 88) are described subsequently. Generally, the records of  communi-
cation of  a person that were acquired against the law (especially if  the condi-
tions under Section 88 were not fulfilled) are taken as absolutely inadmissible 
evidence. Transcripts of  such recordings cannot be filed in the criminal file. 
If  this happens, the transcript, as well as the records themselves, cannot 
be used in criminal proceedings as evidence.135
On the basis of  Section 88 para. 1 (third sentence), the interception 
and recording of  telecommunication between the defense counsel and 
the accused is inadmissible and it has to be destroyed. Such a prohibition 
does not apply, however, to the communication of  the accused person with 
133 It is also necessary to keep in mind the Section 8c and Section 30 paragraph 4 of  the Code 
of  Criminal Procedure.
134 Decision of  the Constitutional Court file number III. ÚS 501/04, N 42/36 SbNU 445.
135 Decision of  the Regional Court in České Budějovice from 29 September 1994, file num-
ber 4 To 354/94.
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his/her family members.136 It is also necessary to fully follow the conditions 
stipulated under Section 88 para. 6 regarding attaching the protocol contain-
ing the information specified above137 in order to be able to use the evidence 
in the criminal proceeding. Only the recordings of  telecommunications rel-
evant to the case may be included in the criminal case file. Other communi-
cations discussed in Section 88 para. 6 must be protected against unauthor-
ized use and kept outside of  the criminal case file. It is especially neces-
sary to protect personal data and third person data contained in the records 
which have no connection to the criminal proceedings.138
The interception and recording of  telecommunications for the purpose 
of  criminal proceedings is governed by the provisions of  Section 88 
of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure. This allows taking such action, also 
before the commencement of  the prosecution, but only in the case of  emer-
gency and urgent operations. The interception can be used in criminal 
proceedings only if  it was conducted on the basis of  Section 88 of  the Code 
of  Criminal Procedure. Interception carried out under any other legal act, 
e.g., under Act No. 283/1991 Sb. on the Police of  the Czech Republic 
or under Act No. 13/1993 Sb., Customs Act, can only be used for the pur-
poses defined by these acts (the means of  operative techniques). This must 
be respected even if  the evidence was collected under the same conditions 
that would otherwise be sufficient to carry out urgent interception accord-
ing to the Code of  Criminal Procedure. The records of  such an interception 
(and the interception itself), as well as any other operative technique materi-
als, cannot be used as evidence.139 It was decided previously by the European 
Court of  Human Rights in the case of  A. v. France that interference with 
136 Decision of  the Supreme Court, file number 4 Pzo 3/2011-37.
137 Decision of  the High Court in Prague from 18 January 2001, file number 4 To 3/01.
138 Decision of  the Constitutional Court file number III. ÚS 3221/09, N 197/58 SbNU 
741.
139 The Act on the Police of  the Czech Republic and the Customs Act have been amended, 
however the decision of  the High Court serves as an example of  narrow interpreta-
tion of  the possibility to use the intercepted evidence in criminal proceedings. Decision 
of  the High Court in Prague from 8 June 2000, file number 2 To 73/2000.
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privacy in the attendance of  police authorities was found to breach Art. 8 
of  the Convention for the Protection of  Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms.140
Despite the fact that the evidence was obtained in violation of  the law, such 
evidence may still be used in criminal proceedings. The Constitutional Court 
stated that in order for an audio recording recorded by a private person with-
out the consent of  the person whose voice was recorded to be used as evi-
dence, it is necessary to consider firstly whether the evidence (e.g. an audio 
recording on a cell phone) of  the witness stands alone in a concrete situation 
when evaluating the guilt of  the offender, or whether the court also has other 
evidence at its disposal which significantly supports the merits of  the accu-
sation and which is also supported by the recording of  the conversation.141 
The information contained in the recording can serve as evidence in crimi-
nal proceedings only if  the invasion of  privacy is justified by the overrid-
ing interests of  the person who provided the information in the manner 
described and then used. According to the opinion of  the courts, illegally 
taken recordings can only be used as supportive evidence to verify the facts 
stated in both interception and witness testimony.142
It is necessary to state the date after which the intercepted communication 
that was created in this time can be used as evidence in criminal proceedings. 
For example: in criminal proceedings, cell phones are treated in the same man-
ner as any other tangible thing. The data stored on cell phones are evaluated 
in a similar way. The authorities in criminal proceedings can therefore extract 
all the data stored on the phone and such evidence can be used in criminal 
proceedings. But it is necessary to distinguish the specific moment at which 
the communication was taking place and to distinguish the use of  various 
procedural instruments.143 This was confirmed by the Explanatory Opinion 
140 Detained suspected hitman agreed to cooperate with the police to record a phone call 
with suspected person to prove, that he was hired by her to commit homicide. Such 
evidence was found as inadmissible. A. v. France, decision from 23 November 1993, 
Application No. 14838/89.
141 Decision of  the Constitutional Court file number II. ÚS 143/06.
142 This was confirmed by the decision of  the Supreme Court, file number 5 Tdo 459/2007 
or by the decision of  the Supreme Court, file number 8 Tdo 908/2013.
143 Such interpretation was confirmed by the decision of  the Supreme Court, file number 7 
Tz 9/2000.
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of  the Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office No. 4/2005.144 Following this 
opinion, police authorities do not need an interception order from a judge 
(issued on the basis of  Section 88 of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure) 
if  the data had already been delivered and was present on the cell phone 
even before the moment at which the police authority took the cell phone 
into its possession.145 This means that all the data stored on the cell phone 
at moment of  securing may be used as evidence.
In the case of  uncollected voicemail, it is necessary to issue an intercep-
tion order according to Section 88 of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure. 
Voicemail (unlike an unread SMS message) is not stored directly on the cell 
phone. Voicemail can only be collected from the data storage of  a service 
provider through the cell phone. Such data cannot be used as evidence 
in the criminal proceedings on the basis of  seizure of  property procee-
dings. It was stated in the Explanatory Opinion of  the Supreme Public 
Prosecutor’s Office No. 1/2015 that it is necessary to issue an interception 
order prior to the commencement of  the communication itself  if  the voice-
mail is planned to be used as evidence.146
Any communication, which is not statically stored via secured remote 
service or storage but is still the subject of  electronic communications 
(email or other messenger communication services), has a special posi-
tion. The Explanatory Opinion states that the provider of  electronic 
144 The Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office, SL 788/2004, The Collection of  the Explanatory 
Opinions of  the Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office, No. 4/2005, in Brno 6 June 2005, 
accessible at: http://www.nsz.cz/images/stories/PDF/Stanoviska_Proces/2005/
stanovisko%204-2005.pdf.
This opinion also stated that the data stored in SIM card inserted in the cell phone have 
the same position as the data stored directly in the cell phone.
145 It is necessary to state that securing of  the cell phone was issued under different pro-
visions than the provision concerning the interception. In this case the proceedings 
are stated in Section 78 (Obligation to Release Property) and Section 79 (Seizure 
of  Property) of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure.
146 The Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office, 1 SL 760/2014, The Collection 
of  the Explanatory Opinions of  the Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office, No. 1/2015, 
in Brno 26 January 2015, accessible at: http://www.nsz.cz/images/stories/PDF/
Stanoviska_Proces/2015/1_SL_760-2014.pdf.
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communications is not entitled to store and transfer message content.147 
The Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office then concludes on the basis of  such 
statement that Section 88 of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure can be only 
used for real-time communication.
If  the evidence (interception) was acquired legally, it cannot be excluded 
by the court only because of  the fact that the legal regulation on evidence 
proceedings has changed. The legality of  such proceedings is decided 
on the basis of  the legal regulation that was in the force at the time the meas-
ures to acquire such evidence were taken.148
When disclosing the committing of  serious crimes, the Police can inter-
fere in a lawful manner with different developmental stages of  a criminal 
offense. It cannot provoke (initiate) criminal activity that would not be com-
mitted without such provocation. The opinion that the duty of  the Police 
is always to prevent a criminal offense from being committed in its initial 
stage would prevent the use of  operative and investigative methods (inter-
ception). This would make such methods useless and would lead to paraly-
sis on the part of  the Police and their attempts to carry out their tasks 
in the process of  the detection of  serious criminal offenses and to reveal 
the identity of  the offender. It is also necessary to address the question 
of  culpability in relation to the application of  a higher criminal sentence 
when deciding whether the requirement of  Section 88 para. 1149 is fulfilled 
or not.150
From the point of  view of  constitutionally protected fundamental rights 
it cannot be possible to commence a criminal procedure using only inter-
ception to subsequently justify that serious crime (under Section 88 para. 1) 
was committed if  such justification was based only on a speculative basis.151 
The Constitutional Court strongly stressed that if  there are any specific facts 
147 The Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office, 1 SL 760/2014, The Collection 
of  the Explanatory Opinions of  the Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office, No. 1/2015, 
in Brno 26 January 2015, accessible at: http://www.nsz.cz/images/stories/PDF/
Stanoviska_Proces/2015/1_SL_760-2014.pdf. P. 8.
148 Decision of  the Constitutional Court file number Pl. ÚS 47/13, N 76/73 SbNU 351.
149 The interception can be used only in the case of  serious crimes; thus it is necessary to as-
sess whether such crime described in Section 88 paragraph 1 was really committed.
150 Decision of  the High Court in Prague file number 2 To 139/2005.
151 Decision of  the Constitutional Court file number II.ÚS 789/06, N 150/46 SbNU 489.
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supporting the suspicion for committing a serious crime, then, with regard 
to the constitutional limits of  regulation of  interception, such facts have 
to be clearly apparent in the rationale of  the interception order. The specific 
rationale, however, contained only very vague argumentation to support 
the suspicion that a person was in attendance during a particular criminal 
action. The interception order did not include specific facts to make it clear 
that a particular person was suspected of  committing the criminal offense. 
It is necessary to use proper and persuasive argumentation in the intercep-
tion order on why it was decided to use such a strong procedural instrument 
that interception certainly is.152 Without a precise rationale in the intercep-
tion order, the information gained on this basis cannot be used in the crimi-
nal proceedings.
The facts stated above serve as the general concept on how the limitation 
and consideration of  the admissibility of  interception as evidence works 
in the criminal proceedings. If  the limits indicated above are exceeded, 
the use of  interception as evidence cannot be found to be legitimate; thus, 
the communication data contained in the interception will be regarded 
as illegally obtained.
It is also necessary to respect the strictly limited range of  situations when 
the providers of  electronic communication can collect traffic and loca-
tion data, which also determines the need to proportionally test the use 
of  traffic and location data in criminal proceedings. This was also under-
lined by the Constitutional Court which pointed out that Section 88a para. 
1 explicitly mentions the list of  criminal offences under which it is possible 
to issue the collection of  traffic and location data. In the specific decision 
the court stressed that if  the criminal offence did not fall under these criminal 
offences mentioned under Section 88a para. 1, it was only possible to collect 
and use traffic and location data in the criminal proceedings if  the condition 
under Section 88a para. 4 was fulfilled (the subjects themselves agreed with 
152 Decision of  the Constitutional Court file number II. ÚS 2806/08, N 15/56 SbNU 143.
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the collection and use of  such data). Any other collection of  traffic and loca-
tion data which does not fall under such conditions has to be seen as illegal 
and unusable in criminal proceedings.153
It is sufficient for the justification to collect traffic and location data by pro-
viders of  electronic communication under Section 88a para. 1, if  it is only 
said, that all the information concerning “all accessible emails” will 
be collected. As the data retention is directed only to the past (contrary 
to the interception), this less specific definition of  the time period still has 
to be regarded as sufficient and in line with the requirements laid down 
by the Code of  Criminal Procedure.154
7.3 Use of  data outside the main proceedings
7.3.1 Data from other criminal investigations
The interception and recording of  telecommunication can be used in another 
criminal case as evidence under the condition that:
1. in this other criminal case there is criminal prosecution for a criminal 
offence referred in Section 88 para. 1. These are crimes for which 
the law stipulates a prison sentence with the upper penalty limit 
of  at least eight years, for a criminal offence of  machinations 
in insolvency proceedings, violation of  regulations on the rules 
of  competition, negotiating advantages during public procurement, 
tender and auction, misuse of  powers of  an official person or for 
any other intentional criminal offence, for which the prosecution 
is stipulated in a declared international treaty, or 
2. with the consent of  the user of  the intercepted station (which 
means anyone who uses or requests a publicly available electronic 
communication service).155
153 Decision of  the Constitutional Court file number III. ÚS 3844/13, N 201/75 SbNU 
259.
154 Decision of  the Constitutional Court file number III. ÚS 2661/12.
155 Section 88 paragraph 6. Third sentence. The Code of  Criminal Procedure. The word-
ing of  Section 88 paragraph 6 was enacted in 1 July 2008, but the use of  the evidence 
in another criminal proceedings under certain condition was already expressed in the de-
cision of  the Constitutional Court file number II. ÚS 6/93, N 22/1 SbNU 159.
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It should be stated that if  there was an interception order issued on the basis 
of  committing a serious criminal offense (as stated in Section 88 para. 1), 
in the first case of  criminal prosecution, then the fact that the criminal pro-
secution against the same person for another criminal offense (which was, 
however, not a serious criminal offense mentioned in Section 88 para. 1) was 
initiated after that does not mean that interception would be illegal against 
that person. Such interception cannot, however, be used as evidence for 
the second, less serious offense; it can be used to support the facts only 
in the first case of  criminal prosecution.156
The requirements that have to be contained in the interception order are 
listed in Section 88 para. 2. “The interception order and recording of  the telecom-
munications service shall include a determined user address or a user device and the user 
if  their identity is known, and the period during which the interception and recording 
of 	telecommunications	traffic	is	conducted	cannot	be	longer	than	four	months;	the	justi-
fication	must	include	the	specific	facts	that	 justify	the	issue	of 	such	order	as	well	as	its	
period.” In case of  possible use of  the intercepted data for the prosecution 
of  individuals who were not the subject of  the interception order, it has 
to be concluded that if  there was already ongoing interception, evidence 
on the basis of  such interception could also be used for the criminal offense 
that had been discovered during the interception. This evidence can, how-
ever, be used only if  the discovered criminal offence fulfils the conditions 
of  serious crime listed in Section 88 para. 1. If  these conditions are fulfilled, 
then it is not relevant whether the interception was allowed and the record-
ing acquired regarding the suspect, accused, or any other person.157
7.3.2 Data from preventive investigations
The case law of  the European Court of  Human Rights, in limiting the fun-
damental right to privacy for security reasons, strictly restricts the conditions 
for the applicability of  evidence obtained by limiting privacy. It approves only 
such practices, which can offer adequate safeguards to protect fundamental 
156 Decision of  the Supreme Court file number 4 Pzo 2/2010.
157 Decision of  the Supreme Court file number 2 To 144/2003.
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rights e.g. against abuse or arbitrariness because, in the opposite case (and 
also because of  the present technological possibilities), democracy itself  
would be at stake.158
Based on the above-mentioned arguments, the Constitutional Court con-
sidered the possibility of  using interception outside of  the criminal procee-
dings (intelligence service) in criminal proceedings. Interception of  com-
munication by public authorities (as well as any other type of  secret sur-
veillance) represents a serious limitation of  fundamental rights. It is implied 
from the interception order that the limitation of  personal integrity and 
privacy may be made by public authorities, albeit very rarely, only when 
necessary and if  the aim of  pursuing public interest cannot otherwise 
be achieved. Failure to comply with certain conditions means that such 
action is unconstitutional.
The intelligence law incorporates less limiting rules on the breach of  pri-
vacy; these milder conditions are only tolerated when limited by strict 
intent of  the use of  the gathered information and also by the seriousness 
of  the possible threat.
Using intelligence interception in criminal proceedings as evidence of  guilt 
is not foreseen in the Code of  Criminal Procedure or in the law on intel-
ligence services. In specific cases, interceptions were acquired pursuant 
to the act relating to the intelligence services. The intelligence service crossed 
the boundaries of  the law when it provided a highly concretized, exten-
sive set of  information to the authorities prosecuting a criminal offence. 
In relation to the criminal proceedings law, intelligence services are only 
entitled to provide basic and general information (Section 8 para. 3 of  Act 
No. 153/1994 Sb. on intelligence services of  the Czech Republic). Any use 
of  interception outside of  the sphere of  application of  the law on intel-
ligence services was and is an ongoing violation of  fundamental human 
rights. It was explicitly stated that the potential threat of  terrorist attack also 
cannot breach the barrier of  constitutional mechanisms.159
158 This principle was highlighted also in the case of  Klass v. Germany (especially in the par-
agraphs 42, 48, 49, 50). Klass and others v. Germany, decision from 6 September 1978, 
Application No. 5029/71.
159 Decision of  the Constitutional Court file number I. ÚS 3038/07, N 46/48 SbNU 549.
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7.3.3 Data from foreign jurisdictions
The questions on acquiring, using, and admitting evidence of  intercepted 
data from abroad are regulated mainly by Act No. 104/2013 Sb. on interna-
tional judicial cooperation in criminal matters. This law deals with the issues 
of  interception in Section 47 where the possibility to provide legal assis-
tance to another state based on the principle of  reciprocity is established. 
This section, however, states that it is unconditionally necessary to respect 
the rules incorporated in the Code of  Criminal Procedure.
If  an international treaty stipulates that the interception can be carried 
out by a foreign country on the territory of  the Czech Republic without 
the technical assistance of  the Czech Republic, the Regional Court in Prague 
is responsible for deciding on the consent to interception or its continu-
ation; if  a preliminary procedure is conducted in the foreign state, which 
will perform the interception, the Public Prosecutor from the Regional 
Prosecutor’s Office in Prague decides on the admissibility of  such intercep-
tion. The consent to interception or its continuation can be granted only 
if  the conditions set out in Section 88 of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure 
are completely fulfilled.160 The general rule to respect the requirements 
under Section 88 of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure has also been high-
lighted by the Supreme Court in the past and before Act No. 104/2013 Sb. 
on international judicial cooperation in criminal matters was in force. It was 
also stressed that it is necessary to rationalize any intervention into privacy.161
If  an international treaty stipulates that it is possible to carry out the inter-
ception of  telecommunication from the Czech Republic on the territory 
of  a foreign state without its technical assistance, the prosecutor and – after 
filing the indictment – the court informs the foreign state about the antici-
pated interception in the manner provided by that international treaty.162
160 Section 64 paragraph 1. Act No. 104/2013 Sb., on international judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters.
161 The decision of  the Supreme Court file number 11 Tz 129/2006.
162 Section 64 paragraph 2. Act No. 104/2013 Sb., on international judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters.
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7.4 Challenging the probity of  intercepted data
According to Section 88 para. 8 of  the Code on Criminal Procedure, after 
the criminal case becomes final, the prosecutor or the presiding judge 
of  the court of  first instance informs the person who is the user of  the device 
about the interception order and the recording of  telecommunication, 
unless exceptions under Section 88 para. 9 are fulfilled. Such person may 
submit a proposal to review the legality of  the interception to the Supreme 
Court within six months under Section 314 l to Section 314 n of  the Code 
of  Criminal Procedure. This decision is not subject to appeal.
The prerequisite for filing a petition for review of  the legality of  intercep-
tion in accordance with Section 314 l of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure 
to the Supreme Court is that the case was ended accordingly to Section 88 
para. 8. It is also necessary that the presiding judge of  the court of  first 
instance or the prosecutor subsequently inform the person authorized 
to file such petition about the ordered interception. A proposal to review 
the legality of  interception cannot therefore be submitted to the Supreme 
Court before the relevant case is final and without the subsequent sending 
of  the information to the authorized person. If  such a petition is filed, even 
if  the above stated conditions were not fulfilled, the Supreme Court rejects 
it as inadmissible.163
In accordance with Section 314 l et seq. of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure, 
in the procedure for a review of  an interception order, review by the Supreme 
Court is limited only to the assessment of  legality of  the issued intercep-
tion order and the recording of  telecommunication. Therefore, in these 
proceedings, the Supreme Court cannot deal with e.g. any objection related 
to the performance of  duties of  the police authority in accordance with 
Section 88 para. 3 or objections against the evaluation of  the results 
of  the interception directed against the rationale of  the court, which decided 
such interception.164
Under the conditions of  Section 88 para. 1, 2, it is also exception-
ally possible to order the interception during the phase of  enforcement 
163 The decision of  the Supreme Court file number 4 Pzo 1/2010.
164 The decision of  the Supreme Court file number 4 Pzo 2/2010.
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proceedings in connection with the search of  a convicted person who 
is meant to be imprisoned for the offence listed in Section 88 para. 1. It is, 
however, permitted to use the interception only when any other procedures 
for locating such a person have failed. The legality of  such interception 
can also be examined by means of  the procedure described under Section 
314 l to Section 314 n.165
165 The decision of  the Supreme Court file number Tpjn 304/2012, No. 54/2013 Sb. Tr. 
Rozh.
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8 DIFFERENTIAL COMPARATIVE NOTE: 
SLOVAKIA
8.1 Security Architecture and the Interception 
of  Telecommunication
8.1.1 National Security architecture – 
Two Frameworks of  Interception
It can be said that Slovak Republic legislators have been inspired in many situ-
ations by the Czech legal setting. To define the constitutional limits of  inter-
ception, we have to look at the Slovak Constitution (Act No. 460/1992 Zb. 
Constitution of  the Slovak Republic). It states in Article 2, Paragraph 3 that 
state bodies can act only on the basis of  the Constitution, within its limits, 
and to the extent and in a manner defined by law. Pursuant to Article 19, 
everybody has the right to protection against unjustified interference with 
his or her private and family life and against the unjustified collection, pub-
lication, or other misuse of  personal data. Article 22 guarantees the secrecy 
of  correspondence, other communications, and written messages delivered 
by post, and of  personal information. The privacy of  letters, other commu-
nications, and written messages kept privately or delivered by post or oth-
erwise, including communications made by telephone, telegraph and other 
means, cannot be violated by anyone except in cases specified by law.166 
Therefore, all the public authorities which are authorised to conduct inter-
ceptions of  telecommunication fall within the scope of  these articles. They 
are permitted to act only within what is expressly allowed to them by law.
There are two situations under which electronic communication can 
be intercepted. The first is the state of  criminal procedure pursuant to Act 
No. 301/2005 in the Code on Criminal Trial (Code of  Criminal Procedure). 
It is conducted by police forces or the court (comparable to the Czech 
166 Act No. 460/1992 Zb. Constitution of  the Slovak Republic. English translation tak-
en from the webpage of  the Slovak Public Defender of  rights. Unofficial translation. 
Online: http://www.vop.gov.sk/constitution-of-the-slovak-republic.
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procedure), to which a special regime of  customs service can be included. 
According to the Code of  Criminal Procedure, the order to intercept and 
record telecommunications can be issued by the presiding judge of  a panel 
prior to the commencement of  criminal prosecution, or by a judge for pre-
trial proceedings after a motion from a prosecutor. If  the matter cannot 
be delayed and a prior order from a judge for pre-trial proceedings cannot 
be obtained, the order may be issued by a prosecutor before the commence-
ment of  criminal prosecution or in pre-trial proceedings, unless the inter-
ception and recording of  telecommunications involves the entry into 
the dwelling of  a person; such an order must be confirmed by a judge for 
pre-trial proceedings within 24 hours of  its issuance; failing that, the order 
shall become null and void and the information obtained on its basis 
may not be used for the purposes of  criminal proceedings and shall have 
to be immediately destroyed in a prescribed manner.167
The second situation is for civil and military intelligence services (regu-
lated by Act No. 46/1993 Zb. in the Slovak Information Service and Act 
No. 198/1994 Zb. on Military Intelligence) and other entitled authorities 
(Police Corps, Prison and Court Guard, and the Customs).
The difference between Slovak and Czech legislation is reflected in Act 
No. 166/2003 Zb. on the Protection of  Privacy against Unauthorised Use 
of  Information-technical Means amending and supplementing certain acts 
(Act on the Protection against Interception). This Law specifies the condi-
tions required for the use of  technical-intelligence measures without the prior 
consent of  the person whose privacy is infringed upon by the state body 
which is using the intelligence-technical measures (ITM). This Law does not 
apply to the use of  ITM in a criminal proceeding in accordance with a spe-
cific law (Code of  Criminal Procedure).168 However, there are notable excep-
tions. The ITM can be used by the Police Corps, the Slovak Information 
Service, Military Intelligence, the Railway Police, the Corps of  Prison and 
167 Section 115 para.1 of  No. 301/2005 Zb. Code of  Criminal Procedure. The European e-
Justice Portal. Unofficial translation. Online: https://e-justice.europa.eu/fileDownload.
do?id=11f9da19-253e-4f02-9a26-2e2285184e7a.
168 Section 1 of  Act No. 166/2003 on the Protection of  Privacy against Unauthorised 
Use of  Information-technical Means amending and supplementing certain Acts (Act 
on the Protection against Interception). Unofficial translation. Online: http://www.sis.
gov.sk/files/zakony/act_166_2003.pdf.
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Judiciary Guards, and the Customs Board in the extent pursuant to spe-
cific regulations. The execution of  ITM for all authorities is technically pro-
vided by the Police Corps following the submission of  a written approval 
of  the legitimate. Generally, ITM can be used only if  it is “required in a demo-
cratic society to safeguard the security and defence of  the country, to prevent and reveal 
criminal activities, or to protect the rights and freedoms of  other persons.”169 An addi-
tional general principle is that by using ITM the essential right or freedom 
can be infringed upon only to the required extent and for a period of  time 
not longer than inevitable to attain the legal goal, to which it serves.
The Slovak Information Service is authorised to use these means in order 
to carry out its legal tasks. These means can be utilised to infringe the pri-
vacy of  persons without their prior approval in accordance with the condi-
tions stated in the law. Also, they can be utilised upon the prior approval 
of  a judge. It is possible to utilise ITM for a period of  no more than 6 
months. This period starts upon the day the approval is granted. If  it is nec-
essary to utilise several types of  ITM, either at once or subsequently, each 
ITM can only be utilised in the scope approved. If  ITM are to be utilised 
in places not accessible to the general public, the judge granting the approval 
decides whether approval is also given for entering such places.170
Moreover, the Act on the Protection against Interception brings distribu-
tive option of  interlining the two regimes (intelligence and criminal pro-
cedure). In an exceptional case, if  there is reasonable suspicion of  a crime 
being committed and ITM might be used, the Police Corps (or investigation 
authorities) may use ITM even without a prior approval of  a legitimate judge. 
The case must be dealt with immediately and the approval of  the legiti-
mate judge cannot be obtained in advance. Even the Police Corps are 
required to notify a legitimate judge of  the use of  the ITM within one hour 
of  the beginning of  the use of  this measure, stating that they are exceed-
ing their power based upon the Code of  Criminal Procedure. The legal 
guarantee is that if  the Police Corps does not obtain subsequent written 
approval from the legitimate judge within twelve hours from the beginning 
169 Section 20 of  Act on the Protection against Interception.
170 Slovak Information Service: Annual Report 2013. Online: http://www.sis.gov.sk/for-
you/sis-annual-report-2013.html.
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of  the use of  the ITM or if  the legitimate judge does not grant the subse-
quent approval, the use of  this measure shall be immediately ceased, and 
moreover, information obtained in this way shall not be used and it shall 
be immediately destroyed. The state body, which has destroyed this infor-
mation, shall immediately notify the legitimate judge of  the destruction.171
The Act on the Protection against Interception serves not only as the base 
for legal intelligence interception but it opens doors to using the obtained 
evidences in criminal procedure.172 This is subject to expected judicature 
of  higher courts, therefore, the separation of  two spheres is not very clear 
here and intelligence legislation is interrelated with criminal procedure 
in some cases. Even more, it passes specific power to police authorities, 
which are entitled under former intelligence legislation and certain circum-
stances to intercept without court approval, which might raise some consti-
tutional questions.
8.1.2 Legislative grounds
The communication interception in the criminal procedure is regulated 
in the Section 115 of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure: 173
“Interception and recording of  telecommunications
Section 115
(1) Where criminal proceedings are conducted in respect of  a felony, corrup-
tion,	criminal	offence	of 	the	abuse	of 	power	of 	a	public	official,	criminal	offence	
of  laundering the proceeds of  crime, or in respect of  an intentional criminal 
offence where so provided by a promulgated international treaty, it shall be pos-
sible to issue an order to intercept and record telecommunications if  there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that it will reveal the facts that are materially rel-
evant for criminal proceedings. Where, in the course of  intercepting and recording 
telecommunications, the accused is found to be in communication with his defence 
counsel, no information thus obtained may be used for the purposes of  criminal 
proceedings, and any such information must be forthwith destroyed in a prescribed 
manner;	this	shall	not	apply	to	information	relating	to	a	case	in	which	a	lawyer	
does not represent the accused as his defence counsel.
171 Section 5 of  Act on the Protection against Interception.
172 Section 7 para. 2 of  Act on the Protection against Interception.
173 Section 115 of  No. 301/2005 Zb. Code of  Criminal Procedure. Unofficial translation. Online: 
https://e-justice.europa.eu/fileDownload.do?id=11f9da19-253e-4f02-9a26-2e2285184e7a.
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(2) The order to intercept and record telecommunications shall be issued by the pre-
siding judge of  a panel prior to the commencement of  criminal prosecution, 
or by a judge for pre-trial proceedings on a motion from a prosecutor. If  the mat-
ter bears no delay and a prior order from a judge for pre-trial proceedings cannot 
be obtained, the order may be issued by a prosecutor before the commencement 




the information obtained on its basis may not be used for the purposes of  criminal 
proceedings and shall have to be immediately destroyed in a prescribed manner.
(3) The order to intercept and record telecommunications shall have to be in writ-
ing and based on circumstantial reasons, separately for each telephone subscriber 
or piece of  technical equipment. The order shall have to specify the telephone sub-
scriber or piece of  technical equipment and, if  known, the person whose telecom-
munications are intercepted and recorded, and the length of  time during which 
the interception and recording of  telecommunications is to be performed. Interception 
and recording may not exceed six months. This period may be extended by another 
two months, also repeatedly, by a motion from a prosecutor or a judge for pre-trial 
proceedings. Interception and recording of  telecommunications operations shall 
be performed by a competent department of  the Police Corps.
(4)	Police	officers	or	a	competent	department	of 	the	Police	Corps	shall	be	obliged	
to continuously review the grounds for the order to intercept and record telecom-
munications. Where such grounds cease to exist, interception and recording of  tel-
ecommunications shall have to be discontinued, even before the expiry of  the time 
limit	referred	to	in	paragraph	3.	This	fact	shall	be	immediately	notified	in	writing	
to	 the	 entity	 that	 issued	 the	 order	 to	 intercept	 and	 record	 telecommunications;	
in	pre-trial	proceedings,	it	shall	also	be	notified	to	the	prosecutor.
(5) In criminal proceedings conducted in respect of  an intentional criminal offence 
which is different from the one referred to in paragraph 1, the order to intercept 
and record telecommunications may be issued by the presiding judge of  a panel or, 
prior to the commencement of  prosecution or in pre- trial proceedings, by a judge for 
pre-trial proceedings acting on a motion from a prosecutor, but only with the con-
sent of  the subscriber to the telecommunication equipment subjected to interception 
or recording.
(6) If  the record of  telecommunications is to be used as evidence, a verbatim 
transcript	made	by	 the	officer	of 	 the	Police	Corps	carrying	out	 the	 interception	
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of  telecommunications shall have to be attached, wherever the recording makes 
it possible, containing information about the place, time and legal grounds for 




script of  telecommunications shall be used as evidence after the interception of  tel-
ecommunications has been discontinued. In pre-trial proceedings, where the circum-
stances of  the case warrant it, the recording of  telecommunications may be submit-
ted to the court even without a transcript of  the recording, if  the accompanying 
report gives the data concerning the time, place and legality of  interception, and 
concerning the persons subject to the recording of  telecommunications, provided 
that the recording of  telecommunications is intelligible.
(7) The recording may be used as evidence in a different criminal matter from 
the one that is subject to interception and recording of  telecommunications only 
if  such other matter is also heard in simultaneous proceedings concerning the crim-
inal offence referred to in paragraph 1.
(8) If  the interception and recording did not produce any facts relevant for crimi-
nal proceedings, the criminal procedure authority or the relevant department 
of  the Police Corps shall have to destroy the obtained records forthwith in a pre-




by	 the	body	whose	decision	has	finally	 settled	 the	matter,	or,	 in	 the	proceedings	
before	the	court,	by	the	presiding	judge	of 	a	panel	of 	a	first-instance	court	within	
three	years	 from	the	date	on	which	 criminal	prosecution	 in	 the	 case	was	finally	
concluded;	this	shall	not	apply	to	the	proceedings	concerning	particularly	serious	
felonies or the felonies committed by organised groups, criminal groups or terrorist 
groups, or criminal offences committed by more than one person if  at least one 
of  the perpetrators is still under prosecution, or if  the provision of  such informa-
tion could obstruct the purpose of  criminal proceedings.
(10)	The	presiding	 judge	 of 	a	panel,	police	 officer	 or	prosecutor	 shall	not	pro-
vide the information pursuant to paragraph 9 in the case of  a person who has 
the	opportunity	 to	 inspect	 the	file	under	 this	Act,	or	 the	proceedings	of 	a	par-
ticularly serious crime or a crime committed by an organized group, a criminal 
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organization or terrorist group, or if  the crime is conducted by more people and 
in relation to at least one of  them has been not legally ended prosecution, or where 
the provision of  such information could defeat the purpose of  criminal proceedings.
(11) The provisions of  paragraphs 1 to 10 shall apply, as appropriate, to the con-
tent data or operational data transmitted in real time via computer systems.”
The intercepted communication and recordings can be used for the sake 
of  criminal proceedings only when the proceeding is conducted for crimes 
specifically enumerated by the law. The general rule is that the intercep-
tion must be initially authorised by a judge. A comparable provision relates 
to creating visual, audio or audio-visual recordings pursuant to the Section 
114 of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure. It is concentrated more on local 
area monitoring and wiretapping than telecommunication interception. 
It is used in intentional crimes only, where the maximum level of  penalty 
exceeds 3 years in prison, corruption, abuse of  the power by public officer, 
money laundering or another crime recognized by mutual legal assistance.
The data retention (traffic and location data) by providers of  electronic 
communication and possibilities of  accessing such data in the criminal 
proceedings by the Police Corps are laid down in section 116 of  the Code 
of  Criminal Procedure. The Slovak Constitutional Court has recently held 
this provision as unconstitutional.174
“Section 116
(1) In criminal proceedings held in respect of  an intentional criminal offence, 
it will be possible to issue an order for the disclosure and provision of  telecom-
munications data that are subject to telecommunications secrecy or enjoy personal 
data protection, if  such data are necessary to clarify the facts relevant for criminal 
proceedings.
(2) The order to disclose and provide telecommunications data shall be issued 
in writing by the presiding judge of  a panel prior to the commencement of  criminal 
prosecution, or by a judge for pre- trial proceedings on a motion from a prosecutor 
in	pre-trial	proceedings,	which	must	be	based	on	circumstantial	reasons;	the	order	
shall be served on the persons referred to in paragraph 3.
174 Press news of  Slovak Constitutional Court from April 29, 2015. sp. zn. PL. ÚS 32/2015. 
Translation of  author. Online: https://www.ustavnysud.sk/docDownload/b6cd9bed-
c37c-4d6c-a8c3-bf92046e7296/č. %2052%20-%20PL.%20ÚS%2032_2015.pdf.
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(3) Legal entities or natural persons carrying out telecommunications activities 
shall notify the presiding judge of  a panel, or, in pre-trial proceedings, a prosecutor 
or	a	police	officer	about	effected	telecommunications.
(4) The provisions of  paragraphs 1 to 3 shall apply, as appropriate, to the content 
data or operational data transmitted in real time via computer systems.
(5) The prosecutor shall not provide the information pursuant to paragraph 4 
in	 the	 case	 of 	 a	 person	who	 has	 the	 opportunity	 to	 inspect	 the	 file	 under	 this	
Act, or the proceedings of  a particularly serious crime or a crime committed 
by an organized group, a criminal organization or terrorist group, or if  the crime 
is conducted by more people and in relation to at least one of  them has been not 
legally ended prosecution, or where the provision of  such information could defeat 
the purpose of  criminal proceedings.
(6) The provisions of  paragraphs 1 to 5 shall apply, as appropriate, to the content 
data or operational data transmitted in real time via computer systems.” 175
Relating to this obligation, the providers of  electronic communications were 
obliged to store traffic data, location data and data about the communicating 
parties for a period of  six months (in the case of  Internet, email or VoIP 
communications) or for a period of  12 months (in case of  other communi-
cations). It was held that the legal framework regulating the access to data 
retention data was completely arbitrary and considerably less stringent than 
comparable provisions on wire-tapping.176
Also, strong powers arise from Act No. 171/1993 Zb. on the Police Corps. 
Police Corps can use ITM and conclude operative-investigative activities 
in performing tasks in the fight against terrorism, the fight against money laun-
dering, narcotics, nuclear materials, and forgery. Also, ITM are used in assis-
tance to exposed witnesses and in the witness protection program under 
special regulation. Another option is the protection of  an agent in detecting 
tax evasion and illicit financial activities. The scope of  the police corps com-
petence regarding interception is quite broad. According to the European 
175 Section 116 of  No. 301/2005 Zb. Code of  Criminal Procedure. 
Unofficial translation. Online: https://e-justice.europa.eu/fileDownload.
do?id=11f9da19-253e-4f02-9a26-2e2285184e7a.
176 The decision was issued almost a year after the CJEU proclaimed the Data Retention 
Directive invalid in the spring of  2014. See Slovakia: Gera, M. Mass surveillance of  citi-
zens is unconstitutional. Protecting digital freedom. EDRi.org. May 4, 2015. Online: 
https://edri.org/slovakia-mass-surveillance-of-citizens-is-unconstitutional/.
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case law, and also according to the national one, the police cannot use ITM 
in a case of  intercepting a communication between client and attorney (e.g., 
a similar concept to the attorney client privilege). The attorney client privi-
lege is recognized in criminal or public law matters only (the antitrust and 
competition practice recognize a similar concept as well).
According to the Act on the Protection against Interception, ITM is pri-
marily electro-technical, radio-technical, photo-technical, optical, mechani-
cal, chemical, and other technical measures and equipment or their sets, used 
in a covert manner in: searching for, opening, examination, and assessment 
of  mail and other transported packages, monitoring and recording of  tel-
ecommunication activities, and making and using visual, audio, and other 
recordings.177 The most important provision for the Slovak Intelligence 
Service and other authorities empowered to interception activities arises from 
following provision of  the Act on the Protection against Interception:178
“Section 4
(1) Technical-intelligence measures shall be used only on the basis of  the prior 
written approval of  a legitimate judge179 (hereinafter “approval”) and only for 
a set period of  time, not exceeding six months. The term shall go into effect 
on the day the approval is granted. If  it is necessary to simultaneously or subse-
quently use several kinds of  technical-intelligence measures, each of  them shall 
be used only to the extent of  the expressly granted approval. If  the technical-
intelligence measure is to be used in places, which are not accessible to the public, 
the legitimate judge shall also decide whether his approval applies also to the entry 
into such places.
(2) The legitimate judge who has granted the approval to use the technical-
intelligence measures can, on the basis of  a new request, extend the duration 
of  the time period, but in each case for no longer than other six months. This term 
shall go into effect on the day the further approval is granted (hereinafter “further 
approval”). Further approval shall be granted in writing not later than on the last 
177 Article 2 of  Act on the Protection against Interception.
178 Act on the Protection against Interception.
179 Article 13, Section 2 and 3, and Article 20, Section 2 of  the Law of  the Slovak National 
Council No. 335/1991 in the Code on the Courts and Judges, as stated in Article III 
of  the Law No. 185/2002 in the Code on the Judicial Council of  the Slovak Republic 
and on the Amendment and Supplementation of  Some Laws.
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day of  the term in accordance with paragraph 1. If  the term cited in paragraph 1 
expires and the further approval is not granted, the use of  the technical-intelligence 
measure shall be ceased on the last day of  the term set in the approval.
(3) The request to grant approval to use a technical-intelligence measure (hereinaf-
ter “the request”) shall be submitted in writing to the competent court. The request 
shall contain the following data:
a)	Specification	of 	the	type	of 	the	technical-intelligence	measure	to	be	used	and	
of  the location of  its use, the proposed time of  duration of  its use, data on the per-
son against whom the use of  this technical-intelligence measure is directed,
b)	Information	on	the	previous	ineffectual	or	considerably	difficult	revelation	and	
documentation of  activities, which constitute the reason for submitting the request,
c) The rationale for using the technical-intelligence measure. The court must not 
make a decision on a request which does not contain the data required by the law. 
It shall return the request to the applicant.
(4) The request is submitted by the state body which intends to use a technical-
intelligence measure to implement its legitimate activities (Section 2, paragraph 2).
(5) It is not possible to lodge a legal remedy against the decision on approval.
(6) The legitimate judge who has granted the approval to use the technical-intel-
ligence measures shall be required to review systematically the existing ration-
ale of  their use. If  the rationale no longer applies, he shall be required to issue 
a decree immediately that the use of  these measures cease.
Section 5
(1) In an exceptional case, if  there is reasonable suspicion of  a crime being com-
mitted and a technical- intelligence measure might be used by the Police Corps 
to	 fulfil	 its	 tasks,	 if 	 the	 case	 is	 to	be	dealt	with	 immediately	and	the	approval	
of  a legitimate judge cannot be obtained in advance, the Police Corps may use 
a technical-intelligence measure even without a prior approval. The Police Corps 
shall be required to notify a legitimate judge of  the use of  the technical-intelligence 
measure within one hour from the beginning of  the use of  this measure, and 
to submit the request in accordance with Section 4, para. 3, to the legitimate judge 
within six hours from the beginning of  the use of  the technical-intelligence meas-
ure. The request shall also contain the time datum of  the beginning of  the use 
of  the technical-intelligence measure.
(2) If  the Police Corps does not obtain a subsequent written approval of  a legiti-
mate judge within twelve hours from the beginning of  the use of  the technical-intel-
ligence measure or if  the legitimate judge does not grant the subsequent approval, 
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the use of  this measure shall be immediately ceased. Information obtained in this 
way shall not be used and it shall be immediately destroyed. The state body, 
which has destroyed this information, shall immediately notify the legitimate judge 
of  the destruction.”
As mentioned above, Slovak regulation for intelligence services, which 
is also broadly used by police authorities, has lower legal prerequisites than 
the Code of  Criminal Procedure. Judge approval as a guarantee of  lawful 
process is sometimes omitted due the faster and flexible investigative reac-
tions to dangerous forms of  criminality. On another hand, these powers 
shall be controlled and supervised by judicial power only, because they can 
represent misbalance or a potential risk of  abuse.
8.1.3 Responsibility for the technical performance and legitimacy 
of  data transfers between different security services
In the Slovak Republic, the technical implementation of  the communication 
interception is done by the state/public authorities (police corps or intel-
ligence service) with cooperation of  compliant subjects pursuant to the Act 
No. 351/2011 Zb. on electronic communication. Section 63 Paragraph 7 
of  the Electronic communication act establishes a duty for a provider 
of  a public communications network or a publicly available electronic com-
munications service to provide and secure interfaces at specified points 
of  the network for connection of  terminal equipment for message tapping 
and recording (e.g., wiretapping).
The legitimacy of  data transfers between various security services in The 
Slovak Republic is a subject of  current legal discussion. Even the authori-
ties do not hold the legitimization to intercept for the preventive purposes, 
there is no clear separation line between criminal and intelligence proce-
dures. The above-mentioned Act on the Protection against Interception 
empowers legal interception to both bodies. The general rule is that the copy 
of  intercepted data (electronic evidence), which has been made using ITM, 
can be released only to the case-related and locally authorized state body 
if  the copy can serve as evidence in a procedure lead before the authorized 
state body within the limits of  its authority established by the law. The case-
related and locally authorized state body, to which the recording has been 
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released, is allowed neither to make a copy of  the recording nor to release its 
transcription for inspection or copying to another person, to another state 
body or to a body of  the local government or of  other self-administration. 
The regulation is missing interpretation of  what is “a case-related and locally 
authorized state body”. This question must be decided by future case law.
8.1.4 Statistics on Telecommunication Interception
Slovak Intelligence Service (2014 – recent data)180
Slovak Intelligence Service in 2013 submitted 235 requests to use ITM; 
the court issued 230 approvals; 5 requests were rejected. Out of  230 uses 
of  information-technical means, all cases were evaluated in terms of  aims 
and purposes as stated by law. The aims and purposes as defined by law were 
reached in 217 uses of  information-technical means; in 13 cases they were 
not. In 2013, upon requests by SIS, 187 court rulings on providing the sub-
ject of  telecommunication secrecy were issued that included lists of  data 
of  communicating parties (billing), locations and additional operational data 







Number of  ITM request - Section 4 (1) 0 206 29 235
Court Approvals 0 202 28 230
Rejected 0 4 1 5
Number of  ITM renewal requests 
to prolong the period of  ITM use 
within the same case – Section 4 (2)
0 0 0 0
Court Approvals 0 0 0 0
Rejected 0 0 0 0
Number of  ITM uses that reached 
aims and purposes as stated by law 0 191 26 217
180 Slovak Intelligence Service. Annual Report. Online: http://www.sis.gov.sk/for-you/sis-
annual-report.html.
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Number of  ITM uses that did not reach 
aims and purposes as stated by law 0 11 2 13
Number of  ITM uses where informa-
tion was used as evidence in criminal 
proceedings -
- - -
Number of  illegitimate ITM uses 0 0 0 0
According to the 2014 statistics, the Slovak Information Service submit-
ted 256 requests to use ITM, 13 requests were rejected. Out of  230 uses 
of  ITM, the aims and purposes as defined by law were reached in 237 uses 
of  information-technical means; in 6 cases they were not. In 2014, there were 
57 requests approved to collect information containing telecommunication 
secrecy initiated by SIS and forwarded to the District Court in Bratislava and 
none were rejected.
General Prosecution of  Slovak Republic (2014 – recent data)181
2013 2012 2011
Producing video, audio 
or visual-audio recordings 
(Section 114 of  The Code 
of  Criminal Procedure)
Number of  requests 70 103 96
Court approvals 62 99 95
The interception and data 
retention (Sections 115 
and 116 of  The Code 
of  Criminal Procedure)
Number of  requests 4395 3459 2576
Court approvals 3700 2826 2327
According to the 2014 statistics, activities of  the Office of  the Special 
Prosecutor were characterized by a rich use of  ITM by tapping and record-
ing telecommunications in accordance with Section 115 of  the Criminal 
181 General Prosecution of  Slovak Republic. Annual Report 2013. Online: http://www.
genpro.gov.sk/spravy-o-cinnosti-12b7.html.
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Procedure Code. It must be said that the judges of  the specialised crimi-
nal court refused to permit the use of  the facility in 95 cases. Also, there 
is an increasing number of  cases where accused persons attack the authen-
ticity of  the evidence. Therefore, the importance of  the forensic examina-
tion of  such records is very important. However, the problem is usually 
obtaining the voice samples of  the accused persons. The law does not lay 
any obligation on persons to provide such samples.







Number of  ITM request 
- Section 4 (1) - 1165 61 1226
Court Approvals - 1089 57 1146
Rejected - 76 4 80
Number of  ITM renewal 
requests to prolong the period 
of  ITM use within the same 
case – Section 4 (2)
- 148 10 158
Court Approvals - 134 10 144
Rejected - 14 - 14
Number of  ITM uses 
that reached aims and 
purposes as stated by law
- 1058 62 1120
Number of  ITM uses that 
did not reach aims and 
purposes as stated by law
- 165 5 170
Number of  ITM uses 
where information 
was used as evidence 
in criminal proceedings
- 110 9 119
182 Parliamentary Committee for Defense and Security. Annual Report 2013. Online: 
http://www.nrsr.sk/dl/Browser/Committee?committeeExternalId=125.
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Number of  illegitimate ITM uses - - - -







Number of  ITM request 
- Section 4 (1) 0 25 1 26
Court Approvals 0 23 1 24
Rejected 0 2 0 2
Number of  ITM renewal 
requests to prolong the period 
of  ITM use within the same 
case – Section 4 (2)
0 17 0 17
Court Approvals 0 17 0 17
Rejected 0 0 0 0
Number of  ITM uses 
that reached aims and 
purposes as stated by law
0 40 1 41
Number of  ITM uses that 
did not reach aims and 
purposes as stated by law
0 2 0 2
Number of  ITM uses 
where information 
was used as evidence 
in criminal proceedings
0 0 0 0
Number of  illegitimate ITM uses - - - -
Custom Board (2014 – recent data)184
183 Parliamentary Committee for Defence and Security. Annual Report 2013. Online: 
http://www.nrsr.sk/dl/Browser/Committee?committeeExternalId=125.
184 Parliamentary Committee for Defence and Security. Annual Report 2013. Online: 
http://www.nrsr.sk/dl/Browser/Committee?committeeExternalId=125.








Number of  ITM request 
- Section 4 (1) 0 155 0 155
Court Approvals 0 141 0 141
Rejected 0 14 0 14
Number of  ITM renewal 
requests to prolong the period 
of  ITM use within the same 
case – Section 4 (2)
0 14 0 14
Court Approvals 0 13 0 13
Rejected 0 1 0 1
Number of  ITM uses 
that reached aims and 
purposes as stated by law
0 150 1 150
Number of  ITM uses that 
did not reach aims and 
purposes as stated by law
0 2 0 2
Number of  ITM uses 
where information 
was used as evidence 
in criminal proceedings
0 5 0 5
Number of  illegitimate 
ITM uses - - - -
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8.2 Constitutional Safeguards of  Telecommunication
8.2.1 Areas of  constitutional protection
Areas of  constitutional protection in the Slovak Republic have the same 
principles, background and roots as those in the Czech law system. 
The written Constitution, along with other documents, forms the Slovak 
constitutional law. The Charter of  Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (Act 
No. 23/1991 Zb.) is identical to the Czech Charter. Therefore, basic safe-
guards for the protection of  fundamental rights are laid down in an identical 
document and they are also reflected in the text of  the Constitution (Act 
No.460/1992 Zb.).
Selected articles of  the Slovak Constitution (covered also by The Charter 
of  Fundamental Rights and Freedoms): 185
“Article 16
(1) The inviolability of  the person and its privacy is guaranteed. It may be limited 
only in cases laid down by law.
(2) No one may be tortured, or subjected to cruel, inhuman, or humiliating treat-
ment or punishment.
Article 20
(1) Everyone has the right to own property. The ownership right of  all owners has 
the same legal content and protection. Inheritance is guaranteed.
(2)	The	law	shall	lay	down	which	property,	other	than	property	specified	in	Article	
4 of  this Constitution, necessary to ensure the needs of  society, the development 
of  the national economy and public interest, may be owned only by the state, 
municipality, or designated legal persons. The law may also lay down that cer-
tain things may be owned only by citizens or legal persons resident in the Slovak 
Republic.
(3) Ownership is binding. It may not be misused to the detriment of  the rights 
of  others, or in contravention with general interests protected by law. The exercis-
ing of  the ownership right may not harm human health, nature, cultural monu-
ments and the environment beyond limits laid down by law.
185 Ibid. The Constitution of  Slovak Republic.
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(4) Expropriation or enforced restriction of  the ownership right is possible only 
to the necessary extent and in the public interest, on the basis of  law and for 
adequate compensation.
Article 22
(1) Secrecy of  letters, other communications and written messages delivered by post 
and personal information shall be guaranteed.
(2) No one may violate the privacy of  letters and the secrecy of  other written 
documents and records, whether they are kept in privacy, or sent by mail or in any 
other way, with the exception of  cases which shall be laid down by law. Equally 
guaranteed is the secrecy of  messages conveyed by telephone, telegraph, or other 
similar means.
(2) No one may violate the privacy of  letters and the secrecy of  other written 
documents and records, whether they are kept in privacy, or sent by mail or in any 
other way, with the exception of  cases which shall be laid down by law. Equally 
guaranteed is the secrecy of  messages conveyed by telephone, telegraph, or other 
similar means.”
The secrecy of  telecommunication is recognized as a fundamen-
tal right in Article 22 of  the Constitution and Article 13 of  the Charter 
of  Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. The written Constitution and 
Charter do not recognize the confidentiality and integrity of  informa-
tion systems. However, it can be interpreted from a more general funda-
mental right, e.g., the general protection of  property coded in Article 20 
of  the Constitution or Article 11 Paragraph 1 of  the Charter. Theoretically, 
the protection of  information self-determination could serve as a consti-
tutional basis for the protection of  cyber security. Unfortunately, a cyber 
security law for Slovakia is currently in process with the outcome as yet 
unknown. But it is highly probable that the main legislative works on this 
legislative document will be inspired by Czech law.186 Also, the same situa-
tion can be identified with the term “privacy”. The term “privacy” is used 
in Slovak law with two main meanings. One of  them denotes a general con-
stitutional principle; another meaning of  the term “privacy” (súkromie) arises 
186 The Concept of  Cybersecurity in Slovak Republic. Government materials. Online: https://
lt.justice.gov.sk/Attachment/Vlastný%20materiál_docx.pdf?instEID=-1 & attEID=75
645&docEID=413095&matEID=7996&langEID=1&tStamp=20150218154455240.
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from the Civil Code (Act No. 40/1964 Zb.) and it establishes civil remedies 
for cases of  infringement:187
“Protection of  personhood
Section 11
An individual shall have the right to protection of  his or her personhood, in par-
ticular of  his or her life and health, civic honour and human dignity as well 
as of  its privacy, name and expressions of  personal nature.”
Finally, neither the Constitution nor the Charter explicitly defines the right 
to informational self-determination. Also, the Slovak Constitutional Court 
has not yet answered this question. Only academic works and law literature 
are currently arguing about the interpretation of  this concept.
8.2.2 Proportionality of  access to data
The doctrine of  proportionality has been recognised by the Slovak 
Republic, which was inspired by Czech and German constitutional judica-
ture. It is now applied by Slovak Constitutional court, and very irregularly 
by regular courts and even by administrative authorities. The methodologi-
cal grounds of  the concept of  proportionality were explained in a decision 
of  the Constitutional Court No. II. ÚS 152/08 (unofficial translation): 188
“The	proportionality	test	is	typically	based	on	the	following	three	steps.	The	first	
step	(A)	is	a	sufficiently	important	objective	test	(test	of 	Legitimate	aim	/	effect),	
accordingly the test of  the suitability (Geeignetheit) or if  an action aims toward 
the	goal	which	is	enough	important	to	justify	intervention;	the	test	of 	rational	links	
between intrusion and intervention (authority order) and said methods (restricting 
the freedom of  expression), if  it is possible to achieve an acceptable target (the 
preservation of  the personal honour).
The second step (B) is the necessity test. It is the test of  the necessity of  the used 
methods for the intrusion (Erforderlichkeit, necessity of  the test, a test of  subsidi-
arity), if  there couldn’t be used more moderate actions.
Finally, the third step (C) is the proportionality test in stricto sensu (Angemessenheit 
test of  proportionality in the strict sense, proporcionate effect), which includes 
both (C1) practical concordance (practical conformity), i.e. the test of  preserving 
187 Act No. 40/1964 Zb. - The Civil Code. Unofficial translation. Online: http://ceflonline.
net/wp-content/uploads/Slovakia-Property-Relations.pdf.
188 Decision of  the Slovak Constitutional Court No. II. ÚS 152/08. Translation of  author. 
Online: http://portal.concourt.sk/.
INTERCEPTION OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND SLOVAKIA
126
a maximum of  both fundamental rights and (C2) called Alexy’s weighing for-
mula. An example of  practical conformity could be a situation where the com-
munity, instead of  banning a meeting because another meeting is held at the same 
time	and	place,	involves	the	police	to	conduct	both	meetings.	[…]	Weighing	for-
mula works with a three-level scale of  values: “low”, “medium” and “substan-
tial”. The intensity of  intrusion to one of  the fundamental right competes with 
the degree of  the satisfaction rate of  the second law in a collision. The intensity 
of  intrusion and the degree of  satisfaction have one of  values-such as “low”, 
“medium” and “substantial”.”
The test has not been used regarding electronic evidence or intrusions into 
information systems in any notable case yet (usually it is used with the pres-
ervation of  personal honour, general publishing law, real estate law189 
or in a case regarding health insurance and profit190). One interesting case 
before the Constitutional Court regarding wiretapping has brought minor 
explanation over the doctrine of  proportionality, where the court noted:
“Finally, the proportionality of  the intrusion means that the intrusion can be exe-
cuted only when it is necessary (the aim can not be achieved by moderate methods) 
and only in the spirit of  the requirements placed on the democratic society of  plu-
ralism,	 tolerance	 and	 free	 spirit.	 […]	The	 issuance	 of 	 the	 order	 for	 the	 inter-
ception	 requires	 specific	 relevant	 explanatory	 argument,	 by	 which	 facts	 would	
fulfil	the	conditions	laid	down	by	law	for	the	infringement	of 	the	right	to	privacy.	
The order or an approval can not be subject to review without such a reasoning 
relying	on	the	specific	facts.” 191
Finally, on April 29 2015, the Constitutional Court of  the Slovak Republic 
ruled that the mass surveillance of  citizens is unconstitutional. The deci-
sion was made in the context of  proceedings initiated by 30 Members 
of  Parliament on behalf  of  the European Information Society Institute, 
a Slovakia-based think-tank. “According to now invalid provisions of  the Electronic 
Communications Act, the providers of  electronic communications were obliged to store traf-
fic	data,	location	data	and	data	about	the	communicating	parties	for	a	period	of 	six	months	
189 Decision of  the Slovak Constitutional Court No. PL. ÚS 3/00. Online: http://portal.
concourt.sk/.
190 Decision of  the Slovak Constitutional Court No. Pl. ÚS 3/09. Online: http://portal.
concourt.sk/.
191 Decision of  the Slovak Constitutional Court No. I. ÚS 114/2012. (informal translation). 
Online: http://portal.concourt.sk/Zbierka/2012/29_12s.pdf.
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(in	the	case	of 	Internet,	email	or	Voice	over	IP	(VoIP)	communications)	or	for	a	period	
of  12 months (in case of  other communications). Data about unsuccessful calls was also 
stored	 for	 the	same	periods.	Moreover,	 the	 legal	 framework	regulating	 the	access	 to	data	
retention data was completely arbitrary and considerably less stringent than comparable 
provisions on wire-tapping.” 192 According to the European Information Society 
Institute, “the introduction of  these obligations constituted a substantial encroachment 
upon the private life of  individuals – especially because this mandated blanket moni-
toring of  all inhabitants of  Slovakia, regardless of  their innocence or prior behaviour. 
The data retention requirements mandated that every day the data about every inhabitant 
of 	Slovakia	must	be	collected,	amassing	a	profile	of 	who	called	whom,	to	whom	someone	
sent	 an	 SMS	 or	 email,	 when	 the	 person	 sent	 it,	 from	which	 location,	 using	 what	 type	
of  device or service, how long the communication took, and many others details. It almost 
goes without saying that combining all this information made it possible to perfectly analyse 
the movements of  every inhabitant of  Slovakia using a mobile phone or the internet.” 
The Constitutional Court applied here the proportionality between the pro-
tection of  privacy of  individuals and state interests in criminal investigations.
8.2.3 Consequences for the interception of  telecommunication
Slovak authorities may safeguard and surrender computer data for crimi-
nal proceeding purposes. Intrusive measures as well as protective instru-
ments are primarily focused on real-time communications and specifically 
on telecommunications. On the other hand, the Slovak criminal law already 
has experience with stored data (communication). Recently, a new provision 
in the Code of  Criminal Procedure states: 193
“Section 90
Safeguarding and surrendering computer data
(1)	 If 	 the	 clarification	of 	 facts	 relevant	 to	 criminal	proceedings	 requires	access	
to safeguard stored computer data, including operational data saved through 
the computer system, the presiding judge of  a panel or a prosecutor prior to the com-
mencement of  criminal prosecution or in pre-trial proceedings, respectively, may 
issue an order based on circumstantial reasons to the person who has possession 
of  or control over such data, or to the provider of  such services, requesting them to
192 EDRI.prg. Slovakia: Mass surveillance of  citizens is unconstitutional. Online: https://
edri.org/slovakia-mass-surveillance-of-citizens-is-unconstitutional/.
193 Ibid. The Code of  Criminal Procedure.
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a) safeguard and maintain integrity of  such data,
b) enable making and keeping copies of  such data,
c) prevent access to such data,
d) remove such data from the computer system,
e) surrender such data for the purposes of  criminal proceedings.
(2) The order referred to in paragraph 1 shall have to specify the period during 
which	the	data	are	to	be	safeguarded,	not	exceeding	90	days;	a	new	order	shall	
have to be issued for any extension of  that period.
(3) Where there is no longer a need to safeguard computer data, including opera-
tional data for the purposes of  criminal proceedings, the presiding judge of  a panel 
or a prosecutor prior to the commencement of  criminal prosecution or in pre-trial 
proceedings, respectively, shall issue an order reversing the obligation to safeguard 
the data.
(4) The order referred to in paragraphs 1 to 3 shall be served on the person 
who has possession of  or control over such data, or on the provider of  such ser-
vices, who may be also imposed the duty to treat the measures set out in the order 
as	confidential.
(5) The person who has possession of  or control over computer data shall sur-
render these data, or the provider of  services shall surrender the information that 
is in his possession or under his control in connection therewith to the authority 
that issued the order pursuant to paragraph 1.”
Also, an example is the old provision implemented for the retention of  traffic 
data in the Act No.351/2011 Zb. on electronic communications. The Slovak 
Constitutional Court has repealed this provision (paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8) 
as unlawful regarding the European trends in mass surveillance issues: 194
“Section 58
(1)	User	identification	means	a	unique	identification	code,	login	name,	or	other	
unique mark assigned to a subscriber at the conclusion of  the contract of  the pro-
vision of  public services or to a user during a registration of  the Internet access 
services or communications services via Internet.
(2)	Cell	identification	(cell	ID)	means	the	identity	of 	the	radio	mobile	network	
cell from which a call via a mobile terminal equipment originated or terminated.
(3) For the purposes of  retaining data under Subsections 5 to 8, telephone service 
means the calls including telephone calls, voice mail, conference calls and data 
194 Ibid. The Code of  Criminal Procedure.
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transmission, supplementary services including call forwarding and call transfer 
and	messaging	and	multimedia	services	including	SMS,	enhanced	media	services	
(EMS)	and	MMS.
(4) For the purposes of  retaining data under Subsections 6 and 7, unsuccessful 
call attempt means the call which has been successfully connected to the calling 
party terminal equipment but such a call has not been answered by the called user 
or his terminal equipment or there has been a network management intervention.
(5) For the purposes under Subsection 7, the undertaking shall be obliged to retain 
traffic	data,	location	data	and	data	of 	the	parties	who	communicated	from	the	date	
of  making the communication during:
a) Six months in case of  Internet access, Internet electronic mail and telephon-
ing through Internet, and
b) Twelve months in case of  other types of  communication.
(6) The undertaking shall retain data under Subsection 5 in the scope in which 
it produces or processes while provisioning a service or network. The undertaking 
shall retain the data under Subsection 5 related to the unsuccessful call attempts 
which the undertaking produces or processes and retain in terms of  the telephone 
numbers, or records in case of  the Internet data. The data related to unconnected 
calls shall not be retained. The list of  data which the undertaking shall be obliged 
to retain under this Subsection and Subsection 5 is referred to in Annex2.
(7) On the basis of  a written request and without delay, the undertaking shall 
be obliged to provide data retained under Subsections 5 and 6 including the sub-
scriber’s data in the scope under Section 63, Subsection 1, Letter b) under condi-
tions set in Section 63, Subsection 6 to the bodies acting in the criminal procee-
dings, court and other state body for the purposes of  investigation, detection and 
prosecution of  criminal offences related to terrorism, illegal trading, organized 
criminal activity, leakage and threatening of  the concealed facts and to crimi-
nal	 offences	 committed	 by	 dangerous	 grouping;	 the	 data	 and	 information	 shall	
be retained only in an electronic form.
(8) The undertaking shall be obliged to administer a yearly statistic on the retained 
data which shall contain:
a) A number of  cases in which the required data was provided to other state 
bodies under Section 55, Subsection 6,
b) The time elapsed between the date on which the data were retained and 
the date on which an authority acting in a criminal proceeding, court or other 
state body requested the provision of  the data, and
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c) The number of  cases where the requests for data could not be met.
(9) Statistics under Subsection 8 shall not contain personal data. The under-
taking	 shall	 provide	 statistics	 under	 Subsection	 8	 to	 the	 Ministry	 within	
January,	31	of 	the	next	year.	The	Ministry	shall	subsequently	submit	statistics	
to the European commission.
(10) Where retaining the data under Subsection 6, the undertaking shall ensure 
that:
a) The retained data shall be of  the same quality and subject to the same 
security and protection as the data which the undertaking processes or retains 
when providing networks or services,
b) The data shall be subject to the relevant technical and organisational 
measures to protect the data against accidental or unlawful destruction, acci-
dental loss or alteration, unauthorised or unlawful storage, processing, access 
or publishing,
c) The data shall be subject to the relevant technical and organisational 
measures to ensure that the data can be accessed by the authorised persons 
only acting under the authority or power of  attorney of  the undertaking and 
authorities acting in a criminal proceeding, court or other state bodies and their 
entrusted or otherwise authorised members or staff,
d) The data, except those that have been provided and secured, shall 
be destroyed at the end of  the period of  retention.”
Also, protection of  the confidentiality and integrity of  information systems 
is a specific part of  the Slovak law of  electronic communications. The respec-
tive provisions of  the Electronic Communications Act read as follows:195
“Section 64
Security and Integrity of  Public Networks and Services Section
(1) The undertaking that provides public networks or public services shall 
be obliged to take appropriate technical and organisational measures to protect 
security of  its networks and services, which with regard to the technology state shall 
ensure	such	a	level	of 	security	that	is	adequate	to	the	risk	posed.	Measures	shall	
be taken in particular to prevent and minimise the impact of  security incidents 
on users and interconnected networks.
195 Act No.351/2011 Zb. On Electronic Communication. Unofficial translation. Online: 
http://www.teleoff.gov.sk/data/files/22211.pdf.
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(2) The undertaking that provides public networks shall be obliged to maintain 
the integrity of  its networks in order to ensure the continuity of  provisioning 
services over those networks.
(3) The undertaking that provides public networks or services shall be obliged, 
without	delay,	to	inform	the	Office	about	a	breach	of 	security	or	integrity	that	has	
had	a	significant	impact	on	the	operation	of 	networks	or	services.
(4)	 If 	 it	 is	 in	 the	 public	 interest,	 the	 Office	 shall	 publish	 information	 under	
Subsection	3	or,	on	the	basis	of 	a	request	of 	the	Office,	the	undertaking	shall	
publish such information.
(5) In the case of  a particular risk of  a breach of  the network security, the pro-
vider of  public services shall be obliged to inform subscribers concerned about 
such a risk and any possible remedies, including likely costs necessary to avert 
the threat.
(6) The undertaking that provides public networks or services shall be obliged:
a)	Upon	the	request	of 	the	Office,	to	provide	the	relevant	information	neces-
sary to assess security and integrity of  its services and networks, including 
the documented security policies,
b)	To	enable	a	security	audit	carried	out	by	a	qualified	independent	person	
selected	by	the	Office	or	the	Office	itself,	while	the	cost	of 	the	audit	shall	be	cov-
ered by the undertaking.
c)	To	provide	 the	 results	 of 	 the	audit	 to	 the	Office	and,	upon	 the	 request,	
the	Office	for	protection	of 	personal	data,
d)	To	cooperate	with	the	Office	 in	 investigation	of 	 cases	of 	non-compliance	
with regulations and their impact on network security and integrity and, upon 
the	request,	to	provide	the	Office	with	relating	relevant	information.
(7) The details on maintaining the network integrity and parameters thereof  
and	 the	 notification	 obligation	 of 	 the	 undertaking	 under	 Subsections	 3	 to	 5	
and 6, Letter a) shall be regulated by a generally binding legal regulation issued 
by	the	Office.
(8) The undertaking providing public networks and associated facilities shall 
be obliged to ensure that its network and associated facilities comply with technical 
standards	and	technical	specifications	for	networks	or	services	under	Section	14,	
Subsection 2, Letter q) in terms of:
a)	Network	traffic	security,
b) Network integrity maintaining,
c) Service interoperability,
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d) Terminal equipment connection.
(9)	Where	appropriate,	the	Office	shall	provide	information	under	Subsection	3	
to	regulatory	authorities	in	the	Member	States	and	agency	ENISA.	The	Office	
shall annually submit the European Commission and ENISA a summary 
report	on	the	notifications	under	Subsection	3	and	any	related	measures	taken.”
Furthermore, the protection of  confidentiality and the integrity of  informa-
tion systems and information networks is the main subject of  Cyber security 
law, which is currently in the progress.196 Protection of  the core area of  pri-
vacy is defined also stricto sensu by the Civil Code from 1964. This old legisla-
tion doesn’t reflect the recent problematic nature of  the concept of  privacy 
or its current technology determination. It includes only very general provi-
sions whose meanings for everyday life in an information society are highly 
uncertain.
8.2.4 Statutory protection of  personal data
In the age of  Slovak independence, the protection of  personal data became 
important as a reflection of  constitutional citizens’ privacy protection. 
The Slovak Penal Code (Act No.300/2005 Zb.) covers criminal liability 
for the unlawful infringement of  telecommunication (e.g., information/
data breach). Likewise, The Slovak Republic is a member of  the Budapest 
treaty,197 so these provisions reflect standard types of  crimes laid down 
therein. Typical crimes are breach of  mailing secrets; harm done to and 
abuse of  an information carrier; and breach of  confidentiality of  spoken 
utterance and other personal expression.
The most important crimes related to the personal data are:198
“Section 196
Breach	of 	Mailing	Secrets
196 NASES. Cyber Security Concept of  the Slovak Republic. Online: https://
www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/national-cyber-security-strategies/ncss-map/
cyber-security-concept-of-the-slovak-republic-1.
197 Budapest Convention on Cybercrime. Online: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/
Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=185&CM=8&DF=02/06/2010&CL=ENG.
198 Act. No. 300/2005 Zb. Penal Code. Unofficial translation: Ďurčová, M. Online: www.
legislationline.org/documents/id/16895 and System ASPI, ASPI Translation. Wolters 
Kluwer. 2016 300/2005 Z.z. Trestný zákon (Penal Code). [Sections 247, 247a, 247 b, 
247c, 247d] Online: http://www.aspi.cz.
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(1) Any person who intentionally breaches the secrecy of  letter through spying 
or opening a sealed letter or other written communication delivered by postal 
service or in other habitual manner, shall be liable to a term of  imprisonment 
of  up to three years.
(2) Any employee of  the provider of  postal service or electronic communication 
service who commits the offence referred to in paragraph 1, or wilfully enables 
another to commit such offence, or who alters or withholds a written communica-
tion delivered by postal service or in other habitual manner or communication 
transferred via electronic communication service shall be liable to a term of  impris-
onment	of 	one	to	five	years.
(3) The offender shall be liable to a term of  imprisonment of  four to ten years 
if  he commits the offence referred to in paragraphs 1 or 2,
a) and causes substantial damage through its commission,
b)	by	reason	of 	specific	motivation,
c) acting in a more serious manner.
Section 247
Illegal Access to a Computer System
(1) Whoever overcomes security measures, thus obtaining illegal access to a com-




(3) A prison sentence of  three to eight years shall be imposed upon an offender 
if  they committed an act referred to in Subsection 1
a) and thus cause damage of  a large extent, or b) as a member of  a danger-
ous group.
Section 247a
Illegal Intervention into a Computer System
(1) Whoever restricts or interrupts the functioning of  a computer system or part 
thereof  by a) illegally entering, transmitting, damaging, deleting, reducing 
the quality of, altering or suppressing computer data or making them inaccessible, 
or b) illegally intervening into the hardware or software of  a computer and destroy-
ing, damaging, deleting, altering the obtained information or reducing the quality 
of  the obtained information, shall be punished by a prison sentence of  six months 
to three years.
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(2) A prison sentence of  three to eight years shall be imposed upon an offender 
if  they committed an act referred to in Subsection 1
a)	and	thus	cause	significant	damage,
b) and thus cause serious failure in the activities of  a state authority, local 
government authority, court or other public authority,
c) by misusing the personal data of  another person in order to gain the trust 
of  a third party.
(3) An offender shall be punished by a prison sentence of  four to ten years if  they 
committed an act referred to in Subsection 1
a) and thus cause damage of  a large extent,
b) and thus cause serious failure in critical infrastructure, or c) as a member 
of  a dangerous group.
Section 247 b
Illegal Intervention into Computer Data
(1) Whoever intentionally damages, deletes, alters, suppresses or makes computer 
data inaccessible or reduces their quality in a computer system or part thereof, shall 
be punished by a prison sentence of  six months to three years.
(2) A prison sentence of  three to eight years shall be imposed upon an offender 
if  they committed an act referred to in Subsection 1
a)	and	thus	cause	significant	damage,
b) and thus cause serious failure in the activities of  a state authority, local 
government authority, court or other public authority,
c) by misusing the personal data of  another person in order to gain the trust 
of  a third party.
(3) An offender shall be punished by a prison sentence of  four to ten years if  they 
committed an act referred to in Subsection 1
a) and thus cause damage of  a large extent,
b) and thus cause serious failure in critical infrastructure, or c) as a member 
of  a dangerous group.
Section 247c
Illegal Capture of  Computer Data
(1) Whoever illegally captures computer data through technical means of  non-
public transmissions of  computer data to or from or within a computer system, 
including electromagnetic emissions from a computer system that contains such 
computer data, shall be punished by a prison sentence of  six months to three years.
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(2) Whoever as an employee of  a provider of  an electronic communications service 
commits the act referred to in Subsection 1 or intentionally facilitates the commis-
sion of  such act by another person, or alters or suppresses a message submitted 
through an electronic communications service, shall be punished by a prison sen-
tence	of 	one	to	five	years.
(3) A prison sentence of  three to eight years shall be imposed upon an offender 
if  they committed an act referred to in Subsection 1 or 2
a) out of  a special motive,
b)	 in	 a	more	 serious	manner	 of 	 conduct,	 or	 c)	 and	 thus	 cause	 significant	
damage.
(4) A prison sentence of  four to ten years shall be imposed upon an offender 
if  they committed an act referred to in Subsection 1 or 2
a) and thus cause damage of  a large extent, or 
b) as a member of  a dangerous group.
Section 247d
Production and Possession of  Access Devices, Passwords to Computer Systems 
or other Data
(1) Whoever, with the intention of  committing the criminal offence of  illegal access 
to a computer system under Section 247, illegal intervention into a computer sys-
tem under Section 247a, illegal intervention into computer data under Section 
247 b or illegal capture of  computer data under Section 247c, produces, imports, 
procures, buys, sells, exchanges, puts into circulation or howsoever provides access 
to a) a device, including a computer programme, created for illegally accessing 
a computer system or part thereof, or b) a computer password, access code or simi-
lar data enabling access to a computer system or part thereof, shall be punished 
by a prison sentence of  up to two years.
(2) A prison sentence of  six months to three years shall be imposed upon 
an offender if  they committed an act referred to in Subsection 1 and thus cause 
significant	damage.
(3)	A	 prison	 sentence	 of 	 one	 to	 five	 years	 shall	 be	 imposed	 upon	 an	 offender	
if  they committed an act referred to in Subsection 1
a) and thus cause damage of  a large extent, or 
b) as a member of  a dangerous group.
Section 377
Breach	of 	Confidentiality	of 	Spoken	Utterance	and	Other	Personal	Expression
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(1)	 Any	 person	 who	 breaches	 the	 confidentiality	 of 	 private	 spoken	 utterance	
or other personal expression by its unlawful recording, and makes such recording 
accessible to a third person or uses it otherwise, and thus causes serious prejudice 
to the rights of  another, shall be liable to a term of  imprisonment of  up to two 
years.
(2) The offender shall be liable to a term of  imprisonment of  between six months 
and three years if  he commits the offence referred to in paragraph 1
a) as a member of  an organised group,
b) and causes substantial damage through the commission of  such offence, or 
c)	with	the	intention	of 	obtaining	substantial	benefit	for	himself 	or	another.
(3) The offender shall be liable to a term of  imprisonment of  between six months 
and	five	years	if 	he	
a)	commits	the	offence	referred	to	in	paragraph	1	as	a	public	official,
b) and causes large-scale damage through the commission of  such offence, or
c)	commits	such	offence	with	the	intention	of 	obtaining	large-scale	benefit	for	
himself  or another.”
Protection of  professional secrets in criminal procedural law is guaran-
teed by dual concepts: the obligation to maintain confidentiality (in Anglo-
American law as an attorney-client privilege) and the ban on witness exami-
nation. For example, Act No. 586/2003 Zb. on the Legal Profession,199 
which rules the attorney profession, in Section 23 of  this act the scope 
of  the obligation to maintain confidentiality is defined:200
“Section 23
(1) The lawyer is obliged not to reveal any information learnt in connection with 
the	practice	of 	law	and	shall	treat	such	information	as	strictly	confidential.
(2)	The	lawyer	may	be	released	from	the	duty	of 	confidentiality	by	the	client,	and	
after his client’s death or dissolution only by the client’s legal successor. If  the client 
has	several	legal	successors,	release	from	the	duty	of 	confidentiality	shall	take	effect	
subject to the prior written consent of  all legal successors.
199 Act No. 586/2003 Zb. on the Legal Profession and on Amending Act No. 455/1991 Zb. 
on the Business and Self-Employment Services (Business Licensing Act) as amend-
ed. Unofficial translation. Online: http://www.ccbe.org/fileadmin/user_upload/
NTCdocument/en_slovak_rep_parlia1_1188889665.pdf.
200 Act No. 586/2003 Zb. on the Legal Profession (unofficial translation by CCBE.eu). 
Online: http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/NTCdocument/EN_transposi-
tion_slo1_1202123946.pdf.
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(3)	The	lawyer	shall	not	disclose	confidential	information	despite	his	having	been	
released from this duty by the client or all his legal successors, if  the lawyer comes 
to a conclusion that any such release and disclosure would be detrimental to the cli-
ent and might cause harm to the client.
(4) The lawyer may reveal information to a person, to whom he wishes to issue 
a derivative power of  attorney in respect of  individual legal acts, provided that 
such	a	person	himself 	is	bound	by	confidentiality	under	separate	legal	rules.
(5)	 The	 lawyer	may	 disclose	 any	 confidential	 information	 to	 the	 court	 of 	 law	
or any other authority, if  the matter handled by such authorities concerns a dispute 
between the lawyer and his client, or the client’s legal successor.
(6)	The	lawyer	may	not	claim	confidentiality	in	a	disciplinary	proceeding	under	
this Act. Details shall be laid down in the Bar’s Disciplinary Rules.
(7)	The	 duty	 of 	 confidentiality	 shall	 be	 observed	 during	 temporary	 suspension	
from the practice and shall even survive the lawyer’s disbarment.
(8)	The	duty	of 	confidentiality	shall	apply	mutatis	mutandis	to:
a) employees of  the lawyer, of  the general non-commercial partnership, 
of  the limited liability partnership, or of  a limited liability company,
b) other persons, who are in connection therewith engaged in the provision 
of  legal services,
c)	members	of 	the	Bar’s	governing	bodies	and	its	employees	[Sec.	66(4)].
(9)	The	duty	of 	confidentiality	shall	not	apply	to	any	cases	of 	lawful	disclosure	
that would prevent a crime.
(10)	The	duty	of 	confidentiality	under	a	separate	legal	rule1	shall	not	be	affected	
or prejudiced hereby.”
On another hand, the Code of  Criminal Procedure brings a ban on wit-
ness examination in the case of  an attorney admitted to the bar. Witnesses 
shouldn’t be asked to testify on matters that involve secret data, the data 
they are obliged to keep secret, except when the competent body waives 
the confidentiality obligation. The waiver can be denied only in the case 
of  danger to the defence or the security of  the State, or if  the examina-
tion could cause other equally serious damage. The denial of  a waiver made 
by an authority must be always justified. Witness can’t be asked to testify 
if  his testimony would constitute a breach of  the confidentiality obligation 
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prescribed or recognised by law or by an international treaty, unless that 
obligation is waived by the competent body or the body in whose interest 
such obligation was imposed.
This ban on interrogation doesn’t apply to the testimony given in respect 
of  an offence that the witness has an obligation to report under the Criminal 
Code.
Also, the principle of  purposeful limitation of  personal data is incorporated 
in Personal Data Protection Act (Act No. 122/2013 Zb.). The most impor-
tant provisions lay down the purpose of  limitation next to the General Data 
Protection Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2016/679).201
8.3 Powers for Accessing Telecommunication Data
8.3.1 Overview
The Code of  Criminal Procedure in the Slovak Republic is the central point 
for the law enforcement authorities to intercept electronic communication 
and to otherwise access electronic communications data for the purpose 
of  criminal investigations. As was mentioned before, the most important 
are provisions regulating: General duty to surrender a thing (Section 89), 
Safeguarding and surrendering computer data (Section 90), Interception 
(Section 115) and the recently repealed provision on Access to traffic and 
location data (Section 116).
Strong powers for the law enforcement authorities accessing telecommuni-
cation data can be found in the Act on the Protection against Interception, 
which stipulates the conditions required for the use of  ITM (intelligence 
technical measures) without the prior consent of  the person whose privacy 
is infringed upon by the state body which uses the ITM.
201 Act No. 122/2013 Zb. on Protection of  Personal Data and on Changing and Amending 
of  other acts, resulting from amendments and additions executed by the Act. 
No. 84/2014 Zb. (Unofficial translation) Online: http://www.dataprotection.gov.sk/
uoou/sites/default/files/kcfinder/files/Act_122-2013_84-2014_en.pdf.
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8.3.2 Requirement of  (reasonable) clarity for 
powers in the law of  criminal procedure
The situation about requirements of  (reasonable) clarity for powers 
in the law of  criminal procedure is very close to Czech law. The fundamen-
tal rules that govern Slovak criminal procedural law are provided in Section 
2 of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure. The Fundamental Rules of  Criminal 
Procedure are based on the principle that no person may be prosecuted 
as accused on other than the legal grounds and in another manner than that 
provided for under the present Act. Another very important principle reads 
that fundamental rights and freedoms of  persons may be, in cases permit-
ted by law, interfered with to the extent necessary to achieve the purpose 
of  criminal proceedings with due respect for the dignity of  persons and 
their privacy. Any interference with fundamental rights and freedoms under 
the Code of  Criminal Procedure before the commencement of  the crimi-
nal prosecution or in pre-trial proceedings shall be decided by a judge for 
pre-trial proceedings; the judge for pre-trial proceedings shall also decide 
on other matters as provided for by the Code of  Criminal Procedure. One 
of  the basic principles of  criminal procedure rules is that any person sub-
ject to criminal prosecution shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty 
by a final sentencing judgment.
Other fundamental criminal procedure principles are:202
• A prosecutor represents the State in criminal proceedings. Unless 
the Code of  Criminal Procedure, an international treaty promulgated 
in a manner prescribed by law (hereinafter referred to as “interna-
tional treaty”) or the decision of  an international organisation which 
is binding on the Slovak Republic provides otherwise, the prosecutor 
shall have the duty to prosecute all criminal offences that came to his 
knowledge.
• Unless the Code of  Criminal Procedure provides otherwise, the bod-
ies involved in criminal proceedings and the courts shall act ex offi-
cio. They shall have the duty to deal with cases involving detention 
as a matter of  priority and without undue delay. The authorities 
202 Section 2 of  301/2005 Zb. Code of  Criminal Procedure. The European e-Justice Portal. 
Unofficial translation.
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involved in criminal proceedings or the courts shall not take account 
of  the petitions whose content infringes on the fulfilment of  this 
duty.
• Every person shall have the right to a fair hearing of  his criminal 
case by an independent and impartial tribunal in a reasonable time 
and in his presence, and to have an opportunity to comment on any 
adduced evidence, unless the Code of  Criminal Procedure provides 
otherwise.
• No person may be prosecuted in respect of  an act for which he had 
already been finally convicted or from which he had been acquitted. 
This principle shall not exclude the use of  extraordinary remedies 
as prescribed by law.
• Every person subject to criminal prosecution shall have the right 
to defence.
• The authorities involved in criminal proceedings shall proceed 
so as to properly establish the facts of  the case that do not give rise 
to reasonable doubts, to the extent necessary for making the deci-
sion. They shall procure the evidence as part of  their official duties. 
The parties shall also be granted the right to procure the evidence. 
The authorities involved in criminal proceedings shall thoroughly 
clarify the circumstances regardless of  whether they prejudice or ben-
efit the accused, and they shall take the evidence in either direction 
so as to enable the court to arrive at a fair decision.
• The court may also take other evidence than those proposed 
by the parties. The parties shall have the right to supply the evidence 
proposed by them.
• The authorities involved in criminal proceedings and the court 
shall evaluate the legally obtained evidence in accordance with their 
deep conviction based on the careful examination of  all the facts 
of  the case, separately and jointly, irrespective of  whether they were 
supplied by the court, the authorities involved in criminal procee-
dings or by one of  the parties to the proceedings.
• All the authorities involved in criminal proceedings shall co-operate 
with associations of  citizens and shall make use of  the educational 
impact thereof.
• All parties shall have equal status before the court.
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• Criminal prosecution before the court shall only be initiated 
on the basis of  a motion or an indictment filed by a prosecutor who 
shall represent the prosecution or the motion in the proceedings 
before the court.
• In criminal proceedings before the court, the decision shall be made 
by a panel of  judges, a single judge or by a judge for pre-trial procee-
dings. A presiding judge of  a panel, a single judge or a judge for pre-
trial proceedings shall have the sole authority to decide the case only 
when the law expressly provides for it.
• Criminal cases shall be heard in open court. Public attendance may 
be excluded from the main hearing or open court hearing only 
in cases explicitly provided for under the Code of  Criminal Procedure. 
The judgment shall always be announced in open court.
• Proceedings before the court shall be oral; exceptions are provided 
for under this Act. The examination of  evidence shall be carried out 
by the court, which, however, leaves the examination of  the accused, 
witnesses and expert witnesses to the parties, starting with the one 
that proposed or procured the evidence.
• When deciding at the main trial, open or closed court hearing, 
the court may only take account of  the evidence taken during 
the hearing, unless otherwise provided by law.
• If  the accused, his legal guardian, the injured party, a participat-
ing person or witness declares that he does not speak the language 
of  the proceedings, he shall have the right to be assigned an inter-
preter or a translator.
Also, in many criminal cases the Supreme Court of  the Slovak Republic 
or the Slovak Constitutional Court has interpreted these fundamental rules 
to define reasonable clarity for powers in the law of  criminal procedure.
8.3.3 Differentiation and classification of  powers 
in the law of  criminal procedure
Coercive powers related to telecommunications data are, in Slovak crimi-
nal procedure, defined by criminal law legislation, which regulates wiretap-
ping on one side and retention of  traffic data on the other side. Duties 
and procedures that apply on the side of  providers of  electronic commu-
nications services are defined in the Electronic Communications Act, while 
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procedures that apply on the side of  the Police or Prosecution Service are 
laid down in the Code of  Criminal Procedure or Act on the Protection 
against Interception (see the Chapter I.A.1).
The reason for such separation is primarily the fact that wiretapping and data 
retention serve other purposes than just criminal procedure. Consequently, 
provisions laid down in the Electronic Communications Act cover, in gen-
eral, the obligations of  providers of  services of  electronic communica-
tions. Also, they specify only purposes for which respective data might 
be requested. Finally, it is important to note that the situation here is cur-
rently unclear due to the Constitutional Court decision about the invalidity 
of  relevant provisions in the Electronic Communications Act.
8.4 Interception of  Content Data
8.4.1 Object of  interception, special protection 
of  confidential communication content and 
execution of  telecommunication interception
Slovak law broadly defines the object of  an interception. The procedural 
concept of  execution is based on the order or approval to intercept and 
record telecommunications. Another important term is ITM (intelligence-
technical measures/means). These measures are defined as electro-technical, 
radio- technical, photo-technical, optical, mechanical, chemical, and other 
technical measures and equipment or their sets, used in a covert manner in: 
a) searching for, opening, examination, and assessment of  mail and other 
transported packages; b) monitoring and recording of  telecommunication 
activities; c) making and using the visual, audio, and other recordings.
Regarding access to on-going telecommunication, the abovementioned 
provisions cover this type of  interception. The investigator may intercept 
any data that are “in traffic” – from the moment it is sent from the source 
device to the moment it is received by the destination device. The provi-
sions on safeguarding and surrendering computer data pursuant to Section 
90 of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure regulate access after the end of  tel-
ecommunication transmission (see above).
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Pursuant to the Section 115 of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure, if  the accused 
is found to be in communication with his defence counsel, no information 
thus obtained may be used for the purposes of  criminal proceedings, and 
any such information must be forthwith destroyed in a prescribed manner. 
This regulation will not apply to information relating to a case in which 
a lawyer does not represent the accused as his defence counsel. A similar 
situation applies for the duty to surrender a thing pursuant to Section 89 
Paragraph 2, respectively for the safeguarding and surrendering of  com-
puter data pursuant to the Section 90 of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure.
The Code of  Criminal Procedure doesn’t stipulate which modes of  inter-
ception law enforcement authorities should use. Minor regulations regard-
ing ITM are embodied in the Act on the Protection against Interception 
(see above). Also, these activities are conducted by the Slovak Police Corps 
pursuant to the Section 36 of  the Act No. 171/1993 Zb. on Police Corps.
8.4.2 Duties of  telecommunication service providers to cooperate
Possible addressees of  duties of  cooperation are any subjects able to assist 
in criminal procedure. Therefore, any natural or legal person is required 
to comply with letters of  request from law enforcement authorities for 
the performance of  their actions without undue delay. The related provision 
is in Section 3 of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure. Public authorities (e.g., 
self-governing higher territorial units, municipalities and other legal entities 
and natural persons) have the duty to provide assistance to the courts and 
authorities involved in criminal proceedings in the fulfilment of  their tasks 
in relation to criminal proceedings.
The content of  duties to cooperate arises from the essence of  criminal 
procedure. According to Section 63 of  the Act on electronic communica-
tions, the subject of  telecommunications secrecy shall cooperate with public 
authorities. This is also valid for provision of  the technical infrastructure; 
security requirements for data transfers by communication service provid-
ers; checks, filtering, and decryption obligations of  communication service 
providers. The subject of  telecommunications secrecy is usually the content 
of  conveyed messages, related data of  the communicating parties which are 
the telephone number, business name and the place of  business of  a legal 
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person, or business name and the place of  business of  a natural person – 
undertaker or the personal data of  a natural person which are the name, 
surname, title and permanent residence address (e.g., the data published 
in the telephone directory shall not be subject to telecommunications 
secrecy), traffic data, and location data. Everybody who becomes familiar 
with the subject of  telecommunications secrecy when providing networks 
and services, using the services, accidentally or otherwise, is obliged to keep 
telecommunications secrecy.
8.4.3 Prerequisites of  interception orders
The competent authority to warrant the interception and recording 
in a criminal procedure is always a legitimate body (judge or prosecutor). 
Usually, the order to intercept and record telecommunications is issued 
by the presiding judge of  a panel prior to the commencement of  criminal 
prosecution, or by a judge for pre-trial proceedings following a motion from 
a prosecutor. If  the matter bears no delay and a prior order from a judge for 
pre-trial proceedings cannot be obtained, the order may be issued by a pros-
ecutor before the commencement of  criminal prosecution or in pre-trial 
proceedings, unless the interception and recording of  telecommunications 
involves entry into the dwelling of  a person. A judge for pre-trial procee-
dings must confirm this type of  order within 24 hours of  its issuance. Failing 
that, the order becomes null and void and the information obtained on its 
basis may not be used for the purposes of  criminal proceedings and has 
to be immediately destroyed in a prescribed manner.
The order to intercept and record telecommunications has to be in writing 
and based on circumstantial reasons, separately for each telephone subscriber 
or other technical equipment. The order has to specify the telephone sub-
scriber or technical equipment and, if  known, the person whose telecommu-
nications are intercepted and recorded, and the length of  time during which 
the interception and recording of  telecommunications are to be performed.
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On another hand, the request to grant approval to use ITM according 
to the Act on protection against interception must be submitted in writing 
as well, and must contain the following data:
a) specification of  the type of  ITM to be used and the location of  its 
use, the proposed duration of  its use, data on the person against 
whom the use of  this technical-intelligence measure is directed,
b) information on the previous ineffectual, or considerably difficult, dis-
closure and documentation of  activities, which constitute the reason 
for submitting the request,
c) the rationale for using ITM.
As we demonstrated, the substantive prerequisites of  interception orders 
according to the Code of  Criminal Procedure are very similar to the Czech 
Code of  Criminal Procedure.
To intercept and record telecommunications is possible only where criminal 
proceedings are conducted in investigation of  a felony, corruption, a crimi-
nal offence of  the abuse of  power of  a public official, a criminal offence 
of  laundering the proceeds of  crime, or in respect of  an intentional crimi-
nal offence where so provided by a promulgated international treaty. Also, 
there must always be reasonable grounds to believe that interception will 
reveal facts that are materially relevant for criminal proceedings. In criminal 
proceedings conducted in respect of  an intentional criminal offence which 
is different from the one referred to in the above mentioned list, the order 
to intercept and record telecommunications may be issued by the presiding 
judge of  a panel or, prior to the commencement of  prosecution or in pre-
trial proceedings, by a judge for pre-trial proceedings acting on a motion 
from a prosecutor, but only with the consent of  the subscriber to the tel-
ecommunication equipment subjected to interception or recording.
On the other hand, substantive prerequisites for interception orders accord-
ing to the Act on protection against interception are entirely vague. Even this 
law does not apply to the criminal proceeding: it is very often used by inves-
tigators. Basically, this law entitles Police Corps, the Slovak Information 
Service, Military Intelligence, the Railway Police, the Corps of  Prison and 
Judiciary Guards, and the Customs Board to shift obtained evidence from 
the intelligence regime to the criminal procedure. It is stated that ITM shall 
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be used only if  it is required in a democratic society to safeguard the secu-
rity and defence of  the country, to prevent and reveal criminal activities, 
or to protect the rights and freedoms of  other persons. By using ITM, 
the essential right or freedom can be infringed upon only to the required 
extent and for a period of  time not longer than needed to attain the legal 
goal which it serves. The data obtained by ITM shall be used exclusively for 
achieving the objective when fulfilling the tasks of  the state. Finally, ITM 
can be used only on the basis of  prior written approval from a legitimate 
judge. In an exceptional case, if  there is reasonable suspicion of  a crime 
being committed and ITM might be used by the Police Corps to fulfil its 
tasks, if  the case is to be dealt with immediately and the approval of  a legiti-
mate judge cannot be obtained in advance, the Police Corps may use ITM 
even without prior approval.
Regarding the time limit, the interception and recording, according 
to the Code of  Criminal Procedure, may not exceed six months. This period 
may be extended by another two months, also repeatedly, on a motion from 
a prosecutor or a judge for pre-trial proceedings. Interception and record-
ing, according to the Act on the Protection against Interception, may not 
exceed six months. This period may be extended by another 6 months, also 
repeatedly, on a motion from the Police Corps or another entitled authority.
According to the Code of  Criminal Procedure, Police officers or a com-
petent department of  the Police Corps shall be obliged to continuously 
review the grounds for the order to intercept and record telecommuni-
cations. Where such grounds cease to exist, interception and recording 
of  telecommunications shall have to be discontinued, even if  this is before 
the expiry of  the time limit. This fact shall be immediately notified in writing 
to the entity that issued the order to intercept and record telecommunica-
tions; in pre-trial proceedings, it shall also be notified to the prosecutor.
The legitimate judge who has granted approval to use ITM is required to sys-
tematically review the existing rationale of  their use pursuant to the Act 
on the Protection against Interception. If  the rationale no longer applies, 
he is obliged to issue a decree immediately that the use of  these measures 
cease. However, in our opinion, the practices of  authorities are very unclear 
in this matter and no relevant statistics have been published yet.
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8.4.4 Duties to record, report, and destroy
According to the Code of  Criminal Procedure, if  the record of  telecommu-
nications is to be used as evidence, a verbatim transcript made by the officer 
of  the Police Corps carrying out the interception of  telecommunications 
has to be attached, wherever the recording makes it possible, containing 
information about the place, time and legal grounds for interception. A ver-
batim transcript of  the record of  telecommunications, which is not secret 
(e.g., classified information), signed by the Police Corps officer who drew 
it up, must be inserted in the file. In the situation where the verbatim tran-
script of  telecommunication records contains a classified fact, it is classified 
according to separate legal provisions. Also, the transcript of  telecommu-
nications can be used as evidence after the interception of  telecommuni-
cations has been discontinued. In pre-trial proceedings, where the cir-
cumstances of  the case warrant it, the recording of  telecommunications 
may be submitted to the court even without a transcript of  the recording, 
if  the accompanying report gives the data concerning the time, place and 
legality of  interception, and concerning the person subject to the recording 
of  telecommunications, provided that the recording of  telecommunications 
is intelligible.
If  the interception and recording did not produce any facts relevant 
to the criminal proceedings, the criminal procedure authority or the relevant 
department of  the Police Corps have to destroy the obtained records forth-
with in a prescribed manner. The protocol for the destruction of  the record-
ings must be inserted in the file.
According to the Act on the protection against interception, if  the infor-
mation obtained by using ITM is to be used as the evidence in a crimi-
nal procedure, the state body must produce a written record with the data 
on the location, time, and legitimacy of  using ITM. Also, he must enclose 
the recording and its verbatim transcription with the written record. 
Information obtained by using ITM, which does not apply to the rationale 
of  their use cited in the request, can be used in the criminal procedure only 
if  it concerns the criminal activity in connection with which ITM has been 
permitted to be used.
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If  ITM has been used in contravention to the law, no state body or another 
body of  public power is allowed to use the recording obtained in such a way, 
or any other result of  the illegal use of  ITM as evidence, or to recognise 
it as evidence, except for a criminal or disciplinary procedure against the per-
son who has made the recording illegally or has ordered it made. The record-
ing or other result obtained illegally must be destroyed in the presence 
of  a legitimate judge, authorised to grant the approval, within twenty-four 
hours of  the illegal use of  the ITM.
A written statement shall be produced on the destruction of  the recording 
or of  any other result, including the reason for destroying this recording 
or result, the personal data of  the person who has ordered or approved 
the use of  ITM (the title, name, surname, and position), the personal data 
of  the person who has ordered or approved the destruction of  the recording 
or of  any other result (the title, name, surname, and position), and the per-
sonal data of  the legitimate judge present during the destruction (the title, 
name, surname, position, and the identification of  the competent court). 
Before being destroyed, the recording or any other result of  the use of  ITM 
must not be copied or transcribed in written or in any other form.
The destruction of  the recordings is usually notified to persons who do not 
have the right to view the criminal file. This practice is unreported so far. 
The notification should be made by the body whose decision has finally set-
tled the matter, or, in proceedings before the court, by the presiding judge 
of  a panel of  a first-instance court within three years from the date on which 
criminal prosecution in the case was finally concluded. However, this does 
not apply to proceedings concerning particularly serious felonies or felo-
nies committed by organised groups, criminal groups or terrorist groups, 
or criminal offences committed by more than one person if  at least one 
of  the perpetrators is still under prosecution, or if  the provision of  such 
information could obstruct the purpose of  criminal proceedings.
8.5 Collection and use of  traffic data and subscriber data
The questionable and cancelled EU Data Retention Directive was fully imple-
mented at the national level in the Code of  Criminal Procedure and other 
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relevant laws. The collection and use of  traffic data and subscriber data could 
be acquired by warrant pursuant to Section 115 (with higher requirements) 
of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure. Recently, the Slovak Constitutional 
Court has repealed the warrant according to Section 116 (with lower for-
mal requirements) to disclosure and provision of  telecommunications data. 
It looked at blanket data retention that does not distinguish between persons 
who can be connected to major criminal activity and other persons, does not 
conform to the rights to privacy and protection of  personal data. Therefore, 
the court ruled that the mass surveillance of  citizens (easy access to the data 
retention) is unconstitutional. The decision has been made in the context 
of  proceedings initiated by Members of  the Parliament in cooperation 
with the European Information Society Institute, a Slovakia-based think-
tank EISi.203 The Grand Chamber of  the Constitutional Court in the mat-
ter No. PL. ÚS 10/2014 ruled that provisions of  the Act on Electronic 
Communications, which until now required providers to retain the com-
munication of  their users, as well as provisions of  the Penal Code, and 
the Police Force Act, which allowed access to this data, to be in contradic-
tion to the constitutionally guaranteed rights of  citizens to privacy and 
personal data. It does not comply with this constitutional order and interna-
tional human rights instruments because it constitutes an inadequate inter-
vention into the privacy of  persons. As an effect, these provisions have been 
repealed. The Grand Chamber of  the Constitutional Court after the pro-
portionality test (see 8. 2. 2) ruled referring to EU Charter as follows:204
“Stemming from the statement of  members of  Parliament there appeared a ques-
tion	of 	conformity	of 	provisions	of 	law	No.	351/2011	Zb.	on	electronic	com-
munications in relation to articles 7, art. 8 and art. 11 of  the Charter which 
is	legally	binding	for	Member	states	in	case	when	they	exercise	European	Union	
law (art. 51 par.1 of  the Charter). Disputed provisions of  law on electronic 
communications are without any doubt a transposition of  related regulation per-
taining to the European Union law (Directive of  European Parliament and 
203 Husovec, M., Lukic, M. The quest for privacy in Slovakia: The case of  data retention. 2014. 
Online: https://www.giswatch.org/sites/default/files/the_quest_for_privacy_in_slo-
vakia.pdf.
204 EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Slovakia / Constitutional Court of  the Slovak 
Republic / PL. ÚS 10/2014. Translation of  the Court’s decision. Online: http://fra.europa.
eu/en/caselaw-reference/slovakia-constitutional-court-slovak-republic-pl-s-102014.




on	 privacy	 and	 electronic	 communications	 (Ú.	 v.	 CE	L	 201,	 p.	 37;	 Special	
edition	13/029,	p.	514)	and	Directive	of 	European	Parliament	and	Council	
2006/24/CE	from	15	March	2006	on	the	retention	of 	data	generated	or	pro-
cessed in connection with the provision of  publicly available electronic communi-
cations services or of  public communications networks and amending Directive 
2002/58/EC	(Ú.	v.	EU	L	105,	p.	54)],	and	thus	Charter	in	fully	applicable	
even in this case on conformity of  legal provisions.”
When it comes to subscriber data, the Slovak Republic applies the same rules 
as the Czech Republic regarding Act No. 351/2011 Zb. on electronic com-
munications. In the case of  a call from a mobile telephone network where 
the calling party number is not available, providers usually track the pres-
entation of  the international mobile equipment identification – a unique 
identification of  mobile terminal equipment functioning as a controlling 
technical measure to identify the goods (IMEI).
8.6 Access to (temporarily) stored communication data
For accessing permanently or temporarily stored data, the law enforcement 
authorities in the Slovak Republic usually use a measure called safeguarding 
and surrendering computer data pursuant to the Section 90 of  the Code 
of  Criminal Procedure (see above). If  the clarification of  facts relevant 
to criminal proceedings requires the safeguarding of  stored computer data, 
including operational data saved through the computer system, the presid-
ing judge of  a panel or a prosecutor prior to the commencement of  criminal 
prosecution or in pre-trial proceedings, respectively, may issue an order based 
on circumstantial reasons to the person who has possession of  or control 
over such data, or to the provider of  such services, requesting them to:
a) safeguard and maintain the integrity of  such data,
b) enable making and keeping copies of  such data,
c) prevent access to such data,
d) remove such data from the computer system,
e) surrender such data for the purposes of  criminal proceedings.
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As was mentioned before, to access permanently or temporarily stored data, 
the law enforcement authorities in the Slovak Republic usually use a meas-
ure called safeguarding and surrendering computer data pursuant to Section 
90 of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure (see above).
The order must specify the period during which the data are to be safe-
guarded, not exceeding 90 days. A new order must be issued for any exten-
sion of  that period. When there is no longer a need to safeguard computer 
data, including operational data for the purposes of  criminal proceedings, 
the presiding judge of  a panel or a prosecutor prior to the commence-
ment of  criminal prosecution or in pre-trial proceedings, respectively, shall 
issue an order reversing the obligation to safeguard the data. The order 
is served on the person who has possession of  or control over such data, 
or on the provider of  such services, who may be also given the duty to treat 
the measures set out in the order as confidential. The person who has 
possession of  or control over computer data must surrender these data, 
or the provider of  services must surrender the information that is in their 
possession or under their control in connection therewith to the authority 
that issued the order.
Finally, with these measures investigators usually undertake the procedure 
to issue a warrant for house search pursuant to Section 100 of  the Code 
of  Criminal Procedure or a warrant for searching other premises or landed 
property pursuant to Section 101 of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure.
8.7 Use of  electronic communication 
data in judicial proceedings
8.7.1 Use of  electronic communication data 
in the law of  criminal procedure
The Code of  Criminal Procedure does not specifically regulate the regime 
of  electronically intercepted communication data in criminal proceedings. 
Authorities must follow the regulations given by Section 115 of  the Code 
of  Criminal Procedure or Sections of  the Act on the protection against 
interception. The most important part of  any interception is the transcript, 
which has to fulfil all formal requirements. Usually, a verbatim transcript 
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made by the officer of  the Police Corps is attached to the criminal file, 
and must contain information about the place, time and legal grounds for 
interception. According to recent opinions, any elimination of  the defects 
in the protocol by police could be challenged as manipulation with the con-
sistency of  the lawful evidence. A content of  the recording is also an essen-
tial requirement of  the protocol related to the recording of  telecommunica-
tions. The recording may be used as evidence in a different criminal matter 
from the one that is subject to interception and recording of  telecommu-
nications only if  such other matter is also heard in simultaneous procee-
dings concerning a criminal offence referred to in Section 115 Paragraph 1 
of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure (a felony, corruption, a criminal offence 
of  the abuse of  power of  public official, a criminal offence of  launder-
ing the proceeds of  crime, or in respect of  an intentional criminal offence 
where so provided by a promulgated international treaty).
8.7.2 Inadmissibility of  evidence as a consequence 
inappropriate collection
In the criminal procedure, the examination of  evidence is carried out 
by the court, which, however, leaves the examination of  the accused, wit-
nesses and expert witnesses to the parties, starting with the one that pro-
posed or procured the evidence.
As a piece of  evidence may consist of  anything that may contribute to proper 
clarification of  the matter and was obtained as evidence under the Code 
of  Criminal Procedure, or under a special law (Act on protection against 
interception or Act on Police Corps). This is an important aspect of  “legal-
ity of  evidence” and is incorporated as a basic principle of  the evidence 
production procedure.
Evidence is categorized as: testimonies of  witnesses or experts; reports and 
expert opinions; a review of  the testimony taken at the scene; recognition; 
reconstruction; investigative experiments; a survey of  objects and docu-
ments relevant to criminal proceedings; and any notifications or informa-
tion obtained by use of  ITM or operative activities.
The authorities involved in criminal proceedings process information 
so as to properly establish the facts of  the case and avoid giving rise 
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to reasonable doubts, to the extent necessary for making the decision. They 
procure the evidence as part of  their official duties. Also, the parties are 
granted the right to procure evidence. The authorities involved in crimi-
nal proceedings thoroughly clarify the circumstances, regardless of  whether 
they prejudice or benefit the accused, and they take the evidence in either 
direction so as to enable the court to arrive at a fair decision. The crucial 
principle for the evaluation of  evidence is that authorities evaluate the evi-
dence in accordance with their deep conviction based on careful examination 
of  all the facts of  the case, separately and jointly, irrespective of  whether 
they were supplied by the court, the authorities involved in criminal procee-
dings or by one of  the parties in the proceedings.
It is very important that the authorities involved in criminal proceedings 
and the court evaluate only legally obtained evidence. This legal aspect 
emphasizes the admissibility of  the evidence, which is embodied in Section 
2 Paragraph 12 of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure. Therefore, we can 
also conclude that the inadmissibility of  the evidence is deduced mainly 
by the interpretation of  the above-mentioned principles of  the evidence-
producing process.
In general, interceptions which were acquired against the law are evaluated 
as absolutely inadmissible evidence. Transcripts of  such recordings can-
not be entered into the criminal file or read before the court. According 
to the opinion of  some scholars, evidence obtained against the law is pass-
ing its inadmissibility and procedural invalidity on the further evidence, 
which is arising from the content of  the first inadmissible evidence.205
Also, emphasis is put on the interception of  a communication between 
an attorney (defence counsel) and client. Pursuant to Section 115 Paragraph 
1 of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure, no information thus obtained may 
be used for the purposes of  criminal proceedings, and any such information 
must be immediately destroyed in a prescribed manner. However, this does 
not apply to information relating to a case in which a lawyer does not repre-
sent the accused as his defence counsel (criminal attorney).
205 Viktoryova, J. Turek, L. Evidence Admissibility in Pre-trial Proceedings. Notitiae 
ex Academia Bratislavensi Iurisprudentiae, 2009, Vol. 3, No. 2, p.13.
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The challenge is a “dual” legal regime of  the interception. The intercep-
tion should be used in criminal proceedings only when it was conducted 
on the basis of  Section 115 of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure. An inter-
ception carried out under another legal act, e.g., under the Act on protection 
against interception, should be used only for the purposes which are defined 
by this act. The problem comes with such a legal definition which is not 
limited to operative techniques only. According to this Act, ITM can be used 
exclusively for achieving the security and defence of  the country, to prevent 
and reveal criminal activities, or to protect the rights and freedoms of  other 
persons. This is a quite open definition which covers criminal procedure 
and pre-trial matters as well. To finish this ambiguous definition, it is further 
required that by using ITM the essential right or freedom can be infringed 
upon only to the required extent and for a period of  time not longer than 
required to attain the legal goal which it serves.
In one notable case, where an interception carried out under the Act on pro-
tection against the interception was used in criminal procedure, the Slovak 
Constitutional Court declared that:206
“[T]here	 cannot	 be	 any	 doubt	 that	 the	 approval	 or	 order	 [to	 intercept]	 must	
be	 justified	 in	 each	 case,	 whether	 issued	 under	 the	 Criminal	 Code	 or	 under	
the Law for protection against interception. This is because it is a serious intrusion 
to	the	fundamental	rights	of 	persons.	Also,	they	have	no	possibility	to	appeal	[…]	
Therefore they are entitled to review the validity of  an issued order subsequently. 
Such	a	review	requires	specific	arguments	explaining	facts	needed	to	interfere	with	
the	 right	 to	 privacy.	Without	 such	 a	 justification	 relying	 on	 specific	 facts	 there	
is	no	review.	At	first	glance,	it	might	seem	that,	due	to	the	secret	nature	of 	inter-
ception, it would be intolerable and counterproductive to state in the reasoning spe-
cific	facts	justifying	the	granting	of 	an	order,	as	these	could	disturb	their	purposes.	
In fact, the opposite is true. Precisely because of  the secret nature of  the intercep-
tion, nothing prevents the court from mentioning the reasons which led to the order 
being issued.”
206 Decision of  the Slovak Constitutional Court No. I. ÚS 274/05-73. Translation of  au-
thor. Online: http://portal.concourt.sk/.
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8.7.3 Use of  data outside the main proceedings
Uses of  data/information outside the main proceedings in Slovak criminal 
procedure are based on these assumptions:
• Criminal proceedings are conducted in respect of  a felony, corrup-
tion, a criminal offence of  the abuse of  power of  public official, 
a criminal offence of  laundering the proceeds of  crime, or in respect 
of  an intentional criminal offence where so provided by a prom-
ulgated international treaty, and if  there are reasonable grounds 
to believe that it will reveal the facts that are materially relevant for 
criminal proceedings; and
• Another matter is also heard in simultaneous proceedings.
In practice, it is questionable what “simultaneous proceedings” means.
One opinion stream belongs to the interpretation that two proceedings have 
to be simultaneous at the moment the evidence is obtained(recording).207 
The second scholars’ opinion holds the argument that the two proceedings 
have to be at simultaneous at the moment the evidence is executed (the 
moment of  the producing the evidence).208
Finally, there is always the possibility to use the evidence in another pro-
cedure if  there is consent of  the user of  the intercepted station or a con-
cerned person.
Regarding the use of  data from preventive investigations, please see the pre-
vious chapter on inadmissibility of  evidence as a consequence of  inap-
propriate collection, where a case was in which an interception carried out 
under the Act on protection against the interception was used in a criminal 
procedure. Under certain circumstances, this type of  the evidence could 
be used in a criminal procedure. But it has to fulfil formal criteria laid down 
by the Code of  Criminal Procedure.
Data from foreign jurisdictions are obtained in accordance with the Code 
of  Criminal Procedure or a valid mutual legal assistance.
207 Opinion of  the Attorney General of  the Slovak Republic from 18. 4. 2011, Nu. 
IV/1GPt 145/12-7, cited in Tittlova, M. Korupcia:	Vybrané	kriminologické	a	 trestnoprávne	
aspekty. Bratislava: Wolters Kluwer, 2015, p.209.
208 Decision of  Supreme Court of  the Slovak Republic from 21. 9. 2011, file number 3 
To2/2011. Online: http://www.supcourt.gov.sk
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Under Section 533 of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure, the general rule 
is that any request for legal assistance shall, in addition to a precise descrip-
tion of  the required act of  assistance, contain a description of  the facts 
of  the offence which is the basis of  the request, the legal denomination 
of  the offence together with a verbatim wording of  the pertinent legal pro-
visions, the personal data of  the accused or, as the case may be, of  the vic-
tim or the witnesses if  their examination is requested, as well as further 
details required for the proper execution of  the requested legal assistance. 
The request shall contain the exact specification of  the requesting author-
ity, its file number, the date of  the request and it shall bear the signature 
of  the responsible officer and the round seal of  the requesting authority. 
The request and the supporting documents shall be accompanied by a trans-
lation into a foreign language done by an official translator if, in relation 
to the requested State, such translation is required.
Under Section 532 of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure, requests for legal 
assistance emanating from the Slovak pre-trial authorities shall be transmit-
ted abroad through the General Prosecutor’s Office. Requests for legal assis-
tance emanating from the Slovak courts shall be transmitted abroad through 
the Ministry of  Justice. Finally, diplomatic channels are another option for 
cooperation.
8.7.4 Challenging the probity of  intercepted data
Challenging the probity of  intercepted data in Slovak law is different from 
the Czech possibility to review the interception decision by the Supreme 
Court. The Code of  Criminal Procedure doesn’t recognize such a procedure.
In the situation where the interception did not produce any facts relevant 
for criminal proceedings, the criminal procedure authority or the relevant 
department of  the Police Corps must destroy the obtained records imme-
diately in a prescribed manner. There should be a protocol on the destruc-
tion as part of  the criminal file. According to Section 115 Paragraph 8 
of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure, the destruction of  the recordings 
shall be notified to persons who do not have the right to view the crimi-
nal file. Furthermore, the notification shall be made by the body whose 
decision has finally settled the matter, or, in proceedings before the court, 
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by the presiding judge of  a panel of  a first-instance court within three years 
from the date on which the criminal prosecution in the case was finally 
concluded. It is important to note that this will not apply to the proceedings 
concerning particularly serious felonies or felonies committed by organized 
groups, criminal groups or terrorist groups, or criminal offences committed 
by more than one person if  at least one of  the perpetrators is still under 
prosecution, or if  the provision of  such information could obstruct the pur-
pose of  criminal proceedings.
Currently, there is on-going discussion about possible options to challenge 
such interception decisions. In one related decision the Slovak Constitutional 
Court has established that: 209
“The	appeal	against	the	consent,	nor	command	[to	interception]	is	not	permitted.	
The concerned person is not able to seek protection at the general court in connec-
tion with the fact that his conversation has been intercepted. The general court could 
not	review	the	eligibility	of 	the	issuance	of 	a	final	consent	or	order,	and	it	is	pre-
cisely because the consent or order is a valid and enforceable decision, by which 
is	the	court	bound.	[…]	The	concerned	person	whose	conversation	has	been	inter-
cepted can challenge the illegality of  the interception and the consequent usefulness 
of  the recorded conversation as evidence in criminal court proceedings. He can 
do	so	only	by	the	simultaneous	fulfilment	of 	two	conditions.	A	criminal	case	has	
to reach the trial stage and the concerned person has to be a party to the criminal 
proceedings, either as a charged person or as a person claiming damages. Also, 
it means the protection by the criminal court will not come up in a case which does 
not come before the criminal court, nor in a case, in which the concerned persons 
are not parties to criminal proceedings.”
The Constitutional Court stated that unless the complainant argues that 
the records were obtained illegally, he can still put forward this argument 
in the context of  criminal proceedings, particularly before the compe-
tent court in his defence. He may request to review illegally obtained evi-
dence which therefore should not be taken in court’s consideration. It will 
be a matter of  a court or other law enforcement agencies to consider such 
an argument and draw conclusions from it. But also, it means that the per-
son whose telephone conversation was intercepted must be able to defend 
209 Decision of  the Slovak Constitutional Court No. I. ÚS 274/05. Unofficial translation. 
Online: http://portal.concourt.sk/.
INTERCEPTION OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND SLOVAKIA
158
against the very fact of  interception. The Slovak Constitutional court has 
divided this procedural right into two parts: a claim to a right to privacy, and 
also a claim against the use of  interception of  communications as evidence 
in criminal proceedings. Regarding these facts, the Slovak Constitutional 
court declared that illegal interceptions have intruded on the claimant’s rights 
and his freedoms (were invalid due to lack of  reasoning). He has repealed 
the orders to intercept and also settled the matter of  adequate financial sat-
isfaction, which has to be paid by state.
Therefore, the conclusion for the options to challenge the probity of  inter-
cepted data in Slovak Republic can be found in barely accessible procedural 
tools:
• Constitutional complaint (Act. No. 38/1993 Z. z., on the organiza-
tion of  the Constitutional Court of  the Slovak Republic, proceedings 
and the status of  its judges), or 
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APPENDIX: COLLECTION OF RELEVANT LEGAL 
PROVISIONS
Constitutional Act No. 1/1993 Sb., Constitution of  the Czech Republic1
Article 2
(1) All state authority emanates from the people; they exercise it through 
legislative, executive, and judicial bodies.
(2) A constitutional act may designate the conditions under which the peo-
ple may exercise state authority directly.
(3) State authority is to serve all citizens and may be asserted only in cases, 
within the bounds, and in the manner provided for by law.
(4) All citizens may do that which is not prohibited by law; and nobody may 
be compelled to do that which is not imposed upon them by law.
Article 3
The Charter of  Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms forms a part 
of  the constitutional order of  the Czech Republic.
Article 10
Promulgated international agreements ratified by the Parliament and bind-
ing the Czech Republic are part of  law; if  the agreement differs from the 
Act, international agreement shall be used.
Resolution of  the Praesidium of  Czech National Council No. 2/1993 
Sb., Charter of  Fundamental Rights and Freedoms2
Article 7
(1) Inviolability of  the person and of  privacy is guaranteed. It may be limited 
only in cases specified by law.
1 Informal translation provided by the Czech Constitutional court. Online: http://
www.usoud.cz/fileadmin/user_upload/Tiskova_mluvci/Ustava_EN_ve_zneni_
zak_c._98-2013.pdf
2 Informal translation provided by the Czech Constitutional court. Online: http://www.
usoud.cz/fileadmin/user_upload/ustavni_soud_www/Pravni_uprava/AJ/Listina_
English_version.pdf.
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Article 10
(2) Everybody is entitled to protection against unauthorized interference 
in his or her personal and family life.
(3) Everybody is entitled to protection against unauthorized gathering, pub-
lication or other misuse of  his or her personal data.
Article 11
(1) Everybody has the right to own property. The ownership right of  all 
owners has the same statutory content and enjoys the same protection, 
inheritance is guaranteed.
Article 13
Nobody may violate secrecy of  letters and other papers and records whether 
privately kept or sent by post or in another manner, except in cases and 
in a manner specified by law. Similar protection is extended to messages 
communicated by telephone, telegraph or other such facilities.
Act No. 40/2009 Sb., the Criminal Code3
Section 12
Principle of  Legality and Principle of  Subsidiarity of  Criminal Repression
(1) Only criminal law shall define criminal offences and prescribe criminal 
sanctions that may be imposed for their commission.
(2) Criminal liability of  an offender and criminal consequences associated 
with it may only be applied in socially harmful cases where application 
of  liability according to other legal regulations does not suffice.
Section 20
Premeditation
(1) Conduct that is based in an intentional creation of  conditions for the com-
mission of  a particularly serious crime (Section 14 Subsection 3), especially 
in its organisation, the acquisition or adaptation of  the means or instruments 
for its commission, in conspiracy, unlawful assembly, in the instigation or aid-
ing of  such a crime, shall be deemed a premeditation only if  the criminal 
law applicable for a specific criminal offence expressly stipulates for it and 
an attempt or completion of  a particularly serious crime did not occur.
3 Informal translation taken from the European Judicial Training Network.
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(2) Premeditation is punishable pursuant to the criminal penalty set out for 
a particularly serious crime to which it leads, unless the criminal law stipu-
lates otherwise.
(3) Criminal liability for the premeditation to commit a particularly serious 
crime shall expire if  an offender voluntarily waived further conduct towards 
the commission of  a particularly serious crime and
a) removed the risk to an interest protected by criminal law which occurred 
due to the attempted premeditation, or
b) reported the premeditation to commit a particularly serious crime at a time 
when the risk to an interest protected by criminal law which occurred due 
to the attempted premeditation could still be removed; reporting must 
be performed to the public prosecutor or the police authority. A soldier may 
report it to their commander.
(4) If  there are several persons involved in an act, the criminal liability for 
the premeditation is not void in the case of  an offender who acted in such 
manner, despite their timely reporting or earlier participation in such act, 
if  it is completed by other offenders.
(5) The provisions of  Subsection 3 and 4 shall have no effect on the criminal 
liability of  an offender for any other committed criminal offence which they 
have already committed by their conduct pursuant to Subsection 1.
Section 21
Attempt
(1) Any conduct that leads directly to the completion of  a criminal offence 
and which the offender committed with the intention of  the commission 
of  a criminal offence, if  the completion of  the criminal offence did not 
occur is defined as an attempt to commit a criminal offence.
(2) An attempted criminal offence shall be punishable under the criminal 
penalty set for a completed criminal offence.
(3) Criminal liability for an attempted criminal offence shall expire 
if  an offender voluntarily waived further conduct leading to the completion 
of  a criminal offence and
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a) removed the risk to an interest protected by criminal law which occurred 
due to the attempted criminal offence, or
b) reported the attempted criminal offence at a time when the risk 
to an interest protected by criminal law which occurred due to an attempted 
criminal offence could still be removed; reporting must be performed to the 
public prosecutor or the police authority. A soldier may report it to their 
commander.
(4) If  there are several persons involved in an act, the criminal liability for 
an attempt is not void in the case of  an offender who acted in such manner, 
despite their timely reporting or earlier participation in such act, if  it is com-
pleted by other offenders.
(5) The provisions of  Subsection 3 and 4 shall have no effect on the criminal 
liability of  an offender for any other completed criminal offence which they 
have already committed by their conduct pursuant to Subsection 1.
Section 28
Extreme Emergency
(1) An act, which is otherwise criminal, whereby a person tries to avert a risk 
imminently threatening an interest protected by criminal law, is not a crimi-
nal offence.
(2) Extreme emergency shall not apply if  such risk could be otherwise averted 
under the given circumstances, or if  the consequences caused are evidently 
equally serious or even more serious than those imminent, or if  the person 
at risk was obliged to endure them.
Section 29
Self  Defence
(1) An act, which is otherwise criminal, whereby a person tries to avert 
an imminently threatening or continuous assault on an interest protected 
by criminal law, is not a criminal offence.
(2) Self  defence shall not apply if  the defence was clearly disproportionate 
to the method of  the assault.
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Section 182
Violating Confidentiality of  Messages
(1) Whoever intentionally violates the confidentiality
a) of  a closed letter or other document during the provision of  postal ser-
vices or transported by other transport services or transport facilities,
b) of  data, text, voice, audio or video messages sent via electronic commu-
nications networks and attributable to an identified subscriber or user who 
receives the message, or
c) of  non-public transmission of  computer data into a computer system, 
from or within which, including electromagnetic radiation from a computer 
system, transferring such computer data, shall be punished by a prison sen-
tence of  up to two years or punishment by disqualification.
(2) Whoever with the intention to cause damage to another person or to pro-
cure an unauthorised benefit for themselves or another person
a) reveals the secret of  which they learned from the document, telegram, tel-
ephone call or electronic transmission through a communications network, 
which was not intended for them, or
b) takes advantage of  such secrets, shall be similarly punished.
(3) An offender shall be punished by a prison sentence of  six months 
to three years or punishment by disqualification, if,
a) they committed an act referred to in Subsection 1 or 2 as a member 
of  an organised group,
b) they committed such an act out of  reprehensible motives,
c) they caused substantial damage by committing such an ac, or
d) they committed such an act with the intention of  gaining a substantial 
benefit for themselves or someone else.
(4) An offender shall be punished by a prison sentence of  one to five years 
or a monetary penalty, if,
a) they committed an act referred to in Subsection 1 or 2 as an official person,
b) they caused large-scale damage by committing such an act, or
c) they committed such an act with the intention to procure another large-
scale benefit for themselves or someone else.
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(5) An employee of  postal services, telecommunications services or com-
puter system or anyone else engaged in communication activities who
a) commits an act referred to in Subsection 1 or 2,
b) intentionally allows another person to commit such an act, or
c) amends or suppresses the document contained in a postal consignment 
or transported by transport facilities or a report filed by non-public trans-
mission of  computer data, telephone, telegram, or in another similar man-
ner, shall be punished by a prison sentence of  one to five years, a monetary 
penalty or punishment by disqualification.
(6) An offender shall be punished by a prison sentence of  three to ten 
years, if,
a) they caused large-scale damage by committing an act referred 
to in Subsection 5, or 
b) they committed such an act with the intention to procure another large-
scale benefit for themselves or someone else.
Section 183
Breach of  Confidentiality of  Documents and 
other Privately Kept Documents
(1) Whoever violates the confidentiality of  documents or other documents, 
photographs, film or other recordings, computer data, or other documents 
kept privately by another person without authorisation, by publishing, mak-
ing them available to third parties, or otherwise uses them, shall be punished 
by a prison sentence of  up to one year, a punishment by disqualification, 
or forfeiture of  items or other assets.
(2) An offender shall be punished by a prison sentence of  up to two years, 
a punishment by disqualification, or forfeiture of  items or other assets, if  they 
committed an act referred to in Subsection 1 with the intention to procure 
material or other benefits for themselves or someone else, to cause dam-
age to another person or other serious damage, or to jeopardise their social 
esteem.
(3) An offender shall be punished by a prison sentence of  six months to five 
years or a monetary penalty, if,
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a) they committed an act referred to in Subsection 1 as a member of  an organ-
ised group,
b) they committed such an act against another person for their actual or per-
ceived race, ethnicity, nationality, political belief, religion, or because they are 
actually or allegedly non-religious,
c) they caused substantial damage by committing such an act, or
d) they committed such an act with the intention of  gaining a substantial 
benefit for themselves or someone else.
(4) An offender shall be punished by a prison sentence of  two to eight 
years, if,
a) they caused large-scale damage by committing an act referred 
to in Subsection 1, or
b) they committed such an act with the intention to procure another large-
scale benefit for themselves or someone else.
Section 230
Unauthorised Access to Computer Systems and Information Media
(1) Whoever overcomes security measures and thus gains access to a com-
puter system or part thereof  without authorisation shall be punished 
by a prison sentence of  up to one year, punishment by disqualification, 
or forfeiture of  items or other assets.
(2) Any person who gains access to a computer system or information 
medium and
a) uses data stored in a computer system or information media without 
authorisation,
b) erases or otherwise destroys, damages, amends, suppresses, or corrupts 
the quality of  data stored in a computer system or information media, 
or renders them unusable without authorisation,
c) forges or alters data stored in a computer system or information media 
so as to be considered authentic and according to them it was treated 
as if  it was authentic data, notwithstanding the fact whether the data 
is directly readable and understandable, or
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d) inserts data into a computer system or information media or performs any 
other intervention into the software or hardware of  the computer or other 
technical data processing equipment without authorisation,
shall be punished by a prison sentence of  up to two years, punishment 
by disqualification, or forfeiture of  items or other assets.
(3) An offender shall be punished by a prison sentence of  six months to three 
years, punishment by disqualification, or forfeiture of  items or other assets, 
if  they committed an act referred to in Subsection 1 or 2
a) with the intention to cause damage to another person or to obtain 
an unauthorised benefit for themselves or another person, or
b) with the intention to restrict the functionality of  a computer system 
or other technical equipment for data processing without authorisation.
(4) An offender shall be punished by a prison sentence of  one to five years 
or a monetary penalty, if,
a) they committed an act referred to in Subsection 1 or 2 as a member 
of  an organised group,
b) they caused substantial damage by committing such an act,
c) they caused substantial interference in the activities of  the State 
Administration body, local government, court, or another public authority 
by committing such an act,
d) they procured a substantial benefit by committing such act for themselves 
or another person, or
e) they caused serious interference in the activity of  a legal entity or natural 
person who is an entrepreneur by committing such an act.
(5) An offender shall be punished by a prison sentence of  three to eight 
years, if,
a) they caused large-scale damage by committing an act referred 
to in Subsection 1 or 2, or
b) they procured another large-scale benefit by committing such act for 
themselves or another person.
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Section 231
Measures and Possession of  Access Devices and Computer System 
Passwords and other such Data
(1) A person who intends to commit a criminal offence of  violating con-
fidentiality of  messages under Section 182 Subsection 1 Paragraph b), c) 
or a criminal offence of  unauthorised access to computer systems and infor-
mation media under Section 230 Subsection 1, 2 produces, puts into circula-
tion, imports, exports, transports, offers, provides, sells, or otherwise makes 
available, procures for themselves or another person or possesses
a) a device or its component, process, instrument or any other means, 
including a computer programme, designed or adapted for unauthorised 
access to electronic communications networks, a computer system or part 
thereof, or
b) a computer password, access code, data, process or any other similar 
means with which they are able to gain access to a computer system or part 
thereof,
shall be punished by a prison sentence of  up to one year, forfeiture of  items 
or other assets, or punishment by disqualification.
(2) An offender shall be punished by a prison sentence of  up to three years, 
punishment by disqualification, or forfeiture of  items or other assets, if,
a) they committed an act referred to in Subsection 1 as a member of  an organ-
ised group, or
b) they procured a substantial benefit by committing such act for themselves 
or another person.
(3) An offender shall be punished by a prison sentence of  six months to five 
years if  they procured another large-scale benefit for themselves or another 
person by committing an act referred to in Subsection 1.
Section 232
Damage to Computer Systems and Information Medium Records and 
Intervention into the Computer Equipment out of  Negligence
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(1) A person who violates, out of  gross negligence, an obligation arising 
from their employment, occupation, position or function or one imposed 
by law, or one that is contractually assumed, and
a) destroys, damages, alters or renders unusable the data stored in a com-
puter system or information media, or
b) makes an intervention into the hardware or software of  the computer 
or other technical data processing equipment,
and thus causes substantial damage to the stranger’s property, shall be pun-
ished by a prison sentence of  up to six months, punishment by disqualifica-
tion, or forfeiture of  items or other assets.
(2) An offender shall be punished by a prison sentence of  up to two years, 
punishment by disqualification, or forfeiture of  items or other assets if  they 
caused large-scale damage by committing an act referred to in Subsection 1.
Section 317
Endangering Classified Information
(1) Whoever pries information classified under another legal regulation 
with the aim to disclose it to an unauthorised person, whoever with such 
an aim collects data containing classified information, or whoever dis-
closes such classified information intentionally to any unauthorised person, 
shall be punished by a prison sentence of  up to three years or punishment 
by disqualification.
(2) An offender shall be punished by a prison sentence of  two to eight 
years, if,
a) they intentionally disclosed classified information to any unauthorised 
person under another legal regulation classed as “Top Secret” or “Secret”,
b) they committed an act referred to in Subsection 1, though the obligation 
to protect the classified information was specifically imposed upon them, or
c) they procured a substantial benefit for themselves or another person, 
or they caused substantial damage or a particularly serious consequence 
by committing such act.
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(3) An offender shall be punished by a prison sentence of  five to twelve 
years, if  a) the act referred to in Subsection 1 relates to classified informa-
tion from the area of  security of  the defensibility of  the Czech Republic 
classed in another legal regulation as “Top Secret”, or
b) they committed such act during a state of  national emergency or war.
(4) Premeditation is punishable.
Section 318
Endangering Classified Information out of  Negligence
Whoever, out of  negligence, causes the disclosure of  classified informa-
tion under another legal regulation classed as “Top Secret” or “Secret” 
shall be punished by a prison sentence of  up to three years or punishment 
by disqualification.
Section 329
Abuse of  Powers of  an Official Person
(1) An official person who, with the intention to cause damage or other 
serious harm to another person or to procure an unauthorised benefit for 
themselves or another person
a) performs their powers in a manner contrary to another legal regulation,
b) exceeds their powers, or
c) fails to meet an obligation under their powers,
shall be punished by a prison sentence of  one to five years or punishment 
by disqualification.
(2) An offender shall be punished by a prison sentence of  three to ten 
years, if,
a) they procured a substantial benefit for themselves or another person 
by committing an act referred to in Subsection 1,
b) they committed such an act on another person for their actual or per-
ceived race, ethnicity, nationality, political belief, religion, or because they are 
actually or allegedly non-religious,
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c) they caused substantial disruption to the activities of  a public administra-
tion body, local government, court or another public authority by commit-
ting such an act,
d) they caused serious disruption to the activities of  a legal entity or natural 
person who is an entrepreneur by committing such an act,
e) they committed such an act while abusing the vulnerability, addiction, 
anxiety, cognitive weakness, or inexperience of  another person, or
f) they caused substantial damage by committing such an act.
(3) An offender shall be punished by a prison sentence of  five to twelve 
years or forfeiture of  property, if,
a) they procured another large-scale benefit for themselves or another per-
son by committing an act referred to in Subsection 1, or
b) they caused large-scale damage by committing such an act.
(4) Premeditation is punishable.
Act No. 141/1961 Sb., on Criminal Procedure (Code of  Criminal 
Procedure)4
Section 2
Basic Principles of  Criminal Procedure
(1) No person shall be prosecuted other than for legitimate reasons and 
in a manner as stipulated by this Act.
(2) A person against whom a criminal procedure is carried out may not 
be perceived as guilty until the final convicting judgment of  the court pro-
nounces them as guilty.
(3) The public prosecutor is obliged to prosecute all criminal offences 
of  which they learn, unless the law or a promulgated international treaty 
to which the Czech Republic is bound stipulates otherwise.
(4) Unless this Act stipulates otherwise, the law enforcement authorities act 
ex officio. Criminal cases must be dealt with expeditiously without undue 
delays; the most expeditious procedure shall be taken in particular for cus-
tody matters and the matters in which property was impounded if  this 
4 Informal translation provided by the Ministry of  Justice.
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is required with regard to the value and nature of  the impounded property. 
Criminal cases shall be dealt with with a full investigation of  rights and free-
doms guaranteed by the Charter of  Fundamental Rights and Freedoms and 
by international treaties on human rights and fundamental freedoms that the 
Czech Republic is bound by; when conducting acts of  criminal proceedings, 
the rights of  persons that such acts affect may be intervened only when 
justified by law and to the extent necessary to ensure the purpose of  crimi-
nal proceedings. The law enforcement authorities shall not take the content 
of  petitions affecting the performance of  such obligations into account.
(5) Law enforcement authorities act in accordance with their rights and obli-
gations under this Act and with the assistance of  the parties so as to duly 
establish the facts of  the case of  which no reasonable doubt exists and to the 
extent that is necessary for their decisions. A confession of  the accused shall 
not relieve the law enforcement authorities from the obligation to examine 
all the relevant circumstances of  the case. During the preliminary hearings, 
the law enforcement authorities shall ascertain all the circumstances for and 
against the person against whom the proceeding is pending with the same 
care and in the manner provided by this Act even without petitions of  the 
parties to an action. In proceedings before the court the public prosecutor 
and the accused may support their position with the proposal and submis-
sion of  evidence. The public prosecutor must prove the guilt of  the defend-
ant. However, this does not relieve the court of  the obligation to provide 
additional evidence to the extent required for their decision.
(6) Law enforcement authorities shall review the evidence according to their 
conviction based on careful consideration of  all the circumstances of  the 
case separately and as a whole.
(7) All law enforcement authorities shall cooperate with public interest 
groups and utilise their educational activities.
(8) A criminal prosecution before the courts is only possible on the basis 
of  an indictment, a petition for punishment or a petition for approval 
of  an agreement on the declaration of  guilt and acceptance of  punishment 
(hereinafter referred to as an “agreement on guilt and punishment”) served 
by the public prosecutor. A bill of  indictment in proceedings before the 
court is represented by the public prosecutor.
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(9) In criminal proceedings before the court, decisions are made by the court 
or a single judge; the presiding judge or a single judge decides alone only 
if  so expressly stipulated by the law. Should the decision during a prelimi-
nary hearing be made by a court in the first instance, then such decisions 
shall be made by a judge.
(10) Criminal cases are heard in public before the court so that citizens may 
observe and participate in hearing. At the main trial and public hearing, the 
public may be excluded only in cases expressly stipulated for in this Act 
or in a special Act.
(11) Proceedings before the courts are oral; the testimony of  witnesses, 
experts and the accused are normally undertaken through an interrogation.
(12) When deciding during a main trial, as well as during public, custody 
and closed hearings, the court may only take into account evidence that was 
given during such proceedings.
(13) The person against whom criminal proceedings have been initiated 
must be instructed in every stage of  the proceedings in an appropriate 
and comprehensible manner as to their rights granting them the full use 
of  defence and that they may choose their defence counsel; all law enforce-
ment authorities are required to enable them to exercise their rights.
(14) Law enforcement authorities conduct the proceedings and produce 
decisions in the Czech language. Any person who declares that they do not 
speak Czech is entitled to speak their mother tongue or a language that they 
indicate they can speak to the law enforcement authorities.
(15) At every stage of  the proceedings the law enforcement authorities are 
obliged to make it possible for the victim to fully exercise their rights and 
are also obliged to instruct the victim of  the victim’s rights in an appropri-
ate and comprehensible manner under the law so that the victim can achieve 
satisfaction of  their claims; the proceedings must be conducted with the 
required consideration for the victim and while being duly regardful of  their 
person.
Section 8
(1) Public authorities, legal entities and natural persons are required 
to comply with letters of  request from law enforcement authorities for the 
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performance of  their actions without undue delay and unless a special regu-
lation stipulates otherwise, to comply without payment. Furthermore, pub-
lic authorities are also obliged to immediately notify the public prosecutor 
or the police authorities of  facts indicating that a criminal offence has been 
committed.
(2) If  the criminal proceedings require a proper investigation of  the circum-
stances suggesting that a criminal offence has been committed or to assess 
the circumstances of  the accused during court proceedings or for the 
enforcement of  a decision, the public prosecutor and, after the indictment 
or a punishment petition, the presiding judge may request information that 
is subject to banking secrecy and data from the security register. Pursuant 
to Section 180 of  the Penal Code, the law enforcement authority may request 
individual data obtained under a special Act for statistical purposes during 
the criminal proceedings. The conditions under which the law enforcement 
authority may require the data obtained in the administration of  taxes are 
stipulated under a special Act. Data obtained under this provision may not 
be used for a purpose other than the criminal proceedings for which such 
data was requested.
(3) For the reasons as stated in Subsection 2, the presiding judge may, and 
upon the proposal of  the public prosecutor during a preliminary hear-
ing, order the surveillance of  the bank accounts or accounts of  persons 
entitled to the records of  investment instruments under a special Act for 
a maximum period of  six months. If  the reason for which the surveillance 
of  an account was ordered exceeds this time, it may be extended upon the 
order of  a judge from a court of  higher instance and, during preliminary 
hearing, upon the proposal of  the public prosecutor of  the County Court 
judge for a further six months, and such prolongation can be performed 
repeatedly. Information obtained under this provision may not be used for 
a purpose other than the criminal proceedings for which it was obtained.
(4) The performance of  obligations under Subsection 1 may be rejected 
with reference to the obligation to maintain the secrecy of  classified infor-
mation protected by a special Act or imposed by the State or the recognised 
duty of  confidentiality; this does not apply,
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a) if  the person who has the obligation would otherwise risk criminal pro-
secution for the failure to notify or prevent a criminal offence, or
b) in executing the request of  a law enforcement authority with regards 
to a criminal offence, where the requested person is also the reporter of  the 
criminal offence.
The State recognised obligation of  confidentiality under this Act does not 
consider such obligation the scope of  which is not defined by law but instead 
arises from a legal action taken under the law.
(5) Unless a special Act stipulates the conditions under which information 
may be disclosed for the purpose of  criminal proceedings that are deemed 
classified pursuant to such Act or which is subject to an obligation of  secrecy, 
such information may be requested for criminal proceedings upon the prior 
consent of  the judge. This does not affect the obligation of  confidentiality 
of  an attorney under the Advocacy Act.
(6) The provisions of  Subsection 1 and 5 shall not affect the obligation 
of  confidentiality imposed on the basis of  a declared international treaty 
to which the Czech Republic is bound.
It is to be noted that recognised by criminal procedural law are only those 
secrecy duties that are laid down by statutory law (not those that are e.g. 
established between parties by a non-disclosure agreements).
Section 8c
Pursuant to Section 88 no person shall disclose information on the court 
order or interception performance and recording of  telecommunications 
traffic without the consent of  persons whom such information concerns 
or information derived thereof, data on telecommunications traffic detected 
on the basis of  an order under Section 88a, or information obtained by the 
surveillance of  people and items under Section 158d Subsection 2 and 3, 
if  such information allows the identification of  the person and if  such were 
not used as evidence in proceedings before the court.
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Section 12
Interpretation of  Certain Terms
(2) Police authorities mean
a) bodies of  the Police of  the Czech Republic,
b) General Inspection of  Security Forces in proceedings on criminal offences 
committed by members of  the Police of  the Czech Republic, members 
of  the Prison Service of  the Czech Republic, customs officers or employ-
ees of  the Czech Republic classified to work in the Police of  the Czech 
Republic, or on criminal offences by employees of  the Czech Republic clas-
sified to work in the Prison Service of  the Czech Republic or in the Customs 
Administration of  the Czech Republic which were committed in connection 
with fulfilment of  their employment duties,
c) appointed bodies of  the Prison Service of  the Czech Republic in procee-
dings on criminal offences of  persons serving detention, a prison sentence 
or security detention that were committed in a custodial prison, prison 
or institute for the execution of  security detention,
d) appointed customs authorities in proceedings on criminal offences com-
mitted by a breach of  customs regulations or regulations on the import, 
export or transit of  goods, even in cases of  criminal offences by mem-
bers of  the armed forces or security forces, and by a breach of  laws in the 
placement and purchase of  goods in Member States of  the European 
Communities if  such goods are transported across the national borders 
of  the Czech Republic, and in cases of  tax infringements, where the cus-
toms authorities manage tax under special legal regulations,
e) appointed bodies of  the Military Police in proceedings on criminal offences 
of  members of  the armed forces and persons who commit a criminal activ-
ity against members of  the armed forces in military facilities, against military 
facilities, military material or other property of  the State that is to be man-
aged by the Ministry of  Defence,
f) appointed authorities of  the Security Information Service in proceedings 
on criminal offences committed by members of  the Security Information 
Service,
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g) appointed authorities of  the Office for Foreign Relations and Information 
in proceedings on criminal offences committed by members of  the Office 
for Foreign Relations and Information,
h) appointed authorities of  Military Intelligence in proceedings on criminal 
offences committed by members of  Military Intelligence,
i) appointed authorities of  the General Inspection of  Security Forces in procee-
dings on criminal offences committed by members of  the General Inspection 
of  Security Forces or on the criminal offences of  employees of  the Czech 
Republic classified to work in the General Inspection of  Security Forces.
This does not affect the entitlement of  the public prosecutor under Section 
157 Subsection 2, Paragraph b). Unless stipulated otherwise, the listed 
authorities are entitled to all acts of  criminal procedure falling under the 
scope of  the police authority.
Section 30
(1) The judge or an associate judge, public prosecutor, police authority 
or a person employed by it who gives way to a reasonable doubt that in rela-
tion to the case or persons who are directly related to it, to their attorneys, 
legal representatives and agents, or due to their relationship to other law 
enforcement authorities they cannot make impartial decisions, then they are 
excluded from carrying out acts of  criminal proceedings. Actions that were 
taken by the excluded persons may not be the basis for decisions in the 
criminal proceedings.
(2) A judge or an associate judge is also excluded from carrying out acts 
of  criminal proceedings if  they were active in the case as a public prosecutor, 
police authority, community representative, defence counsel or as an agent 
of  the party to an action and the victim. After the indictment or petition 
for approval of  an agreement on guilt and punishment is filed, the judge 
who in the matter under discussion in the preliminary hearing ordered the 
home search or search of  other premises and land or issued a detention 
order or warrant for arrest or decided on the custody of  the person against 
whom an indictment was subsequently filed or with whom an agreement 
on guilt and punishment was concluded, is excluded from carrying out acts 
of  criminal proceedings.
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(3) The judge or an associate judge who participated in the decision making 
at a lower court are also excluded from the decision making process at the 
higher court and vice versa. The public prosecutor who made the contested 
decision or gave their consent or order is excluded from the decision making 
process on the issue of  a complaint to the higher authority.
(4) The judge who took part in the decision making process of  the earlier 
proceedings is excluded from the proceedings on the review of  the order 
for the interception and recording of  telecommunications traffic. The judge 
who participated in the decision making process on the review of  the order 
for the interception and recording of  telecommunications traffic is further 
excluded from the decision making process of  the subsequent proceedings.
Section 55
General Provisions for Transcript Recording
(1) Unless the law stipulates otherwise, at any action of  criminal proceedings 
a transcript is recorded, usually during an action or immediately after, which 
must include
a) the name of  the court, public prosecutor or other law enforcement 
authority,
b) the place, time and subject of  an action,
c) name and surname of  officials and their functions, name and surname 
of  the parties present, the name, surname and address of  the legal repre-
sentatives, legal counsel and agents who participated in the action, and in the 
case of  the victim and the accused also the address that is specified for the 
purpose of  delivery, and other data necessary to establish or verify identities, 
including date of  birth or birth certificate numbers,
d) brief  and concise statements of  the course of  an action which would 
be seen as preserving the statutory provisions governing the conduct 
of  an action, essential contents of  the decisions announced during an action, 
and if  a copy of  the decision was delivered immediately after reaching the 
decision, and the confirmation of  this service; if  there is a literal transcript 
of  the person’s statement, it is necessary to indicate such in the transcript 
accordingly so that it is possible to safely identify the beginning and end 
of  the literal transcript,
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e) petitions of  the parties, issued instructions, and/or an expression of  the 
instructed persons,
f) objections of  the parties or the persons interviewed during the execution 
of  an action or the content of  the transcript.
(2) Should the identified condition indicate that the witness or persons close 
to them appear to be under threat of  bodily harm or any other serious risk 
of  violation of  their fundamental rights in relation to their testimony and 
witness protection can not be safely ensured by some other means, the law 
enforcement authorities shall take steps to conceal the identity of  the wit-
ness; the name and surname and other personal information is not recorded 
in the transcript but are kept separate from the criminal file and only law 
enforcement authorities may gain access to such details for the purpose 
of  the case. A witness shall be instructed on the right to request confi-
dentiality of  their identity and must sign the transcript under an assumed 
name and surname under which they are further recorded. If  the protec-
tion of  such persons is required, law enforcement authorities must take all 
necessary steps without undue delay. A special manner to protect witnesses 
and persons close to them is stipulated by a special Act. If  the reasons for 
the confidentiality of  identity and a separate record of  personal data of  wit-
nesses has expired, the authority responsible for the legal proceedings at the 
time shall revoke the level of  classification of  information, attach the infor-
mation to the criminal file, and the identity and details of  the witnesses cease 
to be classified; this does not apply to the classified identity of  persons listed 
in Section 102a.
(3) The transcript drawn up on the conflict shall include literal testimonies 
of  the confronted persons, as well as the wording of  questions and answers; 
and the circumstances that are important in terms of  the purpose and imple-
mentation of  the confrontation. The transcript is drawn up about the recog-
nition and it must include detailed circumstances under which the recogni-
tion was performed, in particular the order in which the persons or items are 
shown to the suspect, accused or witness, the time and conditions of  their 
observations and their opinions; the recognition conducted in the prelimi-
nary hearing is usually video recorded. The transcript drawn up about the 
investigative attempt, the reconstruction and on-site review is necessary 
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to describe all the circumstances under which these actions were carried out 
in detail, including their contents and results; if  the circumstances of  the 
case do not exclude it, video recordings, sketches, and other appropriate 
tools shall, if  possible, be included in the transcript. Similarly, it is necessary 
to proceed even if  an event when the implementation of  other evidence 
is not explicitly provided by law.
(4) The transcript in the Czech language is drawn up on the testimony 
of  a person even if  the questioned person speaks another language; depend-
ing on the literal testimony, the reporter or an interpreter shall record the 
relevant part of  the testimonies in the language spoken by the person who 
testifies.
(5) The correct transcript is guaranteed by the person who performs the 
operation.
Inspection of  Documents
Section 65
(1) The accused, victim and party to an action, their defence counsel and 
their agents have the right to inspect files, with the exception of  the voting 
record and the personal data of  the witnesses in accordance with Section 
55 Subsection 2, to make extracts from them and notes, and make copies 
of  files and their parts at own expense. The same right applies to the legal 
representatives of  the accused, victim or the party to an action if  they are 
denied legal capacity or if  their legal capacity is restricted. Other people may 
then do so with the consent of  the presiding judge and in criminal procee-
dings with the consent of  the public prosecutor or the police authority only 
if  it is necessary to exercise their rights.
(2) The public prosecutor or the police authority are entitled to inspect the 
files, along with the other rights referred to in Subsection 1, and they may deny 
them based on important reasons in the preliminary hearing. The public pros-
ecutor is obligated to urgently review the severity of  the grounds on which 
those rights are denied by the police authority and the request of  the person 
to whom the refusal concerns. These rights can not be denied to the accused 
and the defence counsel once they have been advised of  the possibility to study 
the files, and when concluding an agreement on guilt and punishment.
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(3) Those who had the right to be present to an action can not be denied 
access to the transcript of  such an action. The accused and their legal coun-
sel could not be denied access to the resolution to initiate criminal prosecu-
tion (Section 160 Subsection 1).
(4) The rights of  public authorities and a national member of  Eurojust 
to access the files under other legal regulations are not established with prej-
udice to the provisions of  the preceding Subsections.
(5) When authorising access to the files, it is necessary to take such steps 
to preserve the secrecy of  the classified information protected by a spe-
cial Act which is related to the state ordered or recognised confidentiality 
obligation.
(6) When files are to be inspected, it is necessary to take such measures 
to prevent access to data that may, under Section 55 Subsection 1 Paragraph 
c), only be learnt by the law enforcement authorities and officials of  the 
Probation and Mediation Service acting in the matter concerned. Where 
a person against whom the criminal proceedings are conducted requests 
notification of  such data, Section 55 Subsection 1 Paragraph c) shall apply 
accordingly.
Section 78
Obligation to Release Property
(1) Those who are carrying a tangible property important to the crimi-
nal proceedings are obligated to submit it to the court, public prosecutor, 
or police authority when prompted; if  the purpose of  the criminal procee-
dings requires its securing, they are obligated to release the property when 
prompted. When prompted, it is necessary to note that if  they fail to comply 
with the call, the property may be removed from them, as well as there being 
other consequences of  non-compliance (Section 66).
(2) The obligation under Subsection 1 shall not apply to an instrument 
whose content relates to the circumstances of  the ban on interrogation, 
unless there was an exemption from the obligation to keep the matter secret 
or confidential (Section 99).
(3) The presiding judge and in the preliminary hearing, the public prosecutor 
or the police authority, are entitled to prompt the release.
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(4) Where tangible property to which the rights to be secured are attached 
was released, the securing of  such rights shall take place accordingly under 
Section 79e.
(5) The person who released the tangible property must not transfer such 
property to another person or encumber it during the impoundage. Any 
legal action made contrary to this prohibition is invalid; the court shall 
take account of  such invalidity even without a petition. Such person must 
be instructed on this.
(6) The law enforcement authority stated in Subsection 3 shall order the 
person who released the tangible property to notify the law enforcement 
authority within the term set by such authority whether and who has a pre-
emption or other right to the released property or whether the exercise 
of  the right to dispose of  the property is restricted in another manner, and 
such person shall also be advised of  the consequences of  failure to grant 
such request within the set term (Section 66); subsequently the law enforce-
ment authority shall notify the impoundage of  the tangible property to those 
persons and authorities about whom the law enforcement authority learns 
that they have a pre-emption or other right to such property or are conduct-
ing proceedings in which the exercise of  the right to dispose of  such prop-
erty has been restricted. It shall also notify the authority that keeps a register 
of  such properties under other legal regulations of  the property’s impound-
age without undue delay.
(7) The procedure in the management of  impounded tangible properties 
shall be governed by special legal regulations.
(8) Subsection 4 through 7 shall not apply to tangible properties that were 
taken into custody by a law enforcement authority in criminal proceedings 
only in order to take evidence.
Section 79
Seizure of  Property
(1) If  the tangible property important to the criminal proceedings is not 
released when those who have it in their possession are prompted, it may 
be removed from their possession on the warrant of  the presiding judge, 
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and in preliminary hearing, the public prosecutor or police authority. The 
police authority needs to have the prior approval of  the public prosecutor 
for the issue of  such warrant.
(2) If  the authority that issued the warrant for the seizure of  the tangible 
property does not seize such property themselves, the police authority shall 
do so on the basis of  the warrant.
(3) Without the prior consent referred to in Subsection 1 the warrant may 
be issued by the police authority only if  prior approval cannot be achieved 
and the matter cannot be delayed.
(4) A person who is not involved in the matter shall take part in seizing the 
tangible property.
(5) The transcript of  the release and seizure of  the tangible property must 
also contain a sufficiently accurate description of  the released or seized 
property that would make it possible to determine its identity.
(6) The authority that performed the action shall immediately issue a writ-
ten confirmation of  the receipt of  the property or a copy of  the transcript 
to the person who released the tangible property or from whom the tan-
gible property was removed, together with a written instruction that they 
must not transfer the released or removed tangible property to another party 
or encumber it and that any legal action made contrary to such prohibition 
is invalid.
(7) Removed tangible property that was not taken into custody by a law 
enforcement authority in order to take evidence shall be governed accord-
ingly by Section 78 Subsection 4 through 8.
Section 82
Reasons for House and Personal Searches and 
Search of  Other Premises and Land
(1) A house search can be conducted if  there is a reasonable suspicion that 
a person or property important for criminal proceedings is present in the 
residence or other premises used for housing or on premises associated with 
them (residence).
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2) Due to the grounds provided for in Subsection 1 a search of  non-resi-
dential premises (other premises) and land, if  not publicly accessible, may 
be performed.
(3) Personal searches may be performed if  there is a reasonable suspicion 
that someone is carrying property important to criminal proceedings.
(4) A detained person and a person who was arrested or taken into custody 
may even be inspected if  there is a suspicion that they are in possession 
of  a weapon or other property that could endanger their own or someone 
else’s life or health.
Section 88
Interception and Recording of  Telecommunications
(1) If  criminal proceedings are conducted for a crime for which the law stipu-
lates a prison sentence with the upper penalty limit of  at least eight years, for 
a criminal offence of  machinations in insolvency proceedings under Section 
226 of  the Penal Code, violation of  regulations on rules of  competition 
under Section 248 Subsection 1 Paragraph e) and Subsection 2 through 4 
of  the Penal Code, negotiating advantages during public procurement, ten-
der and auction under Section 256 of  the Penal Code, machinations dur-
ing public procurement and tenders under Section 257 of  the Penal Code, 
machinations at a public auction under Section 258 of  the Penal Code, 
misuse of  powers of  an official person under Section 329 of  the Penal 
Code or for any other intentional criminal offence for which prosecution 
is stipulated in a declared international treaty, an order for the interception 
and recording of  telecommunications may be issued if  it may be reason-
ably assumed that facts relevant to the criminal proceedings will be obtained 
in this way and if  there is no other way to achieve such purpose or if  its 
achievement would be otherwise significantly reduced. The Police of  the 
Czech Republic perform the interception and recording of  telecommuni-
cations for the needs of  all law enforcement authorities. The interception 
and recording of  telecommunications between the defence counsel and the 
accused is inadmissible. If  the police authority finds during the intercep-
tion and recording of  telecommunications that the accused has communi-
cated with their defence counsel, they are obliged to immediately destroy the 
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interception recording and not to use the information learned in this context 
in any way. The report on the destruction of  the record shall be placed 
in the file.
(2) The presiding judge and, in preliminary proceedings upon the petition 
of  the public prosecutor, the judge, is entitled to warrant the interception 
and recording of  telecommunications. If  there is a criminal proceeding for 
an intentional criminal offence, the prosecution of  which is governed by the 
applicable international treaty, the order for the interception and record-
ing of  telecommunications must be issued in writing and must be justified, 
including a specific reference to the applicable international treaty. The 
order for the interception and recording of  the telecommunications service 
shall include a determined user address or a user device and the user if  their 
identity is known, and the period during which the interception and record-
ing of  telecommunications traffic is conducted cannot be longer than four 
months; the justification must include the specific facts that justify the issue 
of  such order as well as its period. The order for the interception and record-
ing of  telecommunications shall immediately be forwarded to the police 
authority. In the preliminary hearing, the judge shall send a copy of  the 
order for the interception and recording of  telecommunications to the pub-
lic prosecutor without undue delay.
(3) The police authority is obliged to continuously assess whether the rea-
sons which led to an order for the interception and recording of  telecom-
munications are still valid. If  the reasons have expired, they are obligated 
to immediately terminate the interception and recording of  telecommunica-
tions even before the end of  the period referred to in Subsection 2. They 
will immediately notify the presiding judge in writing, who issued the order 
for the interception and recording of  telecommunications, and in the pre-
liminary hearing, the public prosecutor and the judge.
(4) Based on the assessment of  the current course of  the interception and, 
recording of  telecommunications, the judge of  a superior court and, in the 
preliminary hearing upon the petition of  the public prosecutor, deputy 
county court judge may extend the duration of  the interception and record-
ing of  telecommunications traffic even repeatedly, however, always only for 
a maximum period of  four months.
  Appendix: Collection of Relevant Legal Provisions
193
(5) The law enforcement authority may, without the order for the inter-
ception and recording of  telecommunications, order the interception and 
recording of  telecommunications or conduct it themselves if  there is a crim-
inal proceeding for the criminal offence of  human trafficking (Section 168 
of  the Penal Code), the delegation of  custody of  a child to someone else 
(Section 169 of  the Penal Code), restriction of  personal freedoms (Section 
171 of  the Penal Code), extortion (Section 175 of  the Penal Code), kid-
napping of  a child and persons suffering from a mental disorder (Section 
200 of  the Penal Code), violence against a group of  people or an indivi-
dual (Section 352 of  the Penal Code), dangerous threats (Section 353 of  the 
Penal Code) or dangerous persecution (Section 354 of  the Penal Code), 
if  the user of  the intercepted unit agrees to such measure.
(6) If  the record of  the telecommunications service is to be used as evidence, 
it is necessary to accompany it with the transcript, giving the place, time, 
manner and contents of  the record, as well as the authority which issued the 
record. The police authority is obliged to label other records, securely store 
them so as to protect them against unauthorised misuse, and indicate the 
place of  storage in the transcript. In another criminal case other than the 
one in which the interception and recording of  telecommunications service 
was performed, the recording may be used as evidence if  there is a criminal 
prosecution in this matter for a criminal offence referred to in Subsection 1, 
or with the consent of  the user by the intercepted station.
(7) If  the interception and recording of  the telecommunications service did 
not find any facts relevant to the criminal proceedings, the police authority, 
after approval by a court and in preliminary hearings, the public prosecutor, 
must immediately destroy all records after three years from the final conclu-
sion of  the matter. If  the police authority was informed of  an extraordinary 
appeal within the set deadline, they shall destroy the records of  the intercep-
tion after the decision on the extraordinary appeal or after a final conclusion 
on the matter. The police authority shall send a transcript on the destruction 
of  the record of  the interception to the public prosecutor, whose decision 
finally concluded the matter and in proceedings before the court, to the 
presiding judge in the first instance, for the record on file.
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(8) The public prosecutor or the police authority, by whose decision the 
case was finally concluded, and in proceedings before the court the presid-
ing judge in the first instance after the final conclusion of  the matter, shall 
inform the person referred to in Subsection 2, if  known, on the ordered 
interception and recording of  telecommunications service. The information 
includes the designation of  the court that issued an order for the intercep-
tion and recording of  telecommunications service, the duration of  the inter-
ception and the date of  the conclusion. Part of  the information includes 
the instructions on the right to submit, within six months of  receipt of  this 
information, a petition to review the legality of  the order for the interception 
and recording of  telecommunications service to the Supreme Court. The 
presiding judge of  the court in the first instance shall submit the informa-
tion without undue delay after the final conclusion of  the matter, the public 
prosecutor by whose decision the matter was finally concluded shall submit 
the information without undue delay after expiration of  the period for the 
review of  their decision by the Attorney General under Section 174a and 
the police authority by whose decision the matter was finally concluded shall 
submit the information without undue delay after expiration of  the period 
for the review of  their decision by the public prosecutor under Section 174 
Subsection 2 Paragraph e).
(9) The presiding judge, the public prosecutor or the police authority does 
not submit the information under Subsection 8 in proceedings on a crime 
committed by an organised group for which the law stipulates a prison sen-
tence with the upper penalty limit of  at least eight years, in proceedings 
on criminal offences committed for the benefit of  an organised criminal 
group, in proceedings for criminal participation in an organised criminal 
group (Section 361 of  the Penal Code), or if  the criminal offence involved 
more people and in relation to at least one of  them the criminal proceedings 
have not yet been finally concluded or if  it is against the person to whom 
the information was submitted, is the subject of  criminal proceedings, 
or if  providing such information could defeat the purpose of  the crimi-
nal proceedings, including those referred to in Subsection 6, or if  it could 
lead to threats to national security, life, health, or the rights and freedoms 
of  individuals.
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Section 88a
(1) If, for the purposes of  criminal proceedings conducted for an intentional 
criminal offence for which the law sets out a prison sentence with an upper 
penalty limit of  at least three years, for the criminal offence of  violating 
the confidentiality of  messages (Section 182 of  the Penal Code), for the 
criminal offence of  fraud (Section 209 of  the Penal Code), for the criminal 
offence of  unauthorised access to computer systems and information media 
(Section 230 of  the Penal Code), for the criminal offence of  procuring and 
possessing access devices and computer system passwords and other such 
data (Section 231 of  the Penal Code), for the criminal offence of  dangerous 
threats (Section 353 of  the Penal Code), for the criminal offence of  danger-
ous persecution (Section 354 of  the Penal Code), for the criminal offence 
of  spreading alarming news (Section 357 of  the Penal Code), for the crimi-
nal offence of  encouraging a criminal offence (Section 364 of  the Penal 
Code), for the criminal offence of  approving a criminal offence (Section 365 
of  the Penal Code) or for an intentional criminal offence for which prosecu-
tion is stipulated in a proclaimed international treaty binding on the Czech 
Republic, it is necessary to ascertain data on the telecommunications service 
that are the subject of  a telecommunications secret or that are subject to the 
protection of  personal and intermediation data, and there is no other way 
to achieve the pursued purpose or if  its achievement would be otherwise 
significantly harder, their release to the public prosecutor or to the police 
authority shall be ordered by the presiding judge in proceedings before the 
court and by the judge upon the petition of  the public prosecutor in a pre-
liminary hearing. If  there are criminal proceedings for a criminal offence the 
prosecution of  which is stipulated in such international treaty, the order for 
ascertaining data on the telecommunications service must be issued in writ-
ing and must be justified, including a specific reference to the proclaimed 
international treaty. If  the request applies to a particular user, their identity 
must be stated in the order, if  known.
(2) The public prosecutor or the police authority by whose decision the mat-
ter was finally concluded, and in proceedings before the court the presiding 
judge of  the court of  first instance after the final conclusion of  the matter, 
shall inform the user referred to in Subsection 1, if  known, of  the ordered 
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ascertainment of  data on the telecommunications service. The informa-
tion shall identify the court which issued the order for the ascertainment 
of  data on the telecommunications service, and detail the period to which 
such order applied. Such information shall include instructions on the right 
to submit to the Supreme Court, within six months of  receipt of  this infor-
mation, a petition to review the legality of  the order for the ascertainment 
of  data on the telecommunications service. The presiding judge of  the court 
of  first instance shall submit the information without undue delay after the 
final conclusion of  the matter, the public prosecutor by whose decision the 
matter was finally concluded shall submit the information without undue 
delay after expiration of  the period for the review of  their decision by the 
Attorney General under Section 174a, and the police authority by whose 
decision the matter was finally concluded shall submit the information with-
out undue delay after expiration of  the period for the review of  their deci-
sion by the public prosecutor under Section 174 Subsection 2 Paragraph e).
(3) The presiding judge, the public prosecutor or the police authority shall 
not submit the information under Subsection 2 in proceedings on a crime 
committed by an organised group for which the law stipulates a prison 
sentence with an upper penalty limit of  at least eight years, in proceedings 
on a criminal offence committed for the benefit of  an organised criminal 
group, in proceedings on the criminal offence of  participation in an organ-
ised criminal group (Section 361 of  the Penal Code), or if  the commission 
of  the criminal offence involved several persons and in relation to at least 
one of  them criminal proceedings have not yet been finally concluded 
or if  criminal proceedings are conducted against the person to whom the 
information is to be submitted, or if  providing such information could 
defeat the purpose of  the particular or some other criminal proceedings, 
or if  it could threaten national security, life, health, or the rights or freedoms 
of  individuals.
(4) An order under Subsection 1 is not required if  the user of  the tele-
communications equipment to whom the data on the performed telecom-
munications service relates gives their approval for the provision of  the 
information.




(1) In a criminal prosecution it is required to prove to the necessary extent, 
in particular:
a) whether an act is seen as a criminal offence,
b) whether the act was committed by the accused or based on what motives,
c) significant factors affecting the assessment of  the nature and seriousness 
of  the act,
d) the relevant circumstances to assess the offenders’ personal circumstances,
e) the significant circumstances allowing the determination of  the conse-
quences, the amount of  damage and unjust enrichment, caused by the crimi-
nal offence,
f) the circumstances that led to the criminal activity or allowed 
it to be committed.
(2) Evidence may be anything that may help to clarify matters, in particular 
the testimonies of  the accused and witnesses, expert opinions, items and 
documents relevant to the criminal proceedings, and examinations. Each 
party may seek, submit, or propose the implementation of  evidence. The 
fact that the law enforcement authority did not seek or request it is not 
grounds for the rejection of  such evidence.
(3) Evidence obtained by unlawful coercion or threat of  coercion may not 
be used in the proceedings except when used as evidence against the person 
that used coercion or threatened coercion.
Experts
Invitation of  Experts
Section 105
(1) If  the clarification of  the facts relevant to the criminal proceedings 
requires the necessary expertise, the law enforcement authority will request 
a professional opinion. If  such a procedure is not sufficient due to the com-
plexity of  the assessed issue, an expert is invited by the law enforcement 
authority. In the preliminary hearings, an expert is invited by the law enforce-
ment authority which considers an expert opinion to be necessary for the 
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decision if  the matter was referred back for further investigation by the pub-
lic prosecutor and, in proceedings before the court, the presiding judge. The 
accused and, in proceedings before the court, the public prosecutor, shall 
be notified on the invitation of  an expert. Another person is notified on the 
invitation of  an expert if  it is necessary for such a person to perform or tol-
erate something for the purpose of  the expert opinion.
(2) In selecting a person who is to be invited as an expert, it is important 
to take the reasons for which the expert is excluded from the presentation 
of  an expert opinion under the special Act into account. In seeking a pro-
fessional opinion, the law enforcement authority shall consider whether 
the person from whom the professional opinion is requested is not biased 
in regard to their relationship to the accused, other persons involved in the 
criminal proceedings, or their relationship to the case.
(3) Objections against the expert may be raised on grounds set out by the 
special Act. In addition, objections can be raised against the professional 
interests of  an expert or on the wording of  the questions given to the expert. 
In the preliminary hearings, the merits of  such objections shall be judged 
by the public prosecutor and, in proceedings before the court, the presid-
ing judge before whom the proceeding is being conducted during the time 
of  the objections’ notification; if  the objections are raised by appeal they 
shall be reviewed by the authority competent to decide on the appeal. If  the 
authority grants the objections and the reasons for requesting an expert 
opinion still exist, they will take steps to either request an expert opinion 
by another expert or by re-phrasing the questions; conversely they shall 
instruct the person who raised the objection that no reasons for the objec-
tion were found. The opinion to the objections raised in an appeal normally 
forms part of  the justification of  the decision of  the appeal.
(4) If  it is particularly important to clarify the facts, it is necessary to invite 
two experts. Two experts must be invited if  it regards an examination 
or an autopsy of  a corpse (Section 115). The physician who treated the 
deceased for a disease, which immediately preceded the death, may not 
be invited as an expert.
(5) Pursuant to Subsection 1, even a person who is, under special Act, reg-
istered in the registry of  experts and a natural person and legal entity that 
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has the required professional expertise may be asked for their professional 
opinion. The public authority shall always submit the professional opinion 
to the law enforcement authorities free of  charge.
Section 106
An expert must be instructed on the consequences of  the failure to appear 
on summons (Section 66) and the obligation to report the facts for which 
they could be excluded or could otherwise prevent them to be active in the 
matter as an expert without undue delay. The expert must also be instructed 
about the importance of  the expert opinion in terms of  general interest 
and the criminal consequences of  perjury and a knowingly false expert 
opinion; this also applies to an expert who submitted an opinion on the 
basis of  a request of  a party pursuant to Section 89 Subsection 2.
Section 107
Preparation of  Opinion
(1) An expert who is responsible for an act shall be provided with the nec-
essary explanations from the files, and their functions should be defined. 
At the same time, it is therefore important that the expert does not evaluate 
the evidence and solve any legal issues. If  it is necessary for the submis-
sion of  the opinion, the experts are allowed to view the files or the files are 
loaned to them. They may also be allowed to be present during the inter-
rogation of  the accused and the witnesses to ask them questions related 
to the subject matter of  the expert investigation. In justified cases, experts 
will be permitted to take part in another act of  the criminal proceedings, 
provided such an act is important for the expert opinion. The expert may 
also suggest that other evidence is first needed to clarify the circumstances 
necessary for the submission of  the opinion.
(2) An expert invited along to submit an expert opinion on the cause of  death 
or the deceased person’s medical condition is entitled to require medical doc-
umentation concerning such persons; in other cases they may require medical 
documentation under the conditions provided by the special Act.
(3) Experts are usually requested to prepare a written version of  the expert 
opinion. The expert opinion is also served to the defence counsel at the 
expense of  the defence.
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Section 108
Interrogation of  an Expert
(1) If  an expert has prepared a written expert opinion, it is enough to refer 
to it and confirm it during the interrogation. If  the opinion was not pre-
pared in writing, the expert shall dictate it for the transcript during the 
interrogation.
(2) If  several experts were invited who, after a mutual consultation, arrived 
to affirmative conclusions, the expert opinion shall be submitted by an expert 
appointed to do so by the others; if  their opinions are different, each expert 
must be heard separately.
(3) In the preliminary hearing, the expert opinion may be omitted if  the 
police authority or the public prosecutor does not doubt the reliability and 
completeness of  the submitted written expert opinion.
Section 109
Errors of  Opinion
If  there are doubts about the correctness of  the opinion, or if  the opinion 
is unclear or incomplete, it is necessary to ask an expert to explain. If  that 
bears no results, another expert is invited along.
Section 110
Opinions from an Institute
(1) In exceptional cases, particularly in difficult cases requiring special scien-
tific assessments, the police authority or the public prosecutor and, in procee-
dings before the court, the presiding judge may invite a public authority, 
scientific institute, university or a specialised institution to provide expert 
services to submit an expert opinion or an examination of  an opinion filed 
by an expert.
(2) A person who was invited to provide an expert opinion or to examine 
an opinion filed by an expert under Subsection 1 shall provide a written 
opinion. It will include the identification of  the person or persons who pre-
pared the opinion and if  necessary, they may be heard as an expert; if  it was 
necessary to invite two experts (Section 105 Subsection 4), they will list 
at least two such persons.
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(3) In selecting persons referred to in Subsection 2 it is important to take the 
reasons for which the expert is excluded from submitting the expert opinion 
under special Act into account.
(4) The provisions of  Section 105 Subsection 3 are similarly applicable when 
requesting the opinion from an institute.
Section 110a
If  the expert opinion submitted by a party has all the elements required 
by law and includes an expert clause that they are aware of  the consequences 
of  giving a knowingly false expert opinion, then the performance of  such 
evidence is the same as if  it was an expert opinion requested by a law enforce-
ment authority. The law enforcement authority shall allow the experts that 
were requested for an expert opinion by one of  the parties to inspect the 
file, or will otherwise allow them to become familiar with the information 
necessary for the preparation of  the expert opinion.
Section 111
Use of  Special Regulations on Experts
(1) Special regulations apply to the provisions of  an expert, their eligibility 
for this function, and their exclusion from it, on the right to deny the perfor-
mance of  an expert act, and on the oath and reminder of  the responsibilities 
prior to the performance of  the expert act, as well as the reimbursement 
of  cash expenses and remuneration (expert fees) for the expert act.
(2) The amount of  expert fees is determined by those who invited the 
expert and, in proceedings before the court, by the presiding judge without 
undue delay or within two months of  invoicing the expert fees. If  those 
who invited the expert disagree with the amount of  expert fees, then they 
shall decide on it by a resolution. A complaint against the resolution with 
a suspensive effect is permissible.
(3) The expert fees must be paid without undue delay within 30 days after 
they were granted.
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Section 113
Purpose of  the Examination and its Transcript
(1) The examination is held provided there are facts relevant to the criminal 
proceedings that are to be clarified by direct observation. An expert is usu-
ally invited for the examination.
(2) The examination transcript must provide a full and fair picture of  the 
examination subject; therefore photographs, drawings and other aids are 
to be attached to it.
Section 158
(1) The Police Authority is obliged, based on their own findings, crimi-
nal reports, and instigations by other persons and authorities on the basis 
of  which conclusions may be made on the suspicion of  a criminal offence, 
to take all necessary investigations and measures to reveal the facts indicat-
ing that the criminal offence was committed and directed towards identify-
ing the offender; they are obligated to take the necessary measures to pre-
vent the criminal activity. The appointed authorities of  the Prison Service 
of  the Czech Republic shall inform the General Inspection of  Security 
Forces without undue delay after they initiate such investigation.
(2) The public prosecutor and the police authority are required to accept 
reports of  facts suggesting that the criminal offence was committed. At the 
same time, they are obligated to instruct the reporting person about the 
liability for knowingly false statements and if  the reporting person requests 
it, to inform them on the effective measures taken within one month of  the 
notification.
Section 158d
Surveillance of  Persons and Items
(1) The surveillance of  persons and items (hereinafter referred to as “sur-
veillance”) means acquiring knowledge about persons and items performed 
in a classified manner by technical or other means. If  the police author-
ity finds during the surveillance that the accused communicates with their 
defence counsel, they are required to immediately destroy the records with 
the content of  the communication, and the information that they learned 
in this context they are not allowed to use in any way.
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(2) Surveillance during which audio, video or other records are to be obtained 
may be performed only upon the written authorisation of  the public 
prosecutor.
(3) If  the surveillance is to interfere with in the inviolability of  residence, the 
confidentiality of  correspondence, or finding the contents of  other docu-
ments and records kept in private with the use of  technology, then it may 
be performed only with the prior authorisation of  a judge. When entering 
a residence, no actions other than those that lead to the planting of  technical 
equipment can be performed.
(4) The authorisation referred to in Subsection 2 and 3 can only be issued 
upon written request. The request must be justified by a suspicion of  spe-
cific criminal activity and, if  known, with the information about the persons 
or items that are to be surveilled. The authorisation must state the period 
during which the surveillance will be carried out and this must not be longer 
than six months. This period may be extended by those who authorised 
it on the basis of  a new written request, but still not exceeding six months.
(5) If  the matter cannot be delayed and it is not a case referred to in Subsection 
3, the surveillance may be initiated even without prior authorisation. 
However, the police authority is obliged to additionally request the authori-
sation without undue delay and if  it is not received within 48 hours they are 
required to cease the surveillance, destroy any records, and not to use any 
information found in this context.
(6) Without compliance with the conditions referred to in Subsection 2 and 
3, the surveillance may performed only if  the person whose rights and free-
doms are to be interfered with by surveillance gives their express consent. 
If  such consent is subsequently withdrawn, surveillance shall immediately 
terminate.
(7) If  the record of  the surveillance is to be used as evidence, it is required 
that the transcript is attached with the particulars referred to in Section 55 
and 55a.
(8) If  no facts important to the criminal proceedings were found, it is neces-
sary to destroy the records in the prescribed manner.
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(9) Operators of  telecommunications activity, their employees, and other 
persons who participate in the operation of  telecommunications activity, 
as well as the post office or the person performing the transport of  the 
consignments are obligated to provide the police authority performing the 
surveillance with the necessary assistance free of  charge and in accordance 
with their instructions. At the same time, they may not claim the obligation 
of  professional confidentiality imposed by special Acts.
(10) In a criminal matter other than that which the surveillance was per-
formed for under the conditions referred to in Subsection 2, the records 
obtained through surveillance and the attached transcript may be used 
as evidence only if  there is, in this case, a pending criminal proceeding 
on an intentional criminal offence or if  the person whose rights and free-
doms the surveillance interfered with, gives their consent.
Section 314l
(1) Upon the petition of  the person referred to in Section 88 Subsection 8, 
the Supreme Court, in closed hearing, shall examine the legality of  the war-
rant for the interception and recording of  the telecommunications service.
(2) Upon the petition of  the person referred to in Section 88a Subsection 2, 
the Supreme Court, in closed hearing, shall examine the legality of  the order 
for the ascertainment of  data on the telecommunications service.
Section 314m
(1) If  the Supreme Court finds that the warrant for the interception and 
recording of  the telecommunications service or the order for the ascertain-
ment of  data on the telecommunications service was issued or its perfor-
mance was contrary to law, they shall pronounce the violation of  the law 
by a resolution.
(2) An appeal against such decision is not permissible.
Section 314n
(1) If  the Supreme Court finds that the warrant for the interception and 
recording of  the telecommunications service was issued and its performance 
was in compliance with the conditions set out in Section 88 Subsection 1 
or the order for the ascertainment of  data on the telecommunications 
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service was issued and its performance was in compliance with the condi-
tions set out in Section 88a Subsection 1, they shall pronounce in a resolu-
tion that the law was not violated.
(2) An appeal against such decision is not permissible.
Act No. 104/2013 Sb., on international judicial cooperation in crimi-
nal matters5
Section 64
Cross-border Interception of  Communications
(1) If  an international treaty stipulates that it is possible to perform inter-
ception of  telecommunications in from a foreign state the territory of  the 
Czech Republic without its technical assistance, the competent author-
ity to decide on granting the authorization to performing the interception 
or with proceeding therewith and to related actions will be the Regional 
Court in Prague; if  there is pre-trial proceeding being conducted in the state 
performing the interception, the Regional Court in Prague will decide upon 
a petition of  a public prosecutor of  the Regional Public Prosecutor’s Office 
in Prague. The authorization to perform the interception or to proceed 
therewith may be granted only if  the conditions of  Section 88 of  the Code 
of  Criminal Procedure are met.
(2) If  an international treaty stipulates that interception of  communications 
may be performed in the territory of  the Czech Republic without its tech-
nical assistance, the public prosecutor and after lodging an indictment the 
judge will inform the foreign state in a manner provided for by the interna-
tional treaty of  the anticipated or conducted interception.
5 Informal translation made by the authors.
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Act No. 127/2005 Sb., on electronic communication and on amend-
ment to some related laws (Electronic Communications Act)6
Section 2
Definitions
For the purposes of  this Act
[…]
f) “provision of  an electronic communications network” means the estab-
lishment, operation or supervision of  such a network, or making it accessible,
[…]
h) “electronic communications network” means transmission systems and, 
where applicable, switching or routing equipment and other facilities, includ-
ing network elements which are inactive and which permit the conveyance 
of  signals by wire, by radio, by optical or by other electromagnetic means, 
including satellite networks, fixed circuit-switched or packet-switched net-
works and mobile terrestrial networks, electricity cable systems, to the extent 
that they are used for the purpose of  transmitting signals, networks used for 
radio and television broadcasting and cable television networks, irrespective 
of  the type of  information conveyed,
[…]
j) “public communications network” means an electronic communications 
network used wholly or mainly for the provision of  publicly available elec-
tronic communications services, and which supports the transfer of  infor-
mation between network termination points, or an electronic communi-
cations network through which a service distributing radio and television 
broadcasts is provided,
[…]
n) “electronic communications services” means a service normally provided 
for remuneration which consists wholly or mainly in the conveyance of  sig-
nals on electronic communications networks, including telecommunica-
tions services and transmission services in networks used for broadcasting, 
6 Informal English translation available online at http://www.mpo.cz/dokument156553.
html
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and on cable television networks, but excluding services that offer content 
by means of  electronic communications networks and services, or exercise 
editorial control over the offered content transmitted using electronic com-
munications networks and services; it does not include information society 
services, which do not consist wholly or mainly in the conveyance of  signals 
on electronic communications networks,
o) “publicly available electronic communications service” means an elec-




(1) The rights and obligations relating to personal data protection, not regu-
lated in this Volume, shall be governed by a special legal regulation.
(2) For the purposes of  this Volume, consent based on a special legal regula-
tion shall also be understood to mean consent granted by electronic means, 
including, but not limited to, the completion of  an electronic form on the 
Internet.
(3) Supervision over compliance with obligations while processing personal 
data according to this Act shall be provided by the Office for Personal Data 
Protection in accordance with a special legal regulation.
Section 88
Securing the Protection of  Personal, Traffic and Location Data and the 
Confidentiality of  Communications
(1) An undertaking providing a publicly available electronic communications 
service is obliged to:
a) take technical and organisational measures to safeguard the security of  the 
service in respect of  the protection of  natural persons’ personal informa-
tion in accordance with a special legal regulation, protection of  traffic and 
location data, and confidentiality of  the communications of  natural persons 
and legal entities in providing the service; if  necessary, the provider con-
cerned shall, upon written agreement, also cooperate with the undertaking 
providing the communications network to provide protection,
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b) prepare internal technical and organisational regulations to provide data 
protection and communications confidentiality in accordance with Clause 
(a) above; secure data protection and communications confidentiality with 
respect to the existing technical capabilities and the costs needed to provide 
protection at a level adequate to the risks of  compromising the protection,
c) inform the subscribers concerned about the specific risk of  the distur-
bance of  network security in relation to data protection in accordance with 
Clause (a) above, and if  the risk is beyond the scope of  the measures taken 
by the undertaking, it shall also inform the subscribers about all the possible 
ways of  remedying the situation, including the costs associated therewith,
d) establish internal procedures for handling requests for access to users’ 
personal data; at the request of  the Office for Personal Data Protection, 
undertakings providing a publicly available electronic communications ser-
vice shall provide it with information about these procedures, the number 
of  applications received, the legal justification of  such requests and their 
responses.
(2) An undertaking providing a publicly available electronic communications 
service shall submit to the Office, if  the Office so requests, the regulations 
referred to in Subsection 1 (c). If  the Office finds that those regulations are 
in contradiction with this Act, the Office shall immediately notify the under-
taking to that effect and shall grant the undertaking a reasonable period 
of  time to remove any deficiencies.
(3) The Office is entitled, having requested the submission of  the regula-
tions referred to in Subsection 1 (b), to inspect how the undertakings pro-
viding a publicly available electronic communications service comply with 
those regulations, with the exception of  inspections of  compliance with 
obligations relating to the protection of  personal data.
(4) In the event of  a breach of  protection of  the personal data of  a natu-
ral person, the undertaking providing a publicly available electronic com-
munications service shall notify this fact to the Office for Personal Data 
Protection without undue delay. Such a notification shall contain a descrip-
tion of  the consequences of  the breach of  protection and the technical 
protection measures the undertaking has adopted, or proposes adopting.
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(5) In the event of  a breach of  protection of  the personal data of  a user 
pursuant to Subsection 4 might have a particularly serious impact on the 
privacy of  a natural person, or if  an undertaking providing a publicly avail-
able electronic communications service failed to take measures to remedy 
this situation and which would have been sufficient to protect the personal 
data at risk, in accordance with an assessment by the Office for Personal 
Data Protection, it shall also notify this fact to the individual concerned and 
to the Office for Personal Data Protection. In this notification, the under-
taking shall indicate the nature of  the breach of  personal data protection, 
recommendations for the implementation of  interventions to mitigate the 
impact of  the breach of  personal data protection and the contact informa-
tion location.
(6) The Office for Personal Data Protection is entitled, after investigating 
the situation resulting from the breach of  protection pursuant to Subsection 
4 above, to impose an obligation on an undertaking providing a publicly 
available electronic communications service to inform the individual con-
cerned of  the breach of  personal data protection, if  it has not already done 
so.
(7) An undertaking providing a publicly available electronic communications 
service shall maintain, only for the purposes of  reviewing compliance with 
obligations pursuant to Subsections 4 and 5, a list of  breaches of  personal 
data protection, including information on the circumstances of  the breach, 
its impacts and measures adopted to remedy the situation. An implement-
ing legal regulation may lay down more detailed conditions under which 
the undertaking providing a publicly available electronic communications 
service is required to notify any breach of  personal data protection, the 
format of  such a notification and the manner in which the notification 
is to be made.
Section 88a
(1) A legal entity or a natural person providing a public communications 
network or a publicly available electronic communications service shall 
ensure that the traffic and location data stored in accordance with Section 
97 Subsection 3 are of  the same quality and subject to the same security 
and protection against unauthorised access, alteration, destruction, loss 
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or theft or other unauthorised processing or use, as the information referred 
to in Section 88; this does not affect the obligations set out in a special legal 
regulation34).
(2) A legal entity or a natural person providing a public communications 
network or a publicly available electronic communications service shall 
draft internal technical and organisational rules to ensure data protection 
in accordance with Subsection 1; it shall provide data protection with regard 
to the existing technical possibilities and to the costs required to provide 
protection at a level appropriate to the risk of  breach of  protection. The 
provisions of  Section 88 Subsections 2 to 7 shall apply mutatis mutandis 
to data protection under this provision
Section 89
Confidentiality of  Communication
(1) Undertakings providing a public communications network or a publicly 
available electronic communications service shall implement technical and 
organisational measures to safeguard the confidentiality of  the messages 
and the related traffic and location data, which are transmitted via their 
public communications network and the publicly available electronic com-
munications services. In particular, such undertakings shall not admit any 
tapping, message storage, or any other types of  interception or monitoring 
of  messages, including the data contained therein and related thereto, by any 
persons other than the users, without the consent of  the users concerned, 
unless otherwise provided in an Act36). This shall not be to the prejudice 
of  the technical storage of  data as needed for message transmission without 
affecting the confidentiality principle.
(2) A message means any information being exchanged or transmitted 
between a finite number of  subscribers or users via the publicly available 
electronic communications service, except for the information transmitted 
as part of  the public radio or television broadcasting service via the elec-
tronic communications network, unless it can be allocated to an identifiable 
subscriber or user receiving that information.
(3) Anybody wishing to use, or using, the electronic communications net-
work for the storage of  data or for gaining access to the data stored in the 
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subscribers’ or users’ terminal equipment shall inform those subscribers 
or users beforehand in a provable manner about the extent and purpose 
of  processing such data and shall offer them the option to refuse such 
processing. This obligation does not apply to activities relating to techni-
cal storage or access and serving exclusively for the purposes of  perform-
ing or facilitating message transmission via the electronic communications 
network, nor does it apply to cases where such technical storage or access 
activities are needed for the provision of  an information society service 
explicitly requested by the subscriber or user.
Section 90
Traffic Data
(1) Traffic data mean any data processed for the purposes of  the transmis-
sion of  a message via the electronic communications network or for the 
billing thereof.
(2) An undertaking providing a public communications network or a publicly 
available electronic communications service who processes and stores traffic 
data, including the appropriate location data relating to a user or subscriber, 
shall erase such data, or render them anonymous, once they are no longer 
needed for message transmission, except as provided in Subsections 3 to 6. 
The obligation of  the legal entity or natural person providing a public com-
munications network or a publicly available electronic communications ser-
vice to maintain traffic and location data in accordance with Section 97 shall 
remain unaffected.
(3) An undertaking providing a public communications network or publicly 
available electronic communications service shall store traffic data for ser-
vices provided to a subscriber or user until such time as a dispute pursuant 
to Section 129 Subsection 3 has been resolved, or until the end of  the period 
during which the prices may be billed or the provision of  an electronic com-
munications service may be legally challenged or settlement recovered.
(4) An undertaking providing a public communications network or a pub-
licly available electronic communications service may process the traffic data 
essential for the billing of  the service provided to a subscriber or user for 
access, to the end of  the period during which payment may be recovered.
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(5) Undertakings providing a public communications network or a publicly 
available electronic communications service may provide each other with 
data related to the provision of  the service, including, but not limited to, 
data about the subscribers being connected, in order to ensure intercon-
nection and access to the network, mutual billing, and identification of  any 
abuse of  the electronic communications network and services. Abuse 
of  electronic communications networks and services means consistent late 
payment of  bills in accordance with Section 64, or the making of  malicious 
or annoying calls.
(6) For the purposes of  marketing the electronic communications services, 
or for the provision of  value-added services, the undertaking providing 
a publicly available electronic communications service may only process the 
data referred to in Subsection 1 above to the extend and for the period 
needed for such services or such marketing, provided the subscriber or user 
to whom the data relate have given their consent thereto. The subscriber 
or user may withdraw their consent to the processing of  traffic data at any 
time.
(7) A value-added service means any service for which it is necessary to pro-
cess traffic data – or location data other than traffic – beyond what is needed 
for the transmission of  a message or for the billing thereof.
(8) The undertaking providing a publicly available communications service 
shall inform the concerned subscriber or user about the traffic data being 
processed and about the time for which such data may be processed for 
the purposes referred to in Subsections 3 to 5. For the purposes referred 
to in Subsection 6, the undertaking shall so inform the subscriber or user 
to whom the data apply before obtaining the consent of  such a subscriber 
or user.
(9) An undertaking providing a public communications network and 
an undertaking providing a publicly available electronic communications 
service shall ensure that the traffic data processing, in accordance with 
Subsections 2 to 6 is restricted to:
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a) the persons who were authorised to that effect by the undertaking and 
who are responsible for the billing or operations management, customer 
inquiries, fraud identification, electronic communications services market-
ing, or who provide value-added services, and
b) the extent essential for the activities referred to in Clause (a) above.
Section 91
Location Data
(1) Location data means any data that are processed within the electronic 
communications network and that define the geographical location of  the 
terminal equipment of  a user of  a publicly available electronic communica-
tions service.
(2) If  an undertaking providing a public communications network or pub-
licly available electronic communications service performs the processing 
of  location data other than traffic data, which have a bearing on a user 
or subscriber, such an undertaking shall render this data anonymous 
or obtain the user’s or subscriber’s consent to the processing of  such data 
to the extent and for the period as needed for the provision of  value-added 
services. Before gaining such consent, the undertaking shall inform the user 
or subscriber concerned about the type of  location data to be processed 
other than traffic data, about the purpose and length of  the processing and 
of  whether the data are to be made available to a third party for the provi-
sion of  value-added services. The user and subscriber may withdraw his/her 
consent to the data processing at any time.
(3) If  the user or subscriber gave his/her consent to the processing of  loca-
tion data other than traffic data, the undertaking providing a public commu-
nications network or a publicly available electronic communications service 
shall offer the user or subscriber the operation of  temporarily refusing the 
processing of  the data in accordance with Subsection 2 above for every con-
nection to the network of  for every message transfer. Such an option shall 
be provided free of  charge and only entail simple processes.
(4) An undertaking providing a public communications network, an under-
taking providing a publicly available electronic communications service 
and an undertaking providing value-added services shall ensure that the 
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data referred to in Subsections 2 and 3 are only processed by persons duly 
authorised and entitled to that effect by internal technical and organisational 
regulations within the meaning of  Section 88 Subsection 1 (b); the process-
ing must be restricted to the extent essential for the needs of  such activities.
Section 92
Display of  Incoming Call Number
(1) An undertaking providing a publicly available telephone service 
is obliged, in the event that the opportunity is offered, to display the sub-
scriber number:
a) of  the calling subscriber, to offer the calling subscriber the possibility free 
of  charge to prevent the display of  his/her subscriber number for each indi-
vidual call, using simple means. The calling subscriber shall have this option 
for each subscriber number,
b) of  the calling subscriber, to offer the called subscriber the possibility 
of  preventing the display of  the calling subscriber number for incoming 
calls, using simple means and providing this function free of  charge in justi-
fied cases, such justified cases being, without limitation, workstations from 
which personal crisis situations are solved (for example hot line services),
c) of  the calling subscriber, and displaying this number before the call 
is actually connected, to offer the called subscriber the possibility of  refus-
ing the incoming calls, for which the calling subscriber restricted the display 
of  his/her subscriber number, using simple means,
d) of  the called subscriber, to offer the called subscriber the possibility 
of  preventing the display of  his/her subscriber number for the calling sub-
scriber, using simple means and providing the service free of  charge.
(2) The provisions of  Subsection 1 (a) shall also apply to calls from the 
Member States of  the European Union routed to third states. The provi-
sions of  Subsection 1 (b), (c) and (d) also apply to incoming calls from third 
states.
(3) Where display of  the calling or called number is offered, the undertak-
ing providing a publicly available electronic communications service shall 
inform the public of  the possibilities referred to in Subsection 1 above.
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(4) An undertaking providing a public communications network or a pub-
licly available electronic communications service is entitled to cancel the 
barring of  the display of  the calling subscriber number:
a) temporarily, at the request of  a subscriber, who has requested that a mali-
cious or annoying call be traced; in such a case, the undertaking shall store 
and make accessible to the aggrieved subscriber information containing the 
calling subscriber identification, and
b) and continue to process the location data during the transmission of  calls 
to every emergency call number operated by the relevant facility for the 
reception of  such calls, even despite a temporary ban or the lack of  consent 
from the subscriber concerned.
(5) An undertaking providing a public communications network or a pub-
licly available electronic communications service shall make public in its 
commercial facilities, and in a manner allowing remote access, the manda-
tory procedures to be followed in order to impose the two options referred 
to in Subsection 4 above, and shall inform its subscribers to that effect.
Section 93
Abuse of  Electronic Mail Addresses of  the Sender
It is prohibited to use any electronic mail address to send a message or mes-




(1) Any undertaking providing a public communications network or a pub-
licly available electronic communications service shall ensure, using simple 
means, that every subscriber can enjoy, free of  charge, the possibility of  pre-
venting automatic forwarding of  calls by a third party to the subscriber’s ter-
minal equipment.
(2) In the event that, during the provision of  the publicly available electronic 
communications service, calls are forwarded automatically or in a concealed 
manner to another service or to a service provided by another under-
taking, or a new connection is established, thereby increasing the price 
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to be charged, the person providing the publicly available electronic com-
munications service shall notify the user of  this fact free of  charge and allow 
him/her to stop the call before it is forwarded or a new call is established. 
If  calls are forwarded or a new connection is established and, as a result, 
the price to be charged is increased without notification of  the user to that 
effect by the person providing a publicly available electronic communica-
tions service at the increased price, the Office shall decide to stop the provi-
sion of  such service.
Section 95
Subscriber Directories
(1) Anybody gathering subscribers’ personal data in order to issue a sub-
scriber directory, whose purpose is to search for detailed contact informa-
tion about persons on the basis of  their names and, if  applicable, other 
identifying elements, to the minimum extent necessary, shall:
a) inform the subscribers concerned, free of  charge and before the inclu-
sion of  their data in the directory, of  the purpose of  the printed of  elec-
tronic directory of  subscribers, which is to be made available to the public 
either directly or through the subscriber directory inquiry services, as well 
as of  other possibilities for its use, based on the search functions contained 
in the electronic versions of  the directory,
b) obtain the prior consent of  the subscribers to the publication of  their 
personal data in accordance with Section 41 Subsection 5 and ensure that the 
subscribers have an opportunity to determine which of  their personal data, 
from the range of  information relevant for the purposes of  the directory, 
as defined by the directory publisher, are to be included in the public direc-
tory; further, it must be ensured that the subscribers are able to verify such 
information and to request the amendment or removal of  such information. 
At the same time, the person gathering such information must ensure that 
the subscribers can indicate, with their personal information, that they do not 
wish to be contacted for marketing purposes. Non-inclusion in the public 
directory of  subscribers, the verifications, corrections and removal of  infor-
mation from the directory and the information concerning the subscrib-
er’s wish not to be contacted for marketing purposes shall be free of  charge.
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(2) If  the purpose of  the public directory is other than to search for detailed 
contact information about a person on the basis of  his/her name, and, 
if  applicable, other identifying elements, to the minimum extent necessary, 
anybody intending to issue such a subscriber directory must first ask for the 
additional consent of  the subscribers concerned.
Section 96
(1) It is prohibited to use electronic communications networks or ser-
vices to offer any marketing advertising or any other method of  offering 
goods or services to those subscribers who indicated in the public directory 
of  subscribers in accordance with Section 95 Subsection 1 (b) or Section 95 
Subsection 2 that they do not wish to be contacted for marketing purposes.
(2) It is prohibited to use electronic communications networks or services 
for the purposes of  direct marketing by means of  automated calling sys-
tems without human intervention (automatic calling equipment), facsimile 
machines or electronic mail, without the prior consent of  the subscriber 
or user concerned.
(3) No undertaking providing subscriber directory enquiry services with 
information about subscriber numbers or other details may disclose any 
subscriber data not contained in the public directory.
(4) The provisions of  Sections 95 and 96 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the 
data of  subscribers who are legal entities.
(5) A provider of  a publicly available electronic communications service, 
whose business interests are harmed by violations of  the obligations set out 
in Subsections 1 to 4 above, is entitled to seek judicial protection on behalf  
of  subscribers whose rights have been harmed by such behaviour. This does 
not affect the right of  a party to pursue their claims in court in their own 
right.
Section 97
Interface for communication interception and message recording
(1) A legal entity or natural person providing a public communications net-
work or a publicly available electronic communications service shall, at the 
INTERCEPTION OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND SLOVAKIA
218
expense of  the requesting party, provide and secure interfaces at specified 
points of  the network to connect terminal equipment for message tapping 
and recording:
a) for the Police of  the Czech Republic for the purposes specified in a spe-
cial legal regulation,
b) for the Security Information Service for the purposes specified in a spe-
cial legal regulation,
c) for the Military Intelligence service for the purposes specified in a special 
legal regulation.
(2) The bodies listed in Subsection 1 above shall prove their authorisation 
for message tapping and recording by submitting a written application, 
which contains a reference number under which the court ruling is filed 
by this body, and which is signed by the person responsible from the body 
listed in Subsection 1 above for the performance of  the message tapping 
and recording. In the event of  message tapping and recording by the Police 
of  the Czech Republic in accordance with special legal regulations36) the 
written application shall contain a reference number under which the con-
sent of  the user of  the station monitored is filed by the Police of  the Czech 
Republic.
(3) A legal entity or a natural person providing a public communications 
network or a publicly available electronic communications service shall for 
a period of  6 months traffic and location data which are created or pro-
cessed during the operation of  their public communications networks and 
during the provision of  their publicly available electronic communications 
services. A legal entity or a natural person providing a public communi-
cations network or a publicly available electronic communications service 
is only required to store data relating to unsuccessful call attempts only when 
these data are created or processed and at the same time stored or recorded. 
At the same time, such a legal entity or natural person is required to ensure 
that, during the performance of  the obligation referred to in the first and 
second sentences, no message content has been stored, and that no content 
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thus stored has been further distributed. A legal entity or a natural person 
who stores traffic and location data is required, on request, immediately 
to provide them to:
a) criminal law enforcement authorities for the purposes of  and under the 
conditions laid down in a special legal regulation,
b) the Police of  the Czech Republic for the purposes of  initiating a search 
for a specific wanted or missing person, for the identification of  persons 
of  unknown identity or the identity of  a corpse that has been discovered, 
for the prevention or detection of  specific terrorist threats or for the veri-
fication of  a protected person, while complying with the conditions set out 
in a special legal regulation,
c) the Security Information Service, for the purposes of  and under the con-
ditions laid down in a special legal regulation,
d) the Military Intelligence service for the purposes of  and under the condi-
tions laid down in a special legal regulation,
e) the Czech National Bank for the purposes of  and under the conditions 
laid down in a special legal regulation.
After expiry of  the period referred to in the first sentence above, the legal 
entity or natural person who stores the traffic and location data is required 
to destroy them, unless they were provided to the bodies authorised to use 
them under a special legal regulation, or unless otherwise provided in this 
Act (Section 90).
(4) The traffic and location data pursuant to Subsection 3 above are primar-
ily data leading to the tracing and identification of  the source and address 
of  the communication, and also data leading to the identification of  the 
date, time, method and duration of  the communication. The scope of  the 
traffic and location data stored in accordance with Subsection 3 above, the 
form and method of  their transmission to the bodies authorised to use them 
under a special legal regulation, and the method of  their disposal is stipu-
lated in an implementing legal regulation.
(5) A legal entity or natural person providing a publicly available telephone 
service is required, on request, to provide information from the database 
of  all its subscribers to the publicly available telephone service to a body 
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authorised to request them in accordance with a special legal regulation, 
at their own expense. The form and scope of  the information provided 
is stipulated in an implementing legal regulation.
(6) Where a legal entity or natural person providing a public communica-
tions network or a publicly available electronic communications service 
introduces into its activities any coding, compression, encryption or any 
other method of  transmission that makes the messages being transmitted 
incomprehensible, such a person shall ensure that the messages requested 
and the traffic and location data related thereto are provided in a compre-
hensible manner at the termination points for connection of  the terminal 
equipment referred to in Subsection 1 above.
(7) For fulfilling the obligations specified in Subsections 1, 3 and 5 above, 
the legal entity or natural person is entitled to reimbursement for effectively 
incurred costs from the authorised body which requested or ordered such 
an action. The amount and method of  reimbursement for the effectively 
incurred costs is set out in an implementing legal regulation.
(8) A person referred to in Subsection 1 above and its employees are required 
to maintain the confidentiality of  any tapping or recording of  messages 
requested or implemented in accordance with Subsections 1 and 2 and data 
requested or provided in accordance with Subsections 3 and 5 and matters 
related thereto.
(9) The technical and operational conditions and points for the connection 
of  terminal telecommunications equipment for the tapping or recording 
of  messages is set out in an implementing legal regulation.
(10) A legal entity or natural person providing a public communications 
network or a publicly available electronic communications service shall keep 
records on:
a) the number of  cases where, on requested, it provided traffic and location 
data to the bodies authorised to request them,
b) the period that elapsed, in each case, from the date on which the storage 
of  the traffic and location data began to the date on which the authorised 
body requested such data, and
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c) the number of  cases when it was not able to comply with a request to pro-
vide traffic and location data.
(11) A legal entity or a natural person providing a public communications 
network or a publicly available electronic communications service is required 
to provide to the Office the collective records referred to in Subsection 
10 above, for the previous calendar, in electronic form, at the latest by 31 
January of  the following calendar year. The records provided may not con-
tain personal and identification data. The Office shall immediately send the 
collective records received to the Commission.
(12) The form of  the records provided under Subsection 11 and the method 
of  their submission to the Office is stipulated in an implementing legal 
regulation.
Section 98
The Security and Integrity of  Public Electronic 
Communications Networks and Services
(1) An undertaking providing a public communications network or a publicly 
available electronic communications service shall ensure the security and integ-
rity of  its network and the security of  the services it provides. For this purpose, 
the undertaking is, in particular, entitles to adopt technical and organisational 
rules created in accordance with network plans pursuant to Subsection 2. With 
regard to the technical capabilities of  these rules to ensure a level of  secu-
rity that corresponds to the existing level of  risk, with the aim of  preventing 
or minimising the impact of  incidents on users and of  the interconnection 
of  networks. Security of  networks and services means their ability to resist 
random incidents or unlawful or malicious actions that seriously compromise 
the availability or interoperability of  services and network integrity.
(2) To ensure the integrity of  public communications networks, the Office 
shall issue network plans (Section 62), in which it defines the basic charac-
teristics of  those networks and their interfaces which are essential for the 
interconnection of  public communications networks, for access thereto, for 
the connection of  non-public communications networks and to ensure the 
continuity of  provision of  those services which are provided through public 
communications services.
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(3) An undertaking providing a public electronic communications network 
or a publicly available electronic communications service may adopt a meas-
ure to suspend provision of  the service or to deny access to the service 
in cases where there is a threat or occurrence of  a serious breach of  the 
security and integrity or its network as a result of  damage or destruction 
of  electronic communications facilities, mainly due to major industrial 
accidents or natural disasters. Such suspension or denial of  service must 
be restricted to the time strictly necessary and, if  it is technically possible, 
access to emergency numbers must be maintained.
(4) An undertaking providing a public electronic communications network 
or a publicly available electronic communications service shall immediately 
inform the Office, the entities operating facilities for reception of  emer-
gency calls – and, using suitable means, also the users – about the serious 
breach to security and the loss of  network integrity, the extent and rea-
sons for the suspension of  the services provided or the denial of  access 
thereto, the measures adopted and of  the expected time of  removal of  the 
causes pursuant to Subsection 3. The scope and form of  the information 
to be provided shall be stipulated by the Office in an implementing legal 
regulation. In the event that this information is published in the public inter-
est, the Office may inform the general public thereof  in a suitable manner.
(5) Each year the Office shall submit to the Commission and the European 
Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) a summary report for 
the previous calendar year, informing of  the notifications and actions taken 
pursuant to Subsections 3 and 4, in the scope and format specified by the 
Commission.
(6) The Office may impose an obligation to carry out a safety audit 
on an undertaking providing a public communications network or a pub-
licly available electronic communications service. This audit must be con-
ducted by a qualified independent entity and the costs shall be borne by the 
undertaking. An undertaking providing a public communications network 
or a publicly available electronic communications service is also required, 
at the request of  the Office, to submit to it the information needed to assess 
network security and integrity and service security, the safety audit and the 
results thereof.
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Section 99
Security, Integrity and Service Provision in Crisis Situations
(1) In a crisis situation, an undertaking providing a public communica-
tions network or a publicly available electronic communications service 
is required, following its own technical and organisational rules, to ensure 
the security and integrity of  its network and the interoperability of  the ser-
vices provided. The particulars to be included in the technical and organisa-
tional rules are stipulated by the Office in an implementing legal regulation.
(2) An undertaking referred to in Subsection 1 above shall submit to the 
Office at its request documents specifying the technical and organisational 
rules referred to in Subsection 1 above and shall allow the Office to monitor 
compliance with these rules. In the event any discrepancy is found between 
these documents and the legal regulations, the Office is entitled to inform 
the undertaking concerned of  this fact and to set it a reasonable period 
within which such discrepancies are to be removed.
(3) An undertaking providing a public communications network or a pub-
licly available telephone service is entitled, when a crisis situation is threat-
ened or during a crisis situation39), at the request of  the Ministry of  Interior, 
to provide priority connections to the public communications network and 
access to the publicly available telephone service to crisis communications 
subscribers, in accordance with a special legal regulation. For that purpose, 
it is entitled, to the extent to which it is absolutely necessary, to restrict 
or suspend the provision of  a publicly available telephone service. It shall 
immediately inform the Office of  any restriction or suspension of  a pub-
licly available telephone service, including the scope thereof. This restriction 
may only be imposed for the period for which it is absolutely necessary, and 
access to emergency numbers must be maintained.
(4) In a crisis situation, an undertaking referred to in Subsection 1 above 
shall immediately inform the Office of  any threat to or breaches of  the 
security and integrity of  its network and the security of  services, includ-
ing measures adopted or envisaged to remedy this situation and the date 
by which the causes are expected to be removed.
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Act No. 273/2008, on the Police of  the Czech Republic7
Section 11
Adequacy of  the procedure
A policeman and police employee are required to ensure that no person suf-
fered unwarranted injury due to their actions, ensure that their decision not 
to act did not resulted in unsubstantiated harm to persons whose security 
is endangered, proceed in a way that any possible interference with the rights 
and freedoms of  persons to whom the act is directed, or any others, did not 
exceed what is necessary to achieve the objective pursued by the act.
Section 19
Technical Support
(1) The police can technically provide the use of  intelligence technology 
or bait and security technology or a surveillance of  persons and goods at the 
request of  a public authority, which is authorised for such use.
(2) The public authority in the request demonstrates that the use of  intel-
ligence technology or surveillance of  people and goods is authorised under 
special legal act.
Section 66
Obtaining information from records and databases
(1) Police may, in cases prescribed by law and to the extent necessary to fulfil 
a specific task, request a legal or natural person providing a public commu-
nications network or publicly available electronic communications with the 
traffic and location data in a manner, which enables remote and continuous 
access, unless another law provides otherwise. These persons are obliged 
to grant the request without undue delay, as and to the extent determined 
by other legislation.
(2) The Police may, to the extent necessary for meeting a specific task, 
demand from the owner or administrator of  a register or database to be pro-
vided with information, online and without any interruption, from the data-
base of  customers of  publicly accessible telephone networks, the register 
of  personal identity cards, the register of  travel documents, the register 
7 Informal translation provided by the Ministry of  Justice.
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of  diplomatic and service passports, the information system of  the register 
of  inhabitants, the register of  motor vehicles, the register of  birth identifica-
tion numbers, the register of  road toll information, the land register, and the 
register of  drivers. In the case of  customers of  publicly accessible telephone 
networks the required information shall be provided in the form and scope 
laid down by another legal regulation.
(3) The Police may, in cases laid down by law and to the extent necessary 
for meeting specific tasks, demand from a legal entity or a physical person 
operating a public communication network or a providing publicly acces-
sible service of  electronic communications to be provided with operational 
and localisation data on-line and without any interruption, unless provided 
otherwise by another legal regulation. The listed persons shall be obliged 
to submit to such demand, without undue delay, and to provide information 
in the form and scope laid down by another legal regulation.
(4) The Police shall demand information pursuant to paragraphs (1) through 
(3) only in a manner which will permit the Police to maintain identification 
data concerning the Police unit or a Police officer, who requested such infor-
mation, and data concerning the purpose of  such request, at least for five 
years. The owner or administrator of  a register or database shall be obliged 
to hold information under the first sentence in confidence.
(5) For the purpose of  protecting a person about whom there is reasonable 
grounds to suspect that his/her life or health could be endangered, or for 
the purpose for searching for a wanted or missed person, the Police and 
the Ministry may demand from the owner or administrator of  the register 
or database, which is maintained under special legal regulations, to provide 
the Police with information on each provision of  personal data.
Section 68
Search for persons and things
(2) Police can request legal or natural person providing a public communica-
tions network or publicly available electronic communications service traffic 
and location data in a manner enabling remote and continuous access, for 
a purpose of  ongoing search for wanted or missing persons and for the 
purpose of  identifying a person of  unknown identity or the identity of  the 
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found corpse, unless another law provides otherwise. The information 
is provided in the form and to the extent determined by other legislation.
Section 71
A police division, competent in fight against terrorism, may for the purpose 
of  preventing and detecting specific threats of  terrorism to the extent nec-
essary to request the
a) legal or natural person providing a public communications network 
or publicly available electronic communications to provide traffic and loca-
tion data in a manner enabling remote and continuous access, unless another 
law provides otherwise; Information will be provided in the form and to the 
extent determined by other legislation.
Section 78
Handover of  information
(1) Police hands over information including the information processed 
in the police registers, which are gained during carrying out its tasks, to the 
national member of  Eurojust, the National Security Office, the intelligence 
services of  the Czech Republic, Military Police, the Ministry, the Prison 
Service of  the Czech Republic, the Customs Administration of  the Czech 
Republic and other public authorities, if  it is necessary to perform the tasks 
within their scope.
(2) The Police does not pass the information if  it would jeopardize the 
accomplishment of  police tasks.
Section 98
Supervision of  the use of  interception and recording of  telecom-
munications, use of  surevillance of  persons and items and inter-
ference with the operation of  electronic communications
(1) Supervision of  the use of  interception and recording of  telecommunica-
tions, use of  surevillance of  persons and items under other legislation, and 
interference with the operation of  electronic communications is performed 
by the Chamber of  Deputies, which for this purpose establishes a super-
visory body. The supervisory body shall consist of  MPs designated by the 
Chamber of  Deputies.
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(2) Supervision pursuant to paragraph 1 is performed by the supervisory 
body in the relevant police departments, after notification to the Minister. 
The Minister presents to the supervisory body at least twice a year a report 
on the use of  these measures. This does not affect the right of  the supervi-
sory body to require information and participation in meetings from others.
(3) Minister shall submit to the Government, to the relevant committee 
of  the Chamber of  Deputies and to supervisory body once a year analysis 
of  the use of  measures listed in paragraph 1.
(4) The procedure in this provision is not affected by the directive 
on controlling.
Act No. 17/2012 Sb., on Customs service of  the Czech Republic8
Section 4
Jurisdiction
(5) The General directorate of  customs
c) in cooperation with public authorities secures, especially technically, the 
use of  intelligence and security equipment or surveillance of  persons and 
things, if  the relevant public authority proves that the it is authorized by law 
to conduct the interception.
Section 57
Handover of  information
(1) Customs authorities shall hand over information to 
a) police,
b) intelligence services of  the Czech Republic,
c) Military Police
d) Ministry of  Interior,
e) Prison Service of  the Czech Republic,
f) the National Security Office and
g) other public authorities, which in the area of  competence of  the customs 
administration are responsible for supervision or which conduct the procee-
dings on an administrative offense.
8 Informal translation made by the authors.
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(2) Customs authorities hand over the information referred to in para-
graph 1 only if  the information is necessary for the performance of  the 
legal tasks of  these bodies.
(3) Customs authorities shall not transmit information when it would signifi-
cantly jeopardize the performance of  its duties
Section 63
Basic Condition of  Use
(1) Bodies of  Customs service may use operative search means, intercep-
tion and recording of  communication (thereinafter “operative search 
means “) as set in the Criminal Procedure Act, when fulfilling duties arising 
from international treaties during conducting of  control of  persons, about 
whom there exist serious reasons to suspect that they are breaching or have 
breached law of  the second party to the treaty.
(2) Rights and duties of  bodies of  customs service arising from the statutes 
regulating criminal procedure are not affected by conduct of  control in the 
meaning of  paragraph 1.
(3) Operative search means may be used only in situation, when the breach 
of  law of  the second party to the treaty, would be considered in accordance 
with the Criminal code9 as an intentional crime, should it happen in the ter-
ritory of  the Czech Republic.
Section 64
(1) Usage of  operative search means must not follow any other purpose 
than the one, which is specified in the concerned international treaty. Rights 
and freedoms of  intercepted persons can be restrained on in the necessary 
manner.
Act No. 341/2011 Sb., on General Inspection of  Security Force10
Section 9
(3) General Inspection may require from Security Forces and other public 
authorities, if  it is necessary for the performance of  a specific task of  the 
Inspection
9 Act No. 40/2009 Sb., the Criminal Code.
10 Informal translation made by the authors.
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a) technical and personal resources for interception and recording of  tel-
ecommunication operations or for operative intelligence means. In the 
request the Inspection demonstrates that the use of  interception and record-
ing of  telecommunication operations or monitoring people and things have 
been permitted under the Criminal Procedure Code.
Section 37
Handover of  information
(1) Inspection hands over information, including personal data and infor-
mation processed in the records of  inspection, which are gained in carry-
ing out its tasks to the Czech Republic Police, Prison Service of  the Czech 
Republic, the Customs Administration of  the Czech Republic, the Czech 
Republic’s intelligence services, military police and other public authorities, 
if  it is necessary to perform the tasks within their jurisdiction.
(2) The Inspection shall without undue delay hand over information which 
were collected during carrying out its tasks and which can be used in course 
of  exempting a member of  security forces from a service to the Director 
of  the security forces; If  this member is the director of  a national security 
force, the inspection passes the information to his superior, Staff  officers.
(3) Inspection of  the information referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 are not 
handed over, if  it would undermine tasks of  the Inspection.
Act No. 137/2001 Sb., on special protection of  a witness and other per-
sons in connection with criminal proceedings and on change of  the 
act No. 99/1963 Sb., Civil procedure code11
Section 10a
Permission to check on a protected person
(1) If  there is given suspicion that the protected person fails to comply with 
the obligations specified in Section 6, and is unable to verify this suspicion 
in another way, the Police is authorised, to the strictly necessary extent, 
to gain knowledge in a classified manner using technical or other means. 
The Police is authorised to make sound, visual or other records, conduct 
interception of  communication and require on the person performing 
11 Informal translation made by the authors.
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telecommunications services data on telecommunications traffic, which are 
the subject of  telecommunications secrecy and subject to the protection 
of  personal and agency data.
(2) Acquisition of  audio, video or other recordings, interception and record-
ing of  telecommunications traffic and requesting data on telecommunica-
tions traffic is possible only with the prior consent of  the presiding judge 
of  the High Court into whose jurisdiction belongs the seat of  the police 
department or the prison service, which provides special protection and 
assistance. Against a decision to authorize or reject the application is not 
subject to appeal.
Act No. 153/1994 Sb., on intelligence services of  the Czech Republic12
Section 8
Reporting by Intelligence Services and tasking Intelligence Services
(3) Intelligence services report to public and police authorities informa-
tion about findings, which fall within their jurisdiction. This does not apply 
if  providing of  the information threatens important interest pursued by the 
relevant intelligence service
Section 9
Intelligence services cooperate with each other on the basis of  agreements, 
which are concluded with the consent of  the Government.
Act No. 154/1994 Sb., on Security Information Service13
Section 8
Intelligence Technology
(1) Intelligence technology for the purposes of  this Act means the techni-
cal facilities and equipment, especially electronic, photo-technical, chemical, 
physic-chemical, radio-optical, mechanical, or their files used in classified 
manner, if  it causes interference with the fundamental rights and freedoms 
in a) searching, opening, examining or evaluating transported consignments,
12 Informal translation made by the authors.
13 Informal translation made by the authors.
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b) interception or recording of  telecommunications, radio communication 
or other similar operation, or surveying data about this operation,
c) making video, audio or other records,
d) Search using technical means that could prevent or impede the fulfil-
ment of  operations within the scope of  Military Intelligence/ Security 
Information Service,
e) identification of  persons or objects, or to identify their movements using 
surveillance techniques and baits.
(2) Using intelligence technology, if  it is not interfering with fundamental 
rights and freedoms, is not
a) capturing, listening, monitoring and evaluating information, which are 
distributed in a way that allows to access them by previously undefined 
group of  persons
b) making video or audio recordings,
c) use security techniques and baits,
d) monitoring of  telecommunications, radio communication or other simi-
lar operations without tapping its content, or collecting data on the traffic.
Section 8a
The Security Information Service is entitled to the extent required for the 
performance of  a specific operation, request a legal or natural person pro-
viding a public communications network or publicly available electronic 
communications service
a) the establishment or security interface for connecting the terminal tel-
ecommunications equipment for the interception or recording messages 
at specified points of  their network, and
b) the provision of  operational and localization data, in the form and to the 
extent determined by special legislation.
Section 9
Application of  intelligence technology
(1) Intelligence technology can be used by the Security Information Service 
only when initially authorised by a written permission of  the presiding 
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judge of  the High Court in whose jurisdiction falls the Security Information 
Service (hereinafter referred to as “judge”), under assumption that detecting 
and documenting of  the activities for which is the technology to be used, 
would be ineffective or substantially more difficult or impossible, should 
it be done in a different way.
(2) Use of  intelligence technology must not exceed the scope of  the authori-
zation of  a judge under paragraph 1 and must not interfere with the rights 
and freedoms beyond what is strictly necessary.
(3) The Security Information Service can technically secure the use of  intel-
ligence technology for the needs of  other competent authorities, if  they 
so request and submit appropriate authorization for the use of  intelligence 
technology issued by a special legal regulation.
(4) The Security Information Service is entitled to demand from the other 
for such activity authorized bodies the use of  technical security intelligence 
technology for its own use. In this case, it is obliged to demonstrate that the 
use of  intelligence technology has been authorised under provision this Act.
Section 10
Authorisation to the use of  intelligence technology
(1) The judge will issue the authorisation to the use of  intelligence technol-
ogy on the basis of  written request, which includes
a) kind of  intelligence technology, which is going to be used, period of  time 
during which it is going to be used, basic identification data about the per-
son (if  known), against which the technology is going to be used, number 
of  telephone or other similar station, should it be used for the communi-
cation interception, as well as the place of  use of  intelligence technology. 
Should the intelligence technology be used against member of  government, 
member of  Parliament or judge of  the Constitutional court, or should the 
right to untouchability of  household be breached, this information must 
be included in the request;
b) reasons for the use of  intelligence technology;
c) information about any prior use of  information technology against per-
son indicated in the letter a) including the information, how was decided 
about that request.
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(2) The judge will decide about the request without delay.
(3) The use of  intelligence technology can be authorised only for the neces-
sary period of  time, at longest for 3 months. This period of  time can be pro-
longed after a new request, but maximally only for 3 more months.
(4) The decision about authorisation to use of  intelligence service includes 
kind of  intelligence technology, which is going to be used, period of  time 
during which it is going to be used, basic identification data about the person 
(if  known), against which the technology is going to be used, number of  tel-
ephone or other similar station, should it be used for the communication 
interception, as well as the place of  use of  intelligence technology.
(5) The judge issues along with the decision about authorisation to use 
of  intelligence service also an abstract made from this decision, which 
includes the necessary identification data and statement, whether by use 
of  intelligence service is breached the right to untouchability of  household. 
The abstract does not include reasoning.
(6) Should the judge deny the request for authorisation to the use of  intel-
ligence technology, the decision must contain reasoning for such decision.
(7) Appellation against the decision is not allowed.
Act No. 289/2005, on Military Intelligence14
Section 8
Intelligence Technology
(1) Intelligence technology for the purposes of  this Act means the techni-
cal facilities and equipment, especially electronic, photo-technical, chemical, 
physic-chemical, radio-optical, mechanical, or their files used in classified 
manner, if  it causes interference with the fundamental rights and freedoms 
in a) searching, opening, examining or evaluating transported consignments,
b) interception or recording of  telecommunications, radio communication 
or other similar operation, or surveying data about this operation,
c) making video, audio or other records,
14 Informal translation made by the authors.
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d) Search using technical means that could prevent or impede the fulfil-
ment of  operations within the scope of  Military Intelligence/ Security 
Information Service,
e) identification of  persons or objects, or to identify their movements using 
surveillance techniques and baits.
(2) Using intelligence technology, if  it is not interfering with fundamental 
rights and freedoms, is not
a) capturing, listening, monitoring and evaluating information, which are 
distributed in a way that allows to access them by previously undefined 
group of  persons
b) making video or audio recordings,
c) use security techniques and baits,
d) monitoring of  telecommunications, radio communication or other simi-
lar operations without tapping its content, or collecting data on the traffic.
Section 9
Application of  intelligence technology
(1) Intelligence technology can be used by The Military Intelligence only 
when initially authorised by a written permission of  the presiding judge 
of  the High Court in whose jurisdiction falls the Ministry of  Defence (here-
inafter referred to as “judge”), under assumption that detecting and docu-
menting of  the activities for which is the technology to be used, would 
be ineffective or substantially more difficult or impossible, should it be done 
in a different way.
(2) Use of  intelligence technology must not exceed the scope of  the authori-
zation of  a judge under paragraph 1 and must not interfere with the rights 
and freedoms beyond what is strictly necessary.
(3) The Military Intelligence can technically secure the use of  intelligence 
technology for the needs of  other competent authorities, if  they so request 
and submit appropriate authorization for the use of  intelligence technology 
issued by a special legal regulation.
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(4) The Military Intelligence is entitled to demand from the other for such 
activity authorized bodies the use of  technical security intelligence technol-
ogy for its own use. In this case, it is obliged to demonstrate that the use 
of  intelligence technology has been authorised under provision this Act.
(5) Military Intelligence is entitled to the extent required for the perfor-
mance of  a specific operation, request a legal or natural person providing 
a public communications network or publicly available electronic commu-
nications service
a) the establishment or security interface for connecting the terminal tel-
ecommunications equipment for the interception or recording messages 
at specified points of  their network, and
b) the provision of  operational and localization data, in the form and to the 
extent determined by special legislation.
Section 10
Authorisation to the use of  intelligence technology
(1) The judge will issue the authorisation to the use of  intelligence technol-
ogy on the basis of  written request, which includes
a) kind of  intelligence technology, which is going to be used, period of  time 
during which it is going to be used, basic identification data about the per-
son (if  known), against which the technology is going to be used, number 
of  telephone or other similar station, should it be used for the communi-
cation interception, as well as the place of  use of  intelligence technology. 
Should the intelligence technology be used against member of  government, 
member of  Parliament or judge of  the Constitutional court, or should the 
right to untouchability of  household be breached, this information must 
be included in the request;
b) reasons for the use of  intelligence technology;
c) information about any prior use of  information technology against per-
son indicated in the letter a) including the information, how was decided 
about that request.
(2) The judge will decide about the request without delay.
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(3) The use of  intelligence technology can be authorised only for the neces-
sary period of  time, at longest for 3 months. This period of  time can be pro-
longed after a new request, but maximally only for 3 more months.
(4) The decision about authorisation to use of  intelligence service includes 
kind of  intelligence technology, which is going to be used, period of  time 
during which it is going to be used, basic identification data about the person 
(if  known), against which the technology is going to be used, number of  tel-
ephone or other similar station, should it be used for the communication 
interception, as well as the place of  use of  intelligence technology.
(5) The judge issues along with the decision about authorisation to use 
of  intelligence service also an abstract made from this decision, which 
includes the necessary identification data and statement, whether by use 
of  intelligence service is breached the right to untouchability of  household. 
The abstract does not include reasoning.
(6) Should the judge deny the request for authorisation to the use of  intel-
ligence technology, the decision must contain reasoning for such decision.
(7) Appellation against the decision is not allowed.
Act No. 15/1998 Sb., on the supervision in the area of  capital market 
and change and supplementation of  some acts
Section 8
(1) The Czech National Bank is entitled for the purpose of  performance 
of  supervision over capital market to a) request, after prior written authori-
sation by the presiding judge of  the High Court under whose jurisdiction 
belongs the seat of  the Czech National Bank, from a legal or natural person 
providing a public communications network or publicly available electronic 
communications traffic and location data in accordance to special legisla-
tion, if  it can be reasonably assumed that data provided may contribute 
to the clarification of  facts important for the detection of  an administrative 
offense in the area of  business or commerce in the capital market under the 
act governing capital market undertakings, including the offender, and if  the 
pursued objective cannot be achieved differently, or if  can be achieved only 
by exerting a disproportionate effort.
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Act No. 101/2000 Sb., on personal data protection and change of  some 
acts15
Section 3
(6) The provisions of  Article 5(1) and Articles 11 and 12 of  this Act shall not 
apply to processing of  personal data necessary to fulfil obligations of  the 
controller provided by special Acts to ensure:
(a) security of  the Czech Republic,
(b) defence of  the Czech Republic,
(c) public order and internal security,
(d) prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of  criminal offences,
(e) important economic interest of  the Czech Republic or of  the European 
Union,
(f) important financial interest of  the Czech Republic or of  the European 
Union, in particular the stability of  financial market and currency, function-
ing of  currency circulation and system of  payments as well as budgetary and 
taxation measures, or (g) exercise of  control, supervision, surveillance and 
regulation related to exercise of  public authority in the cases under (c), (d), 
(e) and (f), or (h) activities related to disclosure of  files of  the former State 
Security.
Section 5
(1) The controller shall be obliged to:
(a) specify the purpose for which personal data are to be processed;
(…)
(d) collect personal data corresponding exclusively to the specified purpose 
and in an extent that is necessary for fulfilment of  the specified purpose;
(e) preserve personal data only for a period of  time that is necessary for the 
purpose of  their processing. After expiry of  this period, personal data may 
be preserved only for purposes of  the state statistical service, and for sci-
entific and archival purposes. When using personal data for these purposes, 
15 Informal translation available at https://www.uoou.cz/en/vismo/zobraz_dok.
asp?id_org=200156 & id_ktg=1107.
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it is necessary to respect the right to protection of  private and personal life 
of  the data subject from unauthorised interference and to make personal 
data anonymous as soon as possible;
(f) process personal data only in accordance with the purpose for which the 
data were collected. Personal data may be processed for some other purpose 
only within the limits of  the provisions of  Article 3(6) or if  the data subject 
granted his consent herewith in advance;
(…)
(h) ensure that personal data that were obtained for different purposes are 
not grouped.
(2) The controller may process personal data only with the consent of  data 
subject. Without such consent, the controller may process the data:
(a) if  he is carrying out processing which is essential to comply with legal 
obligation of  the controller;
(b) if  the processing is essential for fulfilment of  a contract to which the 
data subject is a contracting party or for negotiations on conclusion or alter-
ation of  a contract negotiated on the proposal of  the data subject;
(c) if  it is essential for the protection of  vitally important interests of  the 
data subject. In this case, the consent of  data subject must be obtained with-
out undue delay. If  the consent is not granted, the controller must terminate 
the processing and liquidate the data;
(d) in relation to personal data that were lawfully published in accordance 
with special legislation. However, this shall not prejudice the right to the pro-
tection of  private and personal life of  the data subject, or (e) if  it is essential 
for the protection of  rights and legitimate interests of  the controller, recipi-
ent or other person concerned. However, such personal data processing may 
not be in contradiction with the right of  the data subject to protection of  his 
private and personal life.
(f) if  he provides personal data on a publicly active person, official 
or employee of  public administration that reveals information on their pub-
lic or administrative activity, their functional or working position, or (g) if  the 
processing relates exclusively to archival purposes pursuant to a special Act.
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(3) If  the controller processes personal data on the basis of  a special Act, 
he shall be obliged to respect the right to protection of  private and personal 
life of  the data subject.
Section 12
Data subject’s access to information
(1) If  the data subject requests information on the processing of  his per-
sonal data, the controller shall be obliged to provide him with this informa-
tion without undue delay.
(2) The contents of  the information shall always report on:
(a) the purpose of  personal data processing;
(b) the personal data or categories of  personal data that are subject of  pro-
cessing including all available information on their source;
(c) the character of  the automated processing in relation to its use for deci-
sion-making, if  acts or decisions are taken on the basis of  this processing 
the content of  which is an interference with the data subject’s rights and 
legitimate interests;
(d) the recipients or categories of  recipients.
(3) For provision of  this information the controller shall be entitled 
to require a reasonable reimbursement not exceeding the costs necessary for 
provision of  information.
(4) The controller’s obligation to provide the data subject with informa-
tion pursuant to Article 12 may be met by a processor on behalf  of  the 
controller.
Act No. 412/2005 Sb. on protection of  secret information and security
Section 107
Acts in the proceeding on issuance of  person-
nel security clearance certificates
(3) In the proceedings on issuance of  personnel security clearance certifi-
cates for the Top Secret degree the Office (National Security Authority) 
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shall conduct all the acts according to the paragraph 2 and furthermore 
it requests competent intelligence service to conduct an examination of  pos-
sible security risks in the environment, in which the subject operates
Decree No. 336/2005 Sb. on technical and operational conditions and 
points of  connection of  the telecommunications equipment for inter-
ception and recording of  telecommunications traffic
Section 7
(1) A legal entity or a natural person providing a public communications 
network or a publicly available electronic communications service (herein-
after referred to as “operator”) shall equip their network or service with 
interface for connecting devices for interception on the basis of  a request 
from a competent authority.
(2) If  the operator is developing a new network or service, significantly 
expanding or changing the existing network or service, they shall prompt 
the competent authority to issue a request for equipping the network or ser-
vice with an interface for connecting interception devices. The competent 
authority shall issue the request within 15 days from the prompting.
(3) On the basis of  request issued according to the paragraph 1 or 2, the 
operator in cooperation with the competent authority shall propose pos-
sible technical solutions, including the reasons for their implementation and 
a calculation of  the cost of  each solution.
(4) The chosen solution and its parameters shall be specified in a record 
jointly elaborated by the competent authority and the operator. The record 
shall also include a calculation of  financial costs and the method and sched-
ule of  the payment.
Packet networks outputs
Section 13
(1) The output of  the network or service is provided via
a) a hard data link, or
b) a secure virtual channel on the Internet using the standardized communi-
cation protocol FTP, server shall be provided by a competent authority and 
operator should connect as a client.
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(2) The sent data unit shall be equipped with an identifier of  user address 
and a serial number or a time stamp. The data integrity of  the data unit shall 
be ensured by creating a file stamp using the hash function SHA-1.
(3) During the interception of  emails, the operator may, with consent from 
the competent authority, send copies of  messages using protocol for trans-
ferring email to the SMTP server provided by the competent authority.
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